Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-cfpbc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-25T02:29:04.963Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

National Elite and Local Politician in Taiwan*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Arthur J. Lerman
Arthur J. Lerman*
Affiliation:
Baruch College, City University of New York
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In Taiwan, a national elite socialized to measure the behavior of others (but not its own behavior) against extremely high standards of morality finds itself offended by the apparently immoral behavior of local electoral politicians. With reference to similar situations in other developing countries, this article describes how the attitudes of Taiwan's national elite toward the political morality of others developed and why the electoral politicians act in a manner offensive to the elite's attitudes. As a postscript, the article discusses why the national elite has checked its desire to do away with Taiwan's offensive fledgling electoral system and expanded its scope instead.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 71 , Issue 4 , December 1977 , pp. 1406 - 1422
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1977

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

This article summarizes my research findings concerning provincial and local politics in Taiwan and integrates these findings with related findings concerning Taiwan and from the general field of comparative politics. My own findings are based on the reading of materials published in Taiwan and on interviews conducted in Taiwan between the summers of 1966 and 1968. Interviews, taking the form of informal conversations, were guided by a standardized series of questions, in combination with a feel for the most productive line of questioning at a given moment. Interviews ranged from single hour-long sessions in the relatively formal atmosphere of an interviewee's office, to repeated informal contacts in a variety of surroundings, often including the interviewee's own home. In all, hundreds of hours were spent in Taiwan's various counties and cities, conversing with provincial, county, and city assemblymen; provincial, county, and city assembly staff workers; citizens active in local political campaigns; local newspaper reporters; government officials from the central, provincial, and county-city levels; local and foreign social scientists; and foreign officials stationed in Taiwan. Many hours were also spent in talks with members of Taipei's mainlander community.

Based on long and repeated talks with informants, my findings do not lend themselves to statistical statements. The sources which I use to bolster and expand upon my interview evidence–newspapers, magazines, books, and official documents published on Taiwan and research reports about Taiwan published abroad–are also rarely of a statistical nature. However, in footnotes I do include sources based on statistical research when they apply. Note that my interview evidence stands behind most statements in this article. Footnote citations, therefore, are limited to those sources which bolster and expand upon this evidence.

I am indebted to J. Bruce Jacobs for his careful reading and his criticisms of the original draft of this article. Of course, only I am responsible for all mistakes which remain uncorrected.

An earlier version of this article was presented as a paper at the 26th Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Boston, Massachusetts, April 1-3, 1974.

References

1 Weiner, Myron, “India: Two Political Cultures,” in Political Culture and Political Development, ed. Pye, Lucian W. and Verba, Sidney (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). See esp. pp. 227–28, 243–44Google Scholar.

2 For historical background concerning this discussion see Schwartz, Benjamin, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 9 Google Scholar; Schwartz, Benjamin, In Search of Wealth and Power (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1964), pp. 237–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Paloczi-Horvath, George, Mao Tse-tung: Emperor of the Blue Ants (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 30, 32, 46 Google Scholar. For examples of the relationships of “wealth and power” and democracy in the writings of Taiwan's national elite, see Jen-yang, Hsueh, “Hsu,” in T'ai-wan Sheng Ti-fang Tzu-chih Chih-yao, ed. Ch'ang, Hou (T'ai-pai: T'ai-wan Sheng Ti-fang Tzu-chih Chih-yao Pien-chi Wei-yuan-hui and Chung Hua Ta-Tien Pien-yin-hui, 1965), preface, p. 2 Google Scholar; “Message of Chiang Kai-shek,” in Riggs, Fred W., Formosa Under Chinese Nationalist Rule (New York: Macmillan, 1952), pp. 154–55Google Scholar; and I-feng, Yang, Chung-kuo Ti-fang Tzu-chih Hsin-lun (T'ai-pei: Cheng-chung Shuchu, 1962), pp. 17, 39–40, 57–60 Google Scholar.

