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Self-Judging Security Exception Clause as a Kind of Carte Blanche in Investment Treaties: Nature, Effect and Proper Standard of Review
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 June 2022
Abstract
In investment treaties, the self-judging security exception clause allows states to restrict the exercise of investors’ rights and protections provided for by such treaties during security emergencies. During the last decade, such a clause has been included in numerous investment treaties to support state positions vis-à-vis foreign investors. States consider that this provision gives them a very broad discretion to limit or derogate from obligations which arise under the treaty. In this article, after having identified the self-judging character of this clause, it will be demonstrated that such a clause does not affect the jurisdiction of the tribunal but requires the tribunal to apply the principle of good faith as the proper standard of review to interpret the elements of the clause, preventing states’ abuse of such a clause.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Asian Society of International Law
References
1 According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database, since 2005, 148 investment agreements have included self-judging security exception clauses, see generally: UNCTAD, “International Investment Agreements Navigator”, online: UNCTAD <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements>.
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5 United States-South Korea, Free Trade Agreement 2007 Art. 23.2.
6 United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, 22 November 2006 (entered into force 15 May 2012), art. 22.2.
7 United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, 12 April 2006 U.S.-Peru TP Art. 22.2.
8 United States-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement, 28 June 2007 U.S.-Panama TPA Art. 21.2.
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13 Ibid.
14 In some treaties, particularly in the paragraph related to the non-disclosure of information, the phrase “it determines to” has been used to express the self-judging character. See for example, the 2012 US Model BIT, art. 18; Canada Model BIT 2004, art. 10; Treaty Between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 4 November 2005 (entered into force 31 October 2006), art. 18.
15 1987 US Model BIT; Treaty Between United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 14 November 1991 (entered into force 20 October 1994) [US-Argentina BIT].
16 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment, 27 June 1986, [1986] I.C.J. Rep. 14 at 116, para 222.
17 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 17 June 1992 (not in force), Protocol para 8.
18 Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Mozambique Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 1 December 1998 (entered into force 3 March 2005), art. 14.
19 In this regard, the following treaties contain an explicit self-judging security exception clause: Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of El Salvador Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 10 March 1999 (not in force), art. 14; Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the State of Bahrain Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 29 September 1999 (entered into force 30 May 2001), art. 14; Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of A Free-Trade Area, 24 October 2000 (entered into force 17 December 2001), art. 12.
20 2004 U.S. Model BIT 2004 Art. 18; 2012 U.S. Model BIT Art. 18.
21 EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, 17 July 2018 (entered into force 1 February 2019), art. 1.5; EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement, 19 October 2018 (entered into force 21 November 2019), art. 4.5; EU-Viet Nam Investment Protection Agreement, 30 June 2019 (not in force), art. 4.8; Agreement Among the Government of Japan, the Government of the Republic Of Korea and the Government of the People's Republic Of China for the Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of Investment, 13 May 2012 (entered into force 17 May 2014), art. 18; Agreement between the Kingdom of Morocco and Japan for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, 8 January 2020 (not in force), art. 21; Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Republic of Colombia, 17 March 2010 (entered into force 10 October 2014), art. 4; Agreement between Japan and the Islamic Republic of Iran on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment, 5 February 2016 (entered into force 26 April 2017), art. 13; Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the Islamic Republic of Iran for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 19 January 2016 (entered into force 30 August 2017), art. 12.
22 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 61 Stat. A-II, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 at art. XXI.
23 Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Between the Republic of France and the Djibouti Republic, 27 September 1986 (entered into force 1 August 1992), art. 2.
24 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 13 December 2007 (entered into force 01 December 2009), art. 346.
25 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (n 16) para 222.
26 Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment, 4 June 2008, [2008] I.C.J. Rep. 177 at 229, para 145; Alain Pellet, “La jurisprudence de la Cour Internationale de Justice dans les sentences CIRDI” [2014] Journal du Droit international 5.
27 See US-Argentina BIT, supra note 15 at art. 11 (“This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the Protection of its own essential security interests”).
