There are probably few members of the learned professions who do not feel the urge to contribute, if they can, to the existing store of knowledge regarding their chosen field, or, more ambitious still, to advance yet further that body of thought constituting the fundamental principles by which it is sought to interpret the data dealt with, to trace relationships between cause and effect, to distinguish the essential from the non-essential, to evaluate action by results—in a word, to give philosophic coherence to what would otherwise be disconnected and unrelated thinking.

In the case of many, this urge is supplemented by a positive obligation. Those holding academic positions calling for the direction of students engaged in advanced or postgraduate work, and those at the head of institutions of research, not only have the desire themselves to engage in work of original research, but are under the responsibility of encouraging, if not compelling, work of a like character by others.

Public opinion in democracies should be the final element in political life which gives significance to the activity of the state and the fact of membership in it. The recognition of the force of opinion implies that in the overflowing of the individual's will to his neighbor's will, in the desire to administer the things common to wills, we have perhaps one of the most basic psychological foundations of the state. While one may contend that the problems of the nature of the state or of jurisprudence are more than adequately conceptualized, this certainly cannot be said of public opinion. Yet since the very early use of the term by John of Salisbury in 1159, its significance in human history has not been less than that of justice, liberty, or law. It is suggested that a statement of the elements which appear to be universal is the proper first step in the scientific study of public opinion. The method here proposed may seem barren of immediate results, but it is necessary to clarify reasoning on public opinion as force-ideas in political history. Commonly understood abstractions are necessary to pave the way for organized thinking and action.

The broad use of the “dictatorial” powers granted by the German constitution to the president and the widespread popular demand for constitutional and administrative reform are the two dominant themes of political discussion in Germany today. Both are centered in the problem of what place the executive power occupies, and should occupy, in the German constitutional order. In this age of dictatorship and national concentration, the question is by no means peculiar to Germany. But the German situation contains a number of unusual features which it is the object of this paper to make more vivid and understandable. To this end, I shall first sketch the earlier history of a rather independent executive, then show the place of the executive power in the ordinary parliamentary system of the Weimar constitution, and finally discuss the emergence of a more independent executive under the presidential emergency power.

The world today is appallingly interesting. It is interesting, because it is changing so fast. It is appalling, because almost every change we have witnessed in the course of the last years has been a change for the worse. As mankind is ever proceeding from the past, through the present, toward the future, all change may, in the purely dynamic sense of the term, be called progress. If, however, we seek to estimate the value of change in terms of human welfare, as also if we consider it in the light of the goals pursued, the most significant recent changes in the political and economic spheres are clearly reactionary.

For generations, and in some cases for centuries, ail nations within the orbit of our Western civilization have, through wars and revolutions, been striving to secure for all their members greater physical and moral security, greater political equality, greater individual freedom. Greater security—that is, more assured protection against the violence of their fellow-citizens and against the arbitrary oppression of their governments. Greater equality—that is, less discrimination on grounds of race, of sex, of religious and philosophical creed and of social position. Greater freedom—that is, more latitude for the self-expression and self-assertion of the individual in the face of the authority of tradition and of the state. Guarantees for the protection of the fundamental rights of man, the abolition of arrest without trial and of imprisonment for debt, the suppression of slavery, the extension of the suffrage to all and thereby the subordination of the government to the will of the people (that is, of the majority of all the people), parliamentary control of the budget (that is, no taxation without representation), the recognition of freedom of thought, of speech, of assembly, of the press, the independence of the judiciary and the autonomy of the university—such are some of the ideals for which our fathers, grandfathers, and great-grandfathers fought, bled, and died. Such are some of the conquests of human dignity over barbarism, of knowledge over ignorance, of right over might, which they triumphantly achieved and which they proudly bequeathed to us.

The place of the Diet in the Japanese constitutional system is a subject of some controversy. Jurists of the old school, typified by the teachings of Hozumi, tend to minimize the representative character of the legislature and to magnify the limitations of its authority, while the new school, led by Minobe, stresses the possibility of parliamentary development.