3 For example, the importance of “organized democracy and disciplined freedom” is stressed by Chieh, Huang, former chairman of the Taiwan provincial government, in T'ai-wan Kuang-fu Erh-shihnien, ed. Hsin-wen-ch'u, T'ai-wan Sheng (T'ai-pei: Chung-hua Ta-tien Pien-yin-hui, 1966), preface, p. 6 Google Scholar. For other examples bearing on this point, see Li-fu, Ch'en, Kuo-fu-chih Ch'uang-chien yu Chung-hua Wenhua-chih Pi-fan Fu-hsing (T'ai-pei: Chiao-yu-pu, Wenhua-chu, 1971), pp. 8, 12–14 Google Scholar; Ch'i-hsueh, Fu, Chungkuo Cheng-fu (T'ai-pei: T'ai-ta Fa-hsueh-yuan Shihwu-tsu and T'ai-pei Shih San Min Shu-chu, 1964), pp. 76–78, 83–84, 108–10Google Scholar; and “Ts'ung ‘Luo-pen’ Naochu Lun Tzu-yu yu Chih-hsu,” editorial in Chung-yang Jih-pao (Hang-k'ung-pan), 03 11, 1974 Google Scholar. See Weiner, pp. 230–31, 235–37, for the experience of India's national elite in terms of the need for unity.

4 In this regard, see especially Pye, Lucian W., The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1968)Google Scholar; and Solomon, Richard H., Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971)Google Scholar.

5 Ch'ing-chiu, Pao, T'ai-wan Sheng I-hui (Mu-shan, T'ai-wan: Kuo-li Cheng-chih Ta-hsueh Kung-kung Hsing-cheng Ch'i-yeh Kuan-li Chung-hsin, 1964)Google Scholar. Pao's discussion exemplifies this conception of democracy (p. 98). For the stress on noncontlictive politics in general, see I-feng, Yang, Chung-kuo Ti-fang Tzu-chieh Hsin-lun, pp. 17, 148–49Google Scholar; Ch'en, , Kuo-fu-chih Ch'uang-chien, p. 8 Google Scholar; and Ming-chung, Ho, Chung-hua Wen-hua Tui Shih-chieh Wen-hua-te Kung-hsien (T'aipei: Chiao-yu-pu Wen-hua-chu, 1971), p. 30 Google Scholar. For the attitude of India's national elite in regard to democracy as a rational process, see Weiner, p. 229.

6 Descriptions of this ideal may be found in such works as: Kung-chuan, Hsiao, Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960), p. 291 Google Scholar; Creel, H. G., Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-tung (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Mentor Books, 1953), p. 197 Google Scholar; Hsu, Francis L. K., Americans and Chinese (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Natural History Press, American Museum Science Books, 1970), pp. 369–70, 380–81Google Scholar; and Gallin, Bernard, “Political Factionalism and Its Impact on Chinese Village Social Organization in Taiwan,” in Local-Level Politics, ed. Swartz, Marc J. (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), p. 385 Google Scholar. For expressions of this ideal among Taiwan's national elite, see Ho, , Chung-hua Wen-hua, pp. 10–14, 33, 40 Google Scholar; I-ch'un, Ku, Ts'ung Tui Shih-chu-te Kuan-ch'a Lai Chient'ao Chung-hua Wen-hua Ching-shen (T'ai-pei: Chiaoyu-pu Wen-hua-chu, 1971), p. 12 Google Scholar; and Min, Ts'ao, Lun Fu-hsing Chung-hua Wen-hua Chi-ko Szu Shih Erh Fei-te Kuan-nien chi Ch'i Fu-hsing-chih Tao (T'ai-pei: Chiao-yu-pu Wen-hua-chu, 1971), pp. 16–24, 27–28, 30–32 Google Scholar.

7 For descriptions of actual (as opposed to ideal) social decision making in Chinese society, see Gallin, , “Political Factionalism,” p. 385 Google Scholar; Pasternak, Burton, Kinship and Community in Two Chinese Villages (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 99 Google Scholar; and Hsiao, pp. 262–64, 290–92.

8 On the influence of “the national movement” on such values as unity and sacrifice, see Weiner, pp. 230–33. On Taiwan the importance of “duty and obligations over rights” is stressed by Fu, , p. 77 Google Scholar.

9 The importance of defining oneself as an “old revolutionary” (lao ko-ming) on Taiwan, is noted by Chun, Kao, in “T'ai-wan Ch'uan-li Mao-tun chi Ch'i Chieh-chueh-chih Tao,” Ming-pao Yueh-k'an, no. 109 (01 1975), 80 Google Scholar.