28 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, Award, 12 May 2005, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 at para 370 [CMS v. Argentina].
29 Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, Award, 22 May 2007, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 at para 335 [Enron v. Argentina]; Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine Republic, Award, 28 September 2007, ICSID ARB/02/16 at para 383 [Sempra v. Argentina].
30 Deutsche Telekom AG v. India, Interim Award, 13 December 2017, PCA Case No. 2014-10 at para 231.
31 BLANCO, Sebastián M. and PEHL, Alexander, National Security Exceptions in International Trade and Investment Agreements: Justiciability and Standards of Review (Cham: Springer, 2020) 45–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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33 Ibid.
34 Sempra v. Argentina, supra note 29 at para 385.
35 Mobil Exploration and Development Inc. Suc. Argentina and Mobil Argentina S.A. v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 10 April 2013, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/16 at para 1037 [Mobil v. Argentina].
36 Vandevelde, Kenneth J, ‘Of Politics and Markets: The Shifting Ideology of the BITs’ (1993) 11 Int'l Tax & Bus. Law. 159, 171Google Scholar.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., at 172.
39 2004 U.S. Model BIT Art. 18; 2012 U.S. Model BIT Art. 18.
40 In the Letter of Submittal of the US-Azerbaijan BIT, it was clarified that “measures to protect a Party's essential security interests are self-judging in nature, although each Party would expect the provisions to be applied by the other in good faith”: “Letter of Submittal of U.S.-Azerbaijan BIT, Department of State” (8 September 2000) <https://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/43478.pdf>.
41 VANDEVELDE, Kenneth J., US International Investment Agreements (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 203Google Scholar; JUILLARD, Patrick, L’évolution des sources du droit des investissements (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994)Google Scholar.
42 Burke-White and Von Staden (n 3) 381–6. Professor William Burke-White has served as an expert witness for the Government of the Argentina in some financial crisis cases.
43 Ibid., at 381.
44 Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic, Award, 5 September 2008, ICSID ARB/03/9 at para 183, n 272 [Continental Casualty v. Argentina].
45 Case of the S.S. “Wimbledon” (United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan v. Germany), Judgment, Dissenting Opinion by Judge Anzilotti and Judge Huber, 17 August 1923, [1923] P.C.I.J. 35 (ser. A) No. 1 at 37, para 3.
46 Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine Republic, Opinion of José E Alvarez, 12 September 2005, ICSID ARB/02/16 at 27 [Sempra v. Argentina, Opinion of José E Alvarez]; ALVAREZ, José and KHAMSI, Kathryn, The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment Regime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 36–9Google Scholar.
47 Sempra v. Argentina, Opinion of José E Alvarez, supra note 46 at paras 44–5.
48 Vandevelde (n 36) 172.
49 Ibid., at 173.
50 Ibid., at 174–5.
51 Mobil v. Argentina, supra note 35 at para 1038.
52 El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, Award, 31 October 2011, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15 at paras 602–3 [El Paso v. Argentina].
53 Sempra v. Argentina (n 29) para 385. The tribunal added that “not even if this is the interpretation given to the clause today by the United States would this necessarily mean that such an interpretation governs the Treaty”.
54 El Paso v. Argentina, supra note 52 at paras 602–3.
55 Ibid., at 609.
56 Mobil v. Argentina, supra note 35 at para 1055.
57 Ibid.
58 It should be noted that in the case of cross investment based on a BIT, the answer to this question would be complicated and more controversial.
59 Sempra v. Argentina (n 29) para 386; Enron v. Argentine (n 29) para 337.
60 El Paso v. Argentina, supra note 52 at para 604.
61 Henckels, Caroline, ‘Permission to Act: The Legal Character of General and Security Exceptions in International Trade and Investment Law’ (2020) 69 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 561CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
62 Ibid.
63 Wolfgang Alschner and Kun Hui, ‘Missing in Action: General Public Policy Exceptions in Investment Treaties’ 375–6.
64 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (n 16) para 221.
