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Generative models as parsimonious descriptions of sensorimotor loops

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2019

Manuel Baltieri
EASY Group – Sussex Neuroscience, Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, BrightonBN1 9RH, United Kingdom.
Christopher L. Buckley
EASY Group – Sussex Neuroscience, Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, BrightonBN1 9RH, United Kingdom.


The Bayesian brain hypothesis, predictive processing, and variational free energy minimisation are typically used to describe perceptual processes based on accurate generative models of the world. However, generative models need not be veridical representations of the environment. We suggest that they can (and should) be used to describe sensorimotor relationships relevant for behaviour rather than precise accounts of the world.

Open Peer Commentary
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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