10 That such an “expert ethic” exists on Taiwan is attested to by Assemblyman Ping-huang, Yeh, quoted in T'ai-wan Sheng I-hui Ti-san-chieh Ti-pa-tz'u Ta-hui Chuan-chi (Wu-feng, T'ai-wan: T'ai-wan Sheng I-hui Mi-shu-ch'u, 1967), vol. 2, p. 2574 Google Scholar; by Kao, , “Tai-wan Ch'uan-li Mao-tun,” p. 80 Google Scholar; by Tardio, Felix, Mr. Tardio Sees Taiwan (Taiwan: By the Author, 1966), pp. 109, 196 Google Scholar; and by Yen-fu, Liu, Ti-fang Tzu-chih Lun-chi (T'ai-pei: Min-chien Chih-shih-she, 1964), preface, p.2 Google Scholar.

11 For discussions of ordinary individuals and the social structures they have relied upon for goal achievement in traditional Chinese society, see Levy, Marion J. Jr., “Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2 (1953), 165–66Google Scholar; Pye, p. 180; Fried, Morton H., Fabric of Chinese Society (New York: Praeger, 1953), throughout, but esp. pp. 123, 214, 218–22Google Scholar; and Yang, C. K., A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1959), pp. 99, 109–18Google Scholar.

The same subject is discussed for traditional Taiwanese society by Gallin, , in “Political Factionalism,” pp. 380–81, 386–88Google Scholar; Yang, Martin M. C., Socio-Economic Results of Land Reform in Taiwan (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1970), pp. 428–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pasternak, esp. pp. 144-46; and Jordan, David K., Gods, Ghosts, and Ancestors: Folk Religion in a Taiwanese Village (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), esp. pp. 12–26 Google Scholar.

For general discussions of ordinary individuals and the social structures they have relied upon for goal achievement in traditional society, see Scott, James C., “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,” American Political Science Review, 66 (03 1972), 91–113 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Wolf, Eric R., Peasants (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), esp. pp. 77–95 Google Scholar.

12 That this was often the case in Taiwan is noted by Yang, , Socio-Economic Results, pp. 420–21Google Scholar. That this was often, but not always, the case in Chinese society in general is noted by Fried, pp. 136, 142, 151, 218, 220; and by Levy, , “Modernization of China and Japan,” pp. 165–66Google Scholar.

13 Levy, , “Modernization of China and Japan,” p. 166; Pye, pp. 172, 180–81Google Scholar; and Solomon, Richard H., “Mao's Effort to Reintegrate the Chinese Polity: Problems of Authority and Conflict in Chinese Social Process,” in Chinese Communist Politics in Action, ed. Barnett, A. Doak (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), p. 301 Google Scholar. Specifically in relationship to use of kinship terminology on Taiwan, see Yang, , Socio-Economic Results, pp. 436–37Google Scholar. For a discussion of the use of kinship terminology as a general phenomenon not limited to Chinese society, see Scott, , “Patron-Client Politics,” p. 95 Google Scholar.

14 According to James C. Scott, “material, particularistic inducements to cooperation play a minor role” during the traditional period, “except among a limited number of local power-holders.” See Scott, James C., “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,” American Political Science Review, 63 (12 1969), 1146 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. My contention is that even during this period, major inducements were of both the material and nonmaterial kind. Evidence for my contention is available in Levy, , “Modernization of China and Japan,” pp. 164–66, 171, 172, 176 Google Scholar; Levy, Marion J. Jr., The Family Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1949), pp. 241, 242, 245 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Yang, , Socio-Economic Results, pp. 437–44Google Scholar.

15 Scott, , “Patron-Client Politics,” p. 97 Google Scholar.

16 Gallin, , “Political Factionalism,” p. 386 Google Scholar.

17 In the Chinese case, nationally appointed government positions were also an important resource through which power came to local families. On this point, see T'ung-tsu, Ch'u, Local Government in China Under the Ch'ing (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 168–92Google Scholar. On the general point of local resource bases, see Scott, , “Patron-Client Politics,” pp. 97–98 Google Scholar.

