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Do U.S. Senators Moderate Strategically?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Robert A. Bernstein
Affiliation:
Texas A & M University
Gerald C. Wright Jr.
Affiliation:
Indiana University
Michael B. Berkman
Affiliation:
Indiana University

Abstract

Do U.S. senators adjust their policy positions or voting behavior—engage in “strategic moderation”—in their quest for reelection? In the June 1986 issue of this Review, Gerald Wright and Michael Berkman sought to demonstrate that Senate incumbents moderate their ideological positions as elections near. This endeavor was part of their larger effort to show the importance of policy issues in the selection of members of Congress. Robert Bernstein takes the view that the claims about strategic moderation rest on methodological flaws. But Wright and Berkman argue that most investigators agree on the general direction of senatorial candidate behavior. The controversy turns on conception and interpretation of analytical results.

Type
Controversy
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1988

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References

Elling, Richard C. 1982. Ideological Change in the U.S. Senate: Time and Electoral Responsiveness. Legislative Studies Quarterly 7:7592.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thomas, Martin. 1985. Election Proximity and Senatorial Roll Call Voting. American Journal of Political Science 29:96111.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wright, Gerald C. Jr., and Berkman, Michael B.. 1986. Candidates and Policy in U.S. Senate Elections. American Political Science Review 80:567–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar