¹ For a general statement of this theme see Tarrow, Sidney G., Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 10–11 and passim Google Scholar. Other examples of intrasystem comparisons include Linz, Juan and de Miguel, Amando, “Eight Spains,” in Merritt, Richard and Rokkan, Stein (eds.), Comparing Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966)Google Scholar; Hofferbert, Richard I., “The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States,” this Review, 60 (03, 1966), 73–82 Google Scholar; and Glenn, Norval D. and Simmons, J. L., “Are Regional Cultural Differences Diminishing?” Public Opinion Quarterly, 31 (Summer, 1967), 176–193 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² An example of an exercise very similar to ours is Key, V. O. Jr. and Munger, Frank, “Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: the Case of Indiana” in Burdick, Eugene and Brodbeck, Arthur J. (eds.), American Voting Behavior (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 281–299 Google Scholar.

³ The survey data used in this article are from four sample surveys conducted by the Field Research Corporation's California Poll. These studies are more fully described in our “The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting,” this Review, 62 (09, 1968), 753–769 Google Scholar.

⁴ This statement is based on one of the authors' observations while working in several offices on Capitol Hill. Twenty-four per cent of the letters received by one national magazine in a radical right letter-writing campaign were from Southern California. See McEvoy, James III “Letters from the Right: Content-Analysis of a Letter Writing Campaign” (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Institute for Social Research, 1966), p. 16 Google Scholar.

⁵ San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, 01 22, 1967, p. 8 Google Scholar.

⁶ While Southern California's greater conservatism has been fairly persistent in the recent past, the size of the regional differences in voting returns has not always been as great as in 1964 and 1968. For example, only four percentage pointa separated the two regions in the 1960 presidential election.

⁷ The eight counties of Southern California contain 58 per cent of the state's population. The Los Angeles-Long Beach Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (Los Angeles and Orange Counties) itself accounts for 43 per cent of all Californians. The other six southern counties resemble these two socially, economically, and politically. We will include respondents from all eight counties when analyzing survey data. With Census data and voting returns, it will be more useful to examine separately the two major metropolitan areas in the South: Los Angeles-Long Beach and San Diego.

We will compare Southern California not to the rest of the state, but just to the San Francisco Bay Area, which has 24 per cent of California's residents. With survey data, we define the Bay Area as one seven-county unit. For purposes of aggregate data analysis, we divide it into the San Francisco-Oakland SMSA and the San Jose SMSA. The reasons for this procedure will be apparent later in the article.

⁸ Anderson, Totton J. and Lee, Eugene C., “The 