The basic difference between the two schools is found in their respective attitudes toward the theory of separation of powers. Hozumi holds that the kokutai, or fundamental nature of the Japanese state, is unique. The Emperor is not merely an organ of the state. He is the state. He retains the tochi-ken, the authority of his ancestors, or sovereignty in the modern sense. The tochi-ken is supreme, perfect, and indivisible. The exercise of this authority, however, takes a three-fold form, namely, as gyosei-ken, or the executive power, rippo-ken, or the legislative power, the shiho-ken, or the judicial power.

Students of international relations are concerned with the description, prediction, and control of the external behavior of states, particularly of their more violent types of behavior such as intervention, hostilities, and war. It is clear that mere description of a diplomatic or military event has little meaning by itself and that such an event can neither be predicted nor controlled unless account is taken of the circumstances which preceded it within each of the states involved. Among the internal circumstances which have been studied are the correspondence of statesmen, the declarations of legislatures, executives, foreign offices, and political parties, the prescriptions of constitutional law and procedure, the traditional policies manifested by the history of the state, and the understandings of treaty and international law accepted by the community of nations at the time and presumably by the states involved.

It is in connection with Occam's elaborate theory of property that we can most readily grasp the importance of his theory of higher law, particularly as embodied in the jus gentium. We must, therefore, investigate this subject in considerable detail.

In Occam's view, God is originally the source of all property. But, as in the case of law and government, this is true only in the most general and indirect sense. Most property rights arise from human law and only mediately from God, although in a few special cases such rights follow directly from special divine ordination or from lex divina. Occam cites a passage from St. Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theol. II, II, Qu. 44, Art. 2) stating that separate possessions are not according to natural law but are founded upon human or positive law, and are added to natural law through the exercise of human reason. In the primal condition of mankind, or in the state of innocence in the Garden of Eden, all property was common and none was discrete or private. Before Eve came, Adam had only a de facto right of user and no greater right of private property than a sole remaining monk would have in the property of a monastery.

In the juristic sphere, the Interstate Commerce Commission is charged with enforcing and interpreting certain statutes, hearing and weighing evidence, and rendering formal judgment when the facts have been ascertained. But the recognized judicial character of this work does not render the Commission immune from efforts to influence its judgments. The struggles of contending economic groups and political influences give rise to actions intolerable in a court of law and to repeated efforts to obtain favorable decisions through the use of propaganda. The Commission performs its duties in surroundings far from neutral, and must cope with pressures too powerful to be exorcised by simple exhortation or condemnation. The problem is one of canalizing influences which cannot be eliminated, to the end that they may increase rather than decrease the efficiency of the administrative process and that the public interest may not be submerged in the undertow of sectional and political cross-currents.

A conflict of interests is implicit in most administrative problems, and the successful adjustment of these forces within a predicated legal framework means that the purpose of the governmental agency has been achieved. This consummation is beset with difficulties. The interplay of economic and political influences must be examined in connection with the statutory and formalistic competence of a given governmental bureau if any understanding of the process of administration is to be obtained. Only if the problem is first narrowed to one field, and then focussed upon a single agency, can the component factors be brought to direct and concrete analysis. An effort will be made here to examine the Interstate Commerce Commission in terms of the group pressures that are exerted upon it in its regulatory capacity. The purpose is to discuss the nature of the relations that arise between a regulatory body and the interests touched by its authority and to call attention to the possibilities and problems inherent in such a contact. In short, What political and economic forces make up the environment of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and how does it adapt itself to this environment?

In his instructions to the second Philippine Commission, President McKinley designated “the establishment of a system to secure an efficient civil service” as one of the first tasks that this body should undertake upon its assumption of legislative power in September, 1900. Pursuant to the direction of the president, one of the earliest statutes enacted by the Commission—the fifth—was a civil service law. Many other statements and actions reveal that virtually all of the Americans who were primarily responsible for the establishment of modernized political institutions in the Philippine Islands recognized that a civil service based upon the merit system and divorced from politics was essential to the success of the program of the United States in its great Oriental dependency. Today the character of the Philippine civil service is one of the criteria by which the results of that program may be judged.

As part of a study of this institution, the writer has made inquiry into the antecedents, the education, and the careers of the higher administrative officials of the Philippine government. Data were secured from the service records of 56 of the under-secretaries, bureau chiefs, and assistant chiefs, and in almost every instance was supplemented by a personal interview.

In his classic book, Human Nature in Politics, published in 1908, Graham Wallas said: “We must aim at finding as many relevant and measurable facts about human nature as possible, and we must attempt to make all of them serviceable in political reasoning.” While the point of view which Wallas expressed at that time has by no means been universally accepted, and is today challenged by men like Charles A. Beard, certain steps have been taken toward its recognition.

Wallas was particularly impressed by the successful use of quantitative methods made by the economists, and well he might be. To mention a single case, the work of F. Y. Edgeworth, in the measurement of utility, the algebraical or diagrammatic determination of economic equilibriums, and the application of the theory of probability to sampling and in the measurement of economic value or index numbers, showed the trend of the times in economics. The twentieth century has marked an acceleration of this trend. Political scientists have not only lagged far behind the economists in the use of statistics, but they have shown important resistance in some sections to following in this general direction. What is the explanation of this situation?

One of the best known members of the bench in the United States raised the query whether constitutional law was not becoming so textual and so formal in its applications that it was losing touch with the realities of life. For the operations of government to be “cabined and confined” under ordinary circumstances raises difficulties not readily surmounted; but in times of unusual stress, either constitutional limitations unduly restrict urgent and necessary action or they must be ignored to permit emergency measures. A resumé of the decisions of state and federal courts affecting state constitutions for the year 1932–33 indicates the tendency both toward undue formality in interpretation and toward the warping of the constitutional mold to sanction ways and means of dealing with extraordinary conditions. Law, like life, is a matter of growth, and, as Lord Bryce long since observed, under written constitutions ways of growth must be found either within or without the provisions of fundamental laws.

The “new deal” has received resounding praise from the public press. Newspaper editors, however, have not always hailed the spokesman of it so heartily. Indeed, one is tempted to suggest that the present acclaim arises in some part from the fact that prompt and decisive action came as a distinct and dramatic surprise to those who had expected little. However that may be, the following survey of opinions of newspaper editors made during last fall's presidential campaign presents an interesting contrast with current editorial expression.

This is the latest and most comprehensive of the series of studies promoted or patronized by Mr. Hoover, which began in 1921 with the report on “Waste in Industry.” In September, 1929, the President called upon a group of leading social scientists to examine recent social trends with a view to preparing such a report “as might supply a basis for the formulation of large national policies looking to the next phase in the nation's development.” This was an ambitious undertaking, more ambitious than any of those which had preceded it. But the President believed firmly in the method of fact-finding by commission, as was demonstrated by the contemporaneous creation of the Wickersham Commission. This belief appeared to be justified by the accomplishments of previous commissions, especially the commission whose report on “Recent Economic Changes” was then approaching completion. Be that as it may, it was logical that the series of studies should culminate with a broader view of the great society which constitutes the American community. For the purpose of making this survey, President Hoover secured the services of six expert investigators whose past performances had gained for them the confidence of American students of the social sciences. Among them there was a thoroughly competent representative of political science. There was also assurance of adequate financial support. Thus the enterprise began with a good prospect of achieving whatever it might be practicable to achieve in the existing state of the social sciences.

One of the most persistent legends in American politics is that municipal machines cannot be defeated. Yet time and again they have been split from the inside, successfully overthrown by opposition organizations, and overwhelmed by the joint action of rival political, civic, and protest groups. On many occasions the political machine of New York City has been checked, chastened, and disrupted. On November 7, the allied forces of Fusion administered a crushing defeat to the Tammany and Bronx factions of the Democratic machine in New York City. At the same time, the organized non-partisan masses in Philadelphia administered to the Republican machine there its first defeat in fifty years; while in Pittsburgh the Mellon machine succumbed to attack from the same elements. In scores of other cities the citizens rose in arms against the machines.

