We investigate the dynamics of superpower rivalry. Participants in policy debates within each state use information about expected future threats and economic costs to influence other policy actors, and this process of sophisticated reaction links the security policies of these two states into a single rivalry system. Analysis of vector autoregression models of U.S. and Soviet military expenditures and diplomatic hostility and U.S. gross national product supports the hypothesis that these policies approximate the behavior of unitary rational states capable of forming rational expectations of each other's future behavior. The dynamic response of this system to a wide range of exogenous shocks (or innovations) reveals the underlying stability of this rivalry system. The military expenditures of both states exhibit a cyclical response to innovations, with a shorter U.S. cycle. This lack of synchronization creates several problems for analysis and for policy change.

From an early, incorrect consensus that party identification was free of the short-term influences of political life, its aggregate, macropartisanship, drew little scholary notice. Though macropartisanship, typically seen as a biennial time series, appears essentially constant, our quarterly treatment demonstrates substantial and notably systematic movement of this crucial barometer of the U.S. party system. We demonstrate that it varies systematically with respect to time, has electoral consequences, and can be modeled as a function of economic evaluations and approval of the incumbent presidential administration. Macropartisanship, we argue, is a variable like others, subject to routine ebb and flow as citizens in the aggregate reflect their experiences of politics onto the parties. Its medium-term movements of considerable magnitude are lasting enough to matter but occur without connoting shifts in the underlying party system and can be understood without invoking the crises and convulsions of realignment theory.

We estimate a model of House members' roll call voting decisions embodying some hypotheses about representation, including estimates of the influence of district opinion on broad collective issues relative to personal economic interests, of the effect of electoral security on constituency responsiveness, and of the difference in constituency and party voting among Republicans and Democrats. This model is estimated with votes taken during deliberations on the 1978 Tax Reform Act, important because it was a significant change from the tax reforms passed in the late 1960s and 1970s, marked the first appearance of the Kemp-Roth proposed tax cut, and represented a concerted effort by Republicans to make tax policy a broad national issue. Findings indicate that constituent preferences for redistribution are important influences on representatives' decisions and that Republicans exhibited a greater degree of party voting than the Democrats while the Democrats better represented their constituent's preferences.

Political party leaders are an increasingly influential electoral force in contemporary liberal democracies. We test the hypothesis that their appeal is idiosyncratic, that is, that their electoral effect is a function of the leadership qualities voters perceive individual candidates as possessing. Thus, the less similar their personality profiles, the more the characteristics influencing the vote should differ from one leader to another. A comparison of Australia and Britain finds the opposite to be the case. Despite the divergent profiles of party leaders, the precise characteristics influencing the vote are remarkably similar in the two countries. This does not mean, however, that variation in the distribution of these characteristics is unimportant. It can affect the balance of the party vote and may even have been the difference between victory and defeat for the Australian Labor party in the closely fought 1987 election.

Bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided. Legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature. Although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria, it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures. In our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts, explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting. The model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard, institution-free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium.

According to some accounts, Plato views ruling as a philosophical activity; according to others, he understands it to be a craft. Given the apparent discrepancy between philosophical and technical endeavor, it seems that the two interpretations cannot both be correct. The issue is explored in light of the relationship between guardians and philosopher-kings as it manifests itself in the basic structure of the Republic and also with respect to questions of education, character, and deceit.

I argue that a feminist methodology can help liberal political theory get beyond the problems that it has been recycling since the seventeenth century. Taking political obligation as the focus for my analysis, I show how feminist psychoanalytic and psychological theory can help uncover the structural sexism of liberal theory and epistemology and point the way toward more consistent—and less biased—theoretical formulations. Rejecting the essentialist view of gender difference that has been attributed to this literature, I argue that it is more interesting and appropriate to read it as a symbolic language of power and as a heuristic device for uncovering the gendered dimensions of supposedly “neutral” concepts like obligation.

Recent literature typically attributes the relative scarcity of open international markets to the prisoner's dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade. I argue that the prisoner's dilemma representation does not reflect the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in an anarchic international system: security externalities. Explicit consideration of these effects suggests that a bipolar international political system has an advantage relative to its multipolar counterpart with respect to the opening of markets among states. Less credible exit threats and stronger incentives to engage in altruism within its alliances explain the advantage of a two-power system.

Debates over the reasons for the passage of class legislation during the New Deal era have been of continuing interest to social scientists. Of special importance has been the problem of explaining the passage of the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), often considered the most significant and radical bill of the period. In this article, I examine the influence of worker insurgency and radical organization on the passage and final form of the NLRA. I argue that other analytic approaches fail to take into account the importance of this influence and the degree to which it constrained and structured the responses of key political actors. I conclude that the theories that downplay the importance of worker insurgency and radical organization are both wrong in the particulars and suspect as general theories; this applies especially to the perspective that emphasizes the autonomy of the state from societal forces.

Prior studies of the guns-versus-butter trade-off have focused on total military expenditures and subcomponents of welfare spending (education, health, and housing). I extend the analysis to include the major subcomponents of the defense budget. The results are consistent with Clayton's; Domke, Eichenberg, and Kelleher's; and Russett's findings of a lack of defense-welfare trade-off in the 1947–80 era but reveal very specific trade-offs during the Reagan years.

In the March 1988 issue of this Review, Virginia Gray and David Lowery presented a respecification of Mancur Olson's model of economic growth and tested the revised model with U.S. state data. A special feature of the Gray-Lowery analysis is its more thorough measurement of interest group effects. These investigators found interest group influences quite different from those anticipated by Olson's model. Paul Brace and Youssef Cohen argue that the Gray-Lowery model misspecifies the determinants of state economic growth, overstating the role of interest group size and failing to incorporate crucial exogenous variables. Gray and Lowery join the issue and defend their specification.

In the September 1988 issue of this Review, Stanley C. Brubaker argued that liberals strive for neutrality concerning how people should live and that this moral ambivalence prevented them from punishing. In this Controversy, Ronald Terchek denies that liberalism is crippled by moral relativism or incapacitated for punishment. In return, Brubaker defends his firm no to the question, Can liberals punish?

Bernard Grofman and Scott Feld argued in the June 1988 issue of this Review that Jean-Jacques Rousseau's contributions to democratic political theory could be illuminated by invoking the theorizing of one of his eighteenth-century contemporaries, the Marquis de Condorcet, about individual and collective preferences or judgments. Grofman and Feld's claims about collective consciousness and the efficacy of the public interest provoke debate. One focus of discourse lies in the application of Condorcet's jury theorem to Rousseau's theory of the general will. In this controversy David M. Estlund and Jeremy Waldron in turn raise a variety of issues of theory and interpretation; Grofman and Feld then extend their argument, and propose clarifications.