18 Scott, , “Patron-Client Politics,” pp. 93, 96, 99–100 Google Scholar. Specifically in terms of Taiwan, see Yang, , Socio-Economic Results, pp. 420–22, 437–44, 476–80Google Scholar; Pasternak, , Kinship and Community, p. 57 Google Scholar; and Gallin, , “Political Factionalism,” pp. 379–80, 384–85Google Scholar. According to these sources, heads of large lineages and landlords were the most typical patrons during the traditional period on Taiwan. For reasons why the landlord-tenant relationship may be regarded “as the prototype of patron-client ties,” see Scott, , “Patron-Client Politics,” p. 93 Google Scholar.

19 Yang, , Socio-Economic Results, pp. 423, 439–44Google Scholar; Scott, , “Patron-Client Politics,” pp. 93, 108 Google Scholar; and Fried, pp. 104–05, 195–97, 219–21, 224, all argue against the thesis, so strongly stated in Communist Chinese publications as well as in Western scholarly works, that in traditional societies “peasants only give and cannot control what they give or demand anything in return and aristocrats only take and have no reason to return anything of what they take [They expect] nothing from them and [do] not feel that [they have] rights or duties toward them.” [From Kautsky, John H., The Political Consequences of Modernization (New York: Wiley, 1972), pp. 27, 35 Google Scholar.]

Of course, where patrons concentrated in walled towns or where they were so well endowed with material resources and personal relations that they were able to raise their own military forces, or where modern state power brought police protection into the countryside, the patrons were freed from the threat of their clients' collective physical force. (For example, see Fried, pp. 195–98, 224.)

The appearance of police protection in the countryside–which was often accompanied by support by the police for the patrons as a stabilizing force in the society–was a common occurrence during the colonial period for many colonized societies throughout the world. As a consequence, Scott argues that the weakening of the physical threat which the clients were able to bring against their patrons caused a great strengthening of the patrons' power and a weakening of their motivation to be of service to their clients.

That the position of traditional patrons was in this manner strengthened in Taiwan during the Japanese period (although no reduction in service motivation is indicated) is argued by Gallin, Bernard in “Land Reform in Taiwan: Its Effect on Rural Social Organization and Leadership,” Human Organization, 22 (Summer 1963), 111 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

Evidence that before the Japanese period fear of the collective actions of clients was a factor in convincing patrons to be of some service to their clients on Taiwan is based partially on the general Chinese experience of the possibility of peasant rebellion in areas in which landlords lived in the countryside far from the immediate protection of their own or government police forces. For this evidence, see Hsiao, pp. 426–31, and Fried, pp. 195–96, 219–21, 224. Specifically in terms of Taiwan, evidence that at least some of Taiwan's patrons lived under similar conditions before the Japanese period is found in Crissman, Lawrence W., “Each for His Own: Taiwanese Political Response to KMT Local Administration” (paper prepared for the London-Cornell Project for East and Southeast Asian Studies, 06, 1969), pp. 19–20 Google Scholar; Meskill, Johanna Menzel, “The Lins of Wufeng: The Rise of a Taiwanese Gentry Family,” in Taiwan: Studies in Chinese Local History, ed. Gordon, Leonard H. D. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 7 Google Scholar; and Pasternak, , Kinship and Community, pp. 116–20Google Scholar.

20 Scott, describes the patron-client relationship as an “instrumental friendship” in “Patron-Client Politics,” p. 92 Google Scholar. He explains his use of this term on pp. 92–95 and 106–07. According to Pye and Solomon, aspects of Chinese political culture which closely fit in with Scott's model of the patron-client relationship as an “instrumental friendship” include: (a) manipulation of human relationships as the chief means of satisfying felt-needs, (b) necessity to disguise such manipulation with feelings of trust and warmth, (c) strongly felt needs for order and security, seen as satisfiable only within hierarchically organized personal relationships, (d) personal relationship hierarchies seen as functioning successfully only when they are headed by a single authority figure. See Solomon, , “Mao's Effort to Reintegrate the Chinese Polity,” pp. 298–306 Google Scholar; Pye, pp. 103, 172, 180–81; and Lerman, Arthur J., “Political, Traditional, and Modern Economic Groups, and the Taiwan Provincial Assembly,” (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1972), pp. 267–75Google Scholar.