65 Ibid., at paras 221–2; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objection submitted by the United States of America, 16 December 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep. at paras 3.36–3.42; Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 13 February 2019, [2019] I.C.J. Rep. 7 at paras 40–7 [Certain Iranian Assets]; Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order, 3 October 2018, [2018] I.C.J. Rep. 623 at paras 34–44 [Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights].
66 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (n 16) para 222. In the other three cases mentioned above between Iran and the United States over a similar clause with the same formulation, the Court affirmed its jurisdiction by referring to its previous jurisprudence in the Nicaragua case. See Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 12 December 1996, [1996] I.C.J. Rep. 803 at para 20 [Oil Platforms, Preliminary Objections Judgment]; Certain Iranian Assets, supra note 65 at paras 45–7; Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, supra note 65 at para 41; Sophie LEMAIRE, “L'arbitrage d'investissement et la restructuration de dettes souveraines (de l'expérience Argentine au cas Grec)” [2014] Revue de l'arbitrage: Bulletin du Comité français de l'arbitrage 53.
67 Oil Platforms (n 66) para 20.
68 The ICJ remarked that the treaty did not contain any article that excluded national security matters from the Court's jurisdiction: Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (n 65) paras 41–2.
69 Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (n 26) paras 136–8.
70 Ibid., at 145.
71 In GATT and WTO dispute settlement practice, some states supported this argument regarding Article XXI of the GATT as either a jurisdictional bar or as a non-justiciable matter. For a detailed discussion of these cases, see Michael J Hahn, ‘Vital Interests and the Law of GATT: An Analysis of GATT's Security Exception’ (1990) 12 Mich. J. Int'l L. 558; Roger P Alford, ‘The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception’ [2011] Utah L. Rev. 697; GATT, Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice, vol 1 (6th edn, 1995).
72 The panel's report to the Contracting Parties, which is not adopted, in the dispute between the United States and Nicaragua regarding the review and application of Article XXI stated that “if it were accepted that the interpretation of Article XXI was reserved entirely to the contracting party invoking it, how could the Contracting Parties ensure that this general exception to all obligations under the General Agreement is not invoked excessively or for purposes other than those set out in this provision?”: WTO, United States: Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, Report of the Panel (Unadopted) (13 October 1986) GATT Doc L/6053, paras 7.101–7.102.
73 WTO, Russia: Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit (Report of the Panel, WT/ DS512/ R) [7.101–7.102].
74 Ibid., at para 7.138.
75 WTO, Saudi Arabia: Measures concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, Report of the Panel, WT/DS567/8, para 7.283.
76 For instance, in the LG&E case, the tribunal held that “[w]ere the Tribunal to conclude that the provision is self-judging, Argentina's determination would be subject to a good faith review anyway, which does not significantly differ from the substantive analysis presented here”, see LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, ICSID Case ARB/02/1 at para 214. Sempra v. Argentina, supra note 29 at para 388 [LG&E v. Argentina]; Continental Casualty v. Argentina, supra note 44 at para 182; Enron v. Argentina, supra note 29 at para 339; CC/Devas v. India, Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, 25 July 2016, PCA Case No. 2013–09 at para 219; Deutsche Telekom AG v. India, supra note 30 at para 206.
77 Michael D Nolan and Frédéric G Sourgens, ‘The Limits of Discretion? Self-Judging Emergency Clauses in International Investment Agreements’ [2011] The Limits of Discretion 25, 44.
78 Grimmett, Jeanne J, Dispute Settlement in the US-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) (Washington, USA: Congressional Research Service, 2012) 2Google Scholar.
79 Vandevelde (n 36) 177.
80 Note UNCTAD, The Protection of National Security in IIAs (Geneva, Switzerland: UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development, 2009) 95.
81 India-Singapore, Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement 2005 Art. 6.12.
82 Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, Separate Opinion of Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, 6 July 1957, [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 48.
