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An example of access-consciousness without phenomenal consciousness?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Joseph E. Bogen
Department of Neurological Surgery, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90033-4620


Both Block and the commentators who accepted his P versus A distinction readily recognize examples of P without A but not vice versa. As an example of A without P, Block hypothesized a “zombie,” computationally like a human but without subjectivity. This would appear to describe the disconnected right hemisphere of the split-brain subject, unless one alternatively opts for two parallel mechanisms for P?

Continuing Commentary
© 1997 Cambridge University Press

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