Evidence that the model of patron-client relations as an instrumental friendship is applicable to landlordtenant relationships in traditional China can be found in Hsiao, pp. 427–28. Evidence that the model is applicable to traditional Taiwan is available in Yang, , Socio-Economic Results, pp. 438–42, 460–65Google Scholar.

I recognize that there are scholars who argue in favor of using other terms in place of “instrumental friendship.” See Fried, p. 103; and Wolf, Eric -R., “Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations,” in The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies, ed. Banton, Michael (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 10–13, 16 Google Scholar.

21 In addition to interviews, the major source for this discussion of the effects of economic development on goal attainment in Taiwan, is Gallin, , “Political Factionalism,” esp. pp. 380–81, 399 Google Scholar. Also see Yang, , Socio-Economic Results, pp. 455, 457 Google Scholar. For a discussion of the effects of economic development on goal attainment in other societies, see Scott, , “PatrOn-Client Politics,” pp. 103, 105–08Google Scholar.

22 Gallin, , “Political Factionalism,” p. 380 Google Scholar.

23 For a detailed discussion of my characterization of new interest groups which “seek out or send out politicians” see Lerman, pp. 345–80.

24 Gallin, , “Political Factionalism,” p. 386 Google Scholar, argues that prestige did not automatically come with the attainment of real power. Prestige still had to be earned through traditional respectable behavior. Crissman, p 26, Yang, , Socio-Economic Results, p. 485 Google Scholar, and my own research indicates that the process is more automatic.

25 Gallin, , “Political Factionalism,” pp. 386–87Google Scholar; Gallin, Bernard, “Rural Development in Taiwan: The Role of the Government,” Rural Sociology, 29 (09 1964), 318 Google Scholar; and Yang, , Socio-Economic Results, pp. 487–500 Google Scholar.

26 Gallin, , “Political Factionalism,” pp. 394, 396, 398–99Google Scholar.

27 Note that solidarity is still manifested by many village and lineage organizations on Taiwan. What we are discussing is a gradual tendency toward breakdown, not a completed process. For fuller descriptions of this process, see Gallin, , “Political Factionalism,” pp. 387–88, 392, 394–97Google Scholar; Pasternak, , Kinship and Community, pp. 72–78, 86–113, 116, 120–27Google Scholar; and Yang, , Socio-Economic Results, pp. 455, 457 Google Scholar.

28 Gallin, , “Political Factionalism,” p. 381 Google Scholar, and Gallin, , “Rural Development in Taiwan,” p. 314 Google Scholar.

29 In addition to interviews, the major sources for this discussion of the effects of land reform on goal attainment in Taiwan, are Gallin, , “Political Factionalism,” pp. 380–87Google Scholar, “Land Reform in Taiwan,” pp. 109–12, “Rural Development in Taiwan,” pp. 314–18; Yang, , Socio-Economic Results, pp. 230–59, 458–66, 480–505 Google Scholar; and Pasternak, , Kinship and Community, pp. 25, 100,115 Google Scholar.

30 That many posts at many levels have real power is testified to by Gallin, , “Political Factionalism,” p. 395 Google Scholar; Crissman, pp. 8, 30, 37–38, 42, 44, 47, 54, 57; Yang, , Socio-Economic Results, pp. 408–11, 490–91Google Scholar; “Chueh Pu Jung Chu ‘Hsuan’ Hai Kung,” in Lien-ho Pao (Chia-nan Ti-fang-pan), 01 12, 1968, p. 7 Google Scholar; and T'ai-wan Shengl-hui Ti-san-chieh Ti-pa-tz'u Ta-hui I-yuan Chih-hsun yu Pen Fu Ta-an Hui-pien (Chung Hsing Hsin Ts'un, T'ai-wan: T'ai-wan Sheng Cheng-fu Mi-shu-ch'u, 1967), p. 179 Google Scholar.

