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Domestic Opposition and Foreign War

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Bruce Bueno De Mesquita  and
David Lalman
Bruce Bueno De Mesquita
Affiliation:
Hoover Institution and University of Rochester
David Lalman
Affiliation:
University of Maryland
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Abstract

Domestic opposition to violent, escalatory national policies during international crises has long been considered an important factor influencing the foreign policy behavior of nations. Yet the explicit theoretical linkages between domestic opposition and crisis choices have not been investigated. To provide these linkages, we set out an extensive form game of sequential decisions leading to the various consequences of crises together with their attendant costs and benefits. Our findings indicate that an antagonist's beliefs about domestic opposition are not particularly effective levers to manipulate in crises when a peaceful resolution is the goal.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 84 , Issue 3 , September 1990 , pp. 747 - 765
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1990

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