In its decision in United States v. Smith, the Supreme Court has given final victory to President Hoover in his bitter fight with the Senate in January, 1931, over his appointments to the Federal Power Commission. On December 3, 1930, the President sent to the Senate Smith's nomination to the Federal Power Commission. On Saturday, December 20, 1930, the Senate advised and consented to the appointment and ordered the resolution of confirmation sent to the President. The Senate thereupon adjourned to Monday, January 5, 1931. On Monday, December 22, 1930, the President received the notification that the appointment had been confirmed and on the same day issued Smith's commission. Smith immediately took the oath of office and entered upon his duties. While the record of the Court does not disclose this fact, it will be recalled that one of the very first “duties” entered upon by Smith and his colleagues was the summary dismissal of two subordinates of the Commission generally admitted to have been active in the protection of the public against the aggressions of the so-called power interests. Accordingly, when the Senate convened on January 5, 1931, a majority of its members very much wished to recall the confirmation of Smith's appointment.

Review of administrative authority and procedure has at times some strange and unfortunate results. Such was the case when the railroads protested the payment of taxes levied by the state tax commission of Washington. When the issue was brought to the courts, a special master was designated to secure evidence and to make preliminary findings of fact and conclusions of law. The master found no actual fraud, but concluded that there was constructive fraud in fixing base values and in allocating such values to the counties. He also found gross over-valuation and a grossly excessive ratio of assessed to actual value.

With the master's report before it, the federal district court made the usual deferential statement to administrative officers in this field in asserting that great care must be taken not unduly to interfere with the discretion which is confided to the assessing and taxing agencies; within their jurisdiction, except in case of fraud or a clearly shown adoption of wrong principles, they are the ultimate guardians of certain rights. Then the court proceeded to condemn the methods of procedure followed by the tax commission in assessing railway property, and also to disapprove of some of the conclusions of the master. Among these conclusions, the master believed that reproduction cost could not be used as a criterion for tax purposes; but the court held that such cost may be considered a relevant factor in such cases.

The great game of politics was played throughout this session. The players, holding poor hands and distracted by thoughts of the new deal that was to come, faced a difficult situation. The presence of 158 members retired by the voters in the November elections gave a cast of uncertainty and unreality to the assembly. Deducting the six vacancies in the House, 219 Democrats confronted 209 Republicans, and in the Senate the count stood 48 Republicans to 47 Democrats. The Farmer-Laborites had one spokesman in each chamber. Here was a Congress, divided in control, weakened by the presence of repudiated representatives, and under the discredited leadership of a defeated president, but nevertheless faced with perplexing problems of national and world import arising in a highly critical period. The necessities of the time called for cooperative planning and swift, united action, but the exigencies of politics suggested procrastination and obstruction. And the latter considerations prevailed.

For fifteen years, the American public has been faced with a demand that the veterans of the World War be paid a cash gratuity for the discharge of a patriotic duty. Amendments providing for benefits, preferences, rights, or privileges are attached to bills of all descriptions in Congress. Ill-conceived marches upon Washington continue to be organized, and public speeches whet the veteran's abuse-complex. Highly paid lobbies move Congress almost at will, so that the executive stands as the public's only protection against a minority expertly organized and politically well deployed.

The purposes of organized society in New York City, as in every metropolitan community, are made manifest through groups. By no means exclusively political, these purposes are social, cultural, and economic; they are expressed as objectives of individuals identified with each other by having common national and racial origins, common religion or residence or partisan affiliation. The articulation of these purposes is accomplished through group representatives who, in one way or another, acquire power over their fellows. Relationships between individuals composing these groups are of two kinds: vertical and horizontal. In each vertical group, there is a hierarchy of power, with the few at the top of the pyramid exercising authority over those below—authority that is never unlimited, but always dependent on the observance of established modes of behavior and the recognition of sudden shifts of opinion. The horizontal relationships between the officials on comparable levels of the various vertical groups are normally cooperative in character; but in certain cases they are combative. The theory of the party system requires, for example, the leaders of the parties to contend with each other for the support of the marginal voters. All of the individuals composing these groups are humanly frail and uncertain in their loyalties. Consequently, the equilibrium of forces just described is often disturbed by revolt within the vertical associations and by the constant re-formation of alliances among the horizontal groups.