31 For the institution of elections and the growth of conflict on Taiwan, see Gallin, , “Political Factionalism,” pp. 386–88, 391 Google Scholar; Ming-t'ieh, Ch'en, “Ch'e-ti Hsiao-ch'u Hsuan-chu P'ai-hsi Fen-cheng,” Ti-fang Tzu-chih, no. 176 (02 15, 1968), p. 15 Google Scholar. Pao, p. 69; Liu, pp. 33–34; T'ai-wan Shengl-hui Ti-san-chieh Ti-pa-tz'u Ta-hui I-yuan Chih-hsun yu Pen Fu Ta-an Hui-pien, p. 179. For comparable phenomena in India and Southeast Asia, see Weiner, pp. 208–13 and Scott, , “Patron-Client Politics,” pp. 109–11Google Scholar. Note that material rewards are likely to be great only for higher level elected office. Motivation for lower level office is usually based on the quest for prestige. See Gallin, , “Political Factionalism,” p. 386 Google Scholar, and Crissman, p. 40.

32 Yang, Socio-Economic Results, concludes that “land reform removed most of the large landlords from rural communities and into businesses or politics. Some did stay in rural towns but changed their occupations. Small landlords had, in most cases, become real owner-farmers” (p. 497; also see p. 362). I am not sure that Yang's evidence permits us to make such a definitive statement.

Evidence concerning landlords who withdrew from local leadership competition is found in Yang, , Socio-Economic Results, pp. 230–60Google Scholar, and in Gallin, , “Political Factionalism,” pp. 386–87Google Scholar, and Gallin, , “Rural Development in Taiwan,” pp. 316–18Google Scholar.

33 Yang, , Socio-Economic Results, pp. 492–94Google Scholar, has figures which indicate a possible slow decline in the rate of landlord participation and/or success in competition for local leadership positions over time. If these indications are correct, the decline may be attributable to the aging of the landlords as a group and not to the other causes noted above. The decline may also be attributable to the weakening of traditional status as an electoral asset as time goes by. On this latter point, see Yang, , Socio-Economic Results, pp. 480, 484, 501 Google Scholar, and Gallin, , “Rural Development in Taiwan,” pp. 317–18Google Scholar. On the point of a decline in landlord political participation over time see also Gallin, , “Political Factionalism,” pp. 386–87Google Scholar, and “Rural Development in Taiwan,” pp. 316–18.

34 Early landlord success in local leadership competition is also indicated by Yang's, figures in Socio-Economic Results, pp. 492–94Google Scholar. A generally high rate of landlord participation and success in politics is indicated by Yang, pp. 483–86, 488, 494. Gallin, , in “Political Factionalism,” p. 389 Google Scholar, and in “Rural Development in Taiwan,” pp. 317–18, also offers evidence on these points.

35 That many new politicians were from humble (i.e., not traditional leadership) origins is indicated by the evidence of Gallin, , “Political Factionalism,” pp. 386–87Google Scholar, and Gallin, , “Rural Development in Taiwan,” p. 318 Google Scholar; Yang, , Socio-Economic Results, pp. 487–88, 492–98, 503 Google Scholar; and my own interviews.

36 The importance of elections “when other criteria for status become fuzzy” is stated as a general proposition by Weiner, pp. 208–09. For manifestations of this phenomenon on Taiwan, see Yang, , Socio-Economic Results, p. 485 Google Scholar; and Crissman, p. 26.

37 Scott, , “Patron-Client Politics,” pp. 103–04Google Scholar. In terms of Taiwan, see Gallin, , “Political Factionalism,” pp. 378, 380–81, 391, 394–95, 399 Google Scholar; Crissman, pp. 30–31; and Yang, , Socio-Economic Results, p. 475 Google Scholar.

38 This was especially true of southeastern China, the area in which most of Taiwan's society originated. See Freedman, Maurice, Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung (London: Athlone, 1966), pp. 104–17Google Scholar; Yang, C. K., A Chinese Village, pp. 109–17Google Scholar; and Hsiao, pp. 361–70, 419–27. Open conflict also manifested itself on Taiwan, especially before the establishment of firm police control in the countryside. In this regard, see Meskill, pp. 7, 11–12; Jordan, pp. 9, 20–26, 42, 48–51, 86, 135–37, 163; and Pasternak, Burton, “The Role of the Frontier in Chinese Lineage Development,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 28 (05 1969), 554–55, 559–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Indications that underlying currents of these old conflicts did not disappear with the imposition of police control are found in Crissman, pp. 20–23; Gallin, Bernard, “A Case for Intervention in the Field,” Practical Anthropology, 10 (03–04 1963), 58 Google Scholar; Jordan, pp. 22, 48–49,135–37; 163–64; and Pasternak, , Kinship and Community, pp. 103–05Google Scholar.