83 Vandevelde (n 36) 180.
84 Ibid.
85 By employing the term “standard”, we mean clauses whose interpretation is based solely on the text of the treaty and whose meaning cannot be determined by other means such as subsequent practice or supplementary means. Accordingly, I exclude, for example, treaty provisions that may have been imported from a standard template but are explicitly negotiated over, since the negotiation process itself may provide important travaux préparatoires that can inform the meaning of terms employed in treaties.
86 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (n 16) para 224.
87 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States), Judgment, 6 November 2003, [2003] I.C.J. Rep. 161 at para 73.
88 CMS v. Argentina, supra note 28 at para 340; Continental Casualty v. Argentina, supra note 44 at para 170; Sempra v. Argentina, supra note 29 at para 372.
89 CMS v. Argentina, supra note 28 at paras 349, 352; Continental Casualty v. Argentina, supra note 44 at para 172.
90 El Paso v. Argentine (n 54) para 611.
91 Continental Casualty v. Argentine (n 44) para 175.
92 LG&E v. Argentine (n 76) para 238. Moreover, the CMS tribunal, by interpreting the text of the treaty, showed that there was nothing in the object and purpose of the treaty that could exclude economic crisis form the scope of the article in question: CMS v. Argentina, supra note 28 at para 359.
93 Deutsche Telekom AG v India (n 30) para 234; CC/Devas v. India (n 76) para 221.
94 CC/Devas v. India (n 76) para 244; Deutsche Telekom AG v India (n 30) para 235.
95 CC/Devas v. India (n 76) para 245.
96 Deutsche Telekom AG v India (n 30) para 235.
97 Ibid., at 235–6.
98 Ibid., at 235.
99 SCHLOEMANN, Hannes L. and OHLHOFF, Stefan, “‘Constitutionalization’ and Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence” (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 424, 444, 448CrossRefGoogle Scholar; For a general study, see PELLET, Alain, ‘35. Notes sur la ≪fragmentation≫ du droit international: Droit des investissements internationaux et droits de l'homme’, Unité et diversité du droit international/Unity and Diversity of International Law (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2014)Google Scholar.
100 WTO, Russia: Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit (n 73) para 7.130.
101 Ibid., at 7.131.
102 Ibid., at 7.132.
103 WTO, Saudi Arabia: Measures concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (n 75) para 7.281.
104 Andreas Von Staden, ‘Deference or No Deference, That Is the Question: Legitimacy and Standards of Review in Investor-state Arbitration – Investment Treaty News’ (22 December 2020) <https://www.iisd.org/itn/en/2012/07/19/deference-or-no-deference-that-is-the-question-legitimacy-and-standards-of-review-in-investor-state-arbitration/> accessed 22 December 2020.
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106 Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951–54: General Principles and Sources of Law’ (1953) 30 Brit. YB Int'l l. 1, 212, 225–7.
107 Martin Dawidowicz, ‘The Effect of the Passage of Time on the Interpretation of Treaties: Some Reflections on Costa Rica v. Nicaragua’ (2011) 24 LJIL 201, 206.
108 WTO, United States: Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS58/AB/R, para 130.
109 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights Between the United States and Austria, 19 June 1928 (entered into force 27 May 1931), art. VII.
110 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights Between The United States of America and Iran, 15 August 1955 (entered into force 16 June 1957), art. XX.
111 Summary Record of the 33rd Meeting of Commission A, Economic and Social Council, “UN Doc. E/PC/T/A/SR/ 33”, 33rd Meeting.
112 Hahn (n 71) 580.
113 “Letter of Submittal of U.S.-Lithuania BIT, Department of state” (5 September 2000) 13 <http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/US_Lithuania_e.asp>.
114 Treaty Between the United States of America and Ukraine Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 4 March 1994 (entered into force 16 November 1996), art. IX.
115 Moon (n 105) 497.
116 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 16 at para 224.
117 Moon (n 105) 499.
118 Ibid., 501.
119 Ibid.
120 WTO, Saudi Arabia: Measures concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 76 at para 7.281.
121 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, vol 2 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 105.
