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A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 November 2002

J. Kevin O'Regan
Affiliation:
Laboratoire de Psychologie Expérimentale, Centre National de Recherche Scientifique, Université René Descartes, 92774 Boulogne Billancourt, France oregan@ext.jussieu.fr http://nivea.psycho.univ-paris5.fr
Alva Noë
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of California at Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA 95064 anoe@cats.ucsc.edu http://www2.ucsc.edu/people/anoe/

Abstract

Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual “filling in,” visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press

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