39 For the national elite's attitude toward nongovernmental organizations, see statements in T'ai-wan Sheng Ti-faug Tzu-chih Chih-yao, pp. 896, 872–73, 876, 879, 891.

40 See n. 13 and 20 above. Also see Scott, , “Patron-Client Politics,” pp. 102–04Google Scholar, and Gallin, Bernard and Gallin, Rita S., “Sociopolitical Power and Sworn Brother Groups in Chinese Society: A Taiwanese Case,” in The Anthropology of Power, ed. Adams, R. N. and Fogelson, R. D. (New York: Academic Press, 1977), p. 95 Google Scholar.

Note that the impersonal administration of the land reform program and the strict adherence to a merit system in die treatment of students on all levels of schooling in Taiwan are two important exceptions to this rule.

41 “Historically, the expansion of the suffrage together with die rupture of traditional economic and status arrangements have signalled the rise of particularistic, material inducements” (p. 1148). “The sense of community was especially weak, and … social fragmentation made particularistic ties virtually the only feasible means of cooperation” (p. 1150). In these two statements, Scott, “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,” generalizes on the type of situation facing the ordinary individual in Taiwan. Evidence to indicate that this is the case for Taiwan is found in Lerman, pp. 387–401.

42 In terms of the voters' material needs, see Scott, , “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,” pp. 1148, 1157–58Google Scholar, and Scott, , “Patron-Client Politics,” pp. 108–13Google Scholar. My statements concerning the voter's nonmaterial needs are based on the evidence noted in fns. 4 and 20. That politician-voter relationships on Taiwan are actually of this nature is indicated by Gallin, , “Political Factionalism,” pp. 391, 395 Google Scholar; Crissman, pp. 30, 32, 37; and Lerman, pp. 203–13. Note that a number of politicians on Taiwan echoed the statement made to me by one provincial assemblyman that: “the people recognize money, not candidates.” (“Jen-min jen ch'ien, pu jen jen.”)

It should be noted, however, that two factors make it appear that traditional values still guide individuals when they shop for a politician. First, individuals are still likely to insist upon establishing “personal” relationships rather than treating their dealings with a politician as a coldly calculated transaction. Second, the individual uses traditional guides to determine which politician is likely to offer the most rewarding relationship. See n. 13 above and Crissman, p. 37.

43 Scott, , in “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,” pp. 1143–45Google Scholar, states the general case. For specific examples in Taiwan, see “Hsin-ying Ko-chia Yin-hang, Shih-yuan Ch'ao-p'iao Huankuang,” in Lien-ho Pao (Chia-nan Ti-fang-pan), 01 21, 1968, p. 7 Google Scholar; “Chuch Pu Jung Chu ‘Hsuan’ Hai King,” in Lien-ho Pao, p. 7 Google Scholar; Crissman, pp. 35–36;and Gallin, , “Political Factionalism ” p. 386 Google Scholar.

44 For examples of particularism on Taiwan, see Lerman, pp. 218–25, and Pao, pp. 67, 69. For similar examples in other societies, see Scott, , “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,” p. 1144 Google Scholar, and Weiner.pp. 209–13, 220.

45 Often there is a consensus within which the competition is taking place, but this is not necessarily apparent to the outsider. On this point see Nathan, Andrew J., “A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics,” The China Quarterly, 53 (01–03 1973), 46, 50–51 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Lerman, pp. 300, 309–10. Sources for the rise of factionalism are in fn. 31.

46 James C. Scott argues that this concentration on individual self-interest may be a blessing in disguise. In a divided polity with few other bases of consensus, self-interest can serve as the one motive with which to bind otherwise opposed individuals together. See Scott, , “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,” pp. 1151–54Google Scholar. Weiner, pp. 212, 242, and Lerman, p. 310, make the same point. For an example of lack of principled behavior by Taiwan's local politicians, see “Man T'an Cheng-chin yu Tao-te,” in Min-sheng Jih-pao, 01 24, 1968, p. 2 Google Scholar. For similar behavior in India, see Weiner, p. 212.

