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The N-Prisoners' Dilemma: A Bureaucrat-Setter Solution*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Thomas Romer  and
Howard Rosenthal
Thomas Romer
Affiliation:
Carnegie-Mellon University
Howard Rosenthal
Affiliation:
Carnegie-Mellon University
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Abstract

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Type
Communications
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 72 , Issue 4 , December 1978 , pp. 1364 - 1365
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1978

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Footnotes

*

We thank John Orbell and L. A. Wilson II for helpful comments, and the Spencer Foundation and NSF for financial support.

References

Orbell, John M. and Wilson, L. A. II (1978). “Institutional Solutions to the N-Prisoners' Dilemma.” American Political Science Review 72: 411–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Romer, Thomas and Rosenthal, Howard (1978). “Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo.” Public Choice.Google Scholar
Romer, Thomas and Rosenthal, Howard (1979, forthcoming). “Bureaucrats vs. Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy.” Quarterly Journal of Economics.Google Scholar
Tideman, T. Nicolaus (1977). Public Choice 29–2 (special supplement to spring issue).Google Scholar