122 Ibid.
123 Burke-White and Von Staden (n 3) 378–9.
124 Robert KOLB, La bonne foi en droit international public: Contribution à l’étude des principes généraux de droit (Genève: Presses universitaires de France, 2000) para 68, second part.
125 Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (n 26) para 145.
126 Ibid., at 147–8, 202.
127 Schill and Briese (n 2) 116.
128 Ibid., at 118.
129 Declaration (Separate Opinion) of Judge Keith, Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters ((Djibouti v France), Judgment, ICJ Reports) 279.
130 Ibid.
131 WTO, Russia: Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit (n 73) para 7.138.
132 Ibid., at 7.139.
133 Ibid., at 7.144.
134 Ibid., 7.142, 7.144.
135 WTO, Saudi Arabia: Measures concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (n 75) para 7.292.
136 Ibid., 7.286.
137 Ibid., 7.293. BeoutQ was the broadcasting entity and, in 2017, began the unauthorized distribution and streaming of media content that is created by or licensed to beIN. The panel first held that the non-application of criminal procedures or penalties to beoutQ by Saudi Arabia violates Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement: Ibid., 2.2.4, 7.224.
138 UN International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of states for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries’ (2001) 2 Yearbook of the international law commission. For a comprehensive discussion on the proportionality in international investment law, see Benedict KINGSBURY and Stephan SCHILL, “Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest—the Concept of Proportionality” (2010) 75 International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law 97; BÜCHELER, Gebhard, Proportionality in Investor-State Arbitration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; PELLET, Alain, “Les Articles de la CDI sur la responsabilité de l’État pour fait internationalement illicite. suite-et fin?” (2002) 48 Annuaire français de droit international 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
139 Eisenhut, Dominik, ‘Sovereignty, National Security and International Treaty Law. The Standard of Review of International Courts and Tribunals with Regard to'Security Exceptions’’ (2010) 48 Archiv des Völkerrechts 431, 456–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schloemann and Ohlhoff (n 99) 443.
140 Case C-41497, Commission v. Spain [1999] ECR I-05585, para 22; Case T-26/01, Fiocchi Munizioni v. Commission [2003] ECR II-3953.
141 Otabek Ismailov, ‘The Necessity Defense in International Investment Law’ (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada, 2017) 323.
142 KURTZ, Jürgen, “Adjudging the Exceptional at International Investment Law: Security, Public Order and Financial Crisis” (2010) 59 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 325, 370CrossRefGoogle Scholar; LEBEN, Charles, “La responsabilité internationale de l’État sur le fondement des traités de promotion et de protection des investissements” (2004) 50 Annuaire français de droit international 683CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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144 Ibid., at 386.
145 Ibid., at 389–90.
146 Ibid., at 389.
147 Ibid., at 390.
148 Kolb (n 124) para 69,78.
149 Schill and Briese (n 2) 125–38.
150 Ibid., at 125.
151 Ibid., at 126.
152 Ibid., at 127.
153 Ibid., at 137.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid., at Schill and Briese (n 2) 128–31.
156 Ibid., at 131–2.
157 Kolb, Robert, “Principles as Sources of International Law (with Special Reference to Good Faith)” (2006) 53 Netherlands International Law Review 1, 13–14CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Burke-White and Von Staden (n 3) 379–80. The later scholars have stated that good faith encompasses two basic elements: honest and fair dealing – reasonableness.
158 Kolb (n 157) 14.
159 Ibid., at 17.
160 Ibid., at 17–19.
161 Kolb, La bonne foi en droit international public: Contribution à l’étude des principes généraux de droit, supra note 125 at para 115; LEBEN, Charles, “L'etat de nécessité dans le droit international de l'investissement” (2005) 19 Gazette de Palais 349Google Scholar.
162 Kolb, Kolb (n 157) 16; Kolb (n 124) para 127.
163 Ismailov (n 141) 312–3.