47 Scott, , “Patron-Client Politics,” p. 110 Google Scholar, and “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,” p. 1154. For examples of the national political party going down to defeat in Taiwan, see articles in Tzu Chih, no. Ko Hsin 181 (May 1, 1968), pp. 4, 5, 10.

48 For an example of this strategy on Taiwan, see Chun-wu, Chao, “Miao-li Hsien Chang Hsuan-chu, Liu Huang Liang P'ai Ta Chueh-chan,” Liao-wang Chouk'an, no. 31 (10 14, 1967), p. 26 Google Scholar.

49 Crissman, pp. 33, 38, and Mendel, Douglas, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 95 Google Scholar. For a general statement describing the elite's influence over elections and the response to this influence by local level factions on Taiwan, see Gallin, and Gallin, , “Sociopolitical Power and Sworn Brother Groups,” p. 95 Google Scholar.

50 For general descriptions of the boss machine model, see Scott, , “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,” pp. 1154–58Google Scholar, and Scott, , “Patron-Client Politics,” pp. 96, 110–12Google Scholar. I prefer not to refer to the local factions as boss machines, since, according to Scott's definition, the term boss machine “connotes the reliable and repetitive control it exercises within its jurisdiction” ( Scott, , “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,” p. 1143 Google Scholar). Most factions, however, appear to share control of their jurisdiction with at least one other faction.

51 Scott, , “Patron-Client Politics,” pp. 108–12Google Scholar, Scott, , “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,” pp. 1144–45, 1157–58Google Scholar, and Weiner, pp. 241–44. That such developments may be taking place on Taiwan, especially among younger, educated voters, is indicated in “Hsuan-chu Chien-t'ao Tso-t'anhui,” Ta-hsueh Tsa-chih, no. 62 (02 1973), p. 18 Google Scholar.

52 See n. 31 above.

53 For examples of the elite's attitudes concerning interest groups, see Pao, pp. 67, 69, and Ho, p. 30.

54 For examples of elite attitudes concerning the deficiency of the electoral system, see Liu, preface, p. 4, and pp. 1, 33–34, and Yang I-feng, p. 178.

55 For examples of the national elite's faith in the government, see Pao, pp. 67–69, 107, and Liu, p. 34.

56 For the elite's attitude on what should be done about the local political system, see Pao, pp. 50–52, 68–69, 74, 99, Yang I-feng, pp. 117–79, and Ch'en, p. 14.

57 In terms of the over-high standards which the elite insists that democracy must live up to, see Liu, preface, pp. 1–4, and Pao, p. 98.

58 In terms of the national elite's unwillingness to accept even a small number of imperfections in the electoral system (and for further examples of what the elite thinks should be done about the local political system), see Pao, pp. 52, 69, 74, 99, and Ho, Chien, “Ch'i Kao I Chao,” in Chung-yang Jih-pao (Hangk'ung-pan), 09 14, 1971, p. 4 Google Scholar. For further examples of the Taiwan national elite's attitudes toward the local political system, see material introduced in fns. 5, 31, 43, 44, and 46 above. For the reactions of India's national elite to their local political system, see Weiner, pp. 228–44. For the reactions of other national elites to their local political systems, see Scott, , “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,” pp. 1155, 1157 Google Scholar.

59 For examples of the attitudes of local politicians, see T'ai-wan Sheng I-hui Ti-san-chieh Ti-pa-tz'u Ta-hui Chuan-chi, vol. 2, pp. 2525–26, 2534, 2569, 2574, 2579 Google Scholar. These and other statements of local politicians are translated in Lerman, pp. 142–85. For the attitudes of India's local politicians, see Weiner, pp. 231, 241.

60 It hardly seems necessary to add that this is exactly the direction in which the national elite appears to be moving (though with great hesitation). See, for example, Jacobs, J. Bruce, “Taiwan 1972: Political Season,” Asian Survey, 13 (01 1973), 106–07CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Jacobs, J. Bruce, “Taiwan 1973: Consolidation of the Succession,” Asian Survey, 14 (01 1974), 26–29 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.