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Why episodic memory may not be for communication

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 January 2018

Felipe De Brigard
Department of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708. Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708. Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708. Duke Institute for Brain Sciences, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708.
Bryce Gessell
Department of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708.


Three serious challenges to Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) proposal are presented. First, we argue that the epistemic attitude that they claim is unique to remembering also applies to some forms of imaginative simulations that aren't memories. Second, we argue that their account cannot accommodate critical neuropsychological evidence. Finally, we argue that their proposal looks unconvincing when compared to more parsimonious evolutionary accounts.

Open Peer Commentary
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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