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True to the power of one? Cognition, argument, and reasoning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 March 2011

Drew Michael Khlentzos
Affiliation:
Language and Cognition Research Centre, Psychology, School of Behavioural, Cognitive and Social Sciences, University of New England, Armidale 2351, Australia. dkhlentz@une.edu.auhttp://www.une.edu.au/staff/dkhlentz.phpbstevens@une.edu.auhttp://www.une.edu.au/staff/bstevens.php
Bruce Stevenson
Affiliation:
Language and Cognition Research Centre, Psychology, School of Behavioural, Cognitive and Social Sciences, University of New England, Armidale 2351, Australia. dkhlentz@une.edu.auhttp://www.une.edu.au/staff/dkhlentz.phpbstevens@une.edu.auhttp://www.une.edu.au/staff/bstevens.php

Abstract

While impressed by much of what Mercier & Sperber (M&S) offer through their argumentative hypothesis, we question whether the specific competencies entailed in each system are adequate. In particular, whether system 2 might not require independent reasoning capabilities. We explore the adequacy of the explanations offered for confirmation bias and the Wason selection task.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

Crain, S. & Khlentzos, D. (2010) The logic instinct. Mind and Language 25(1):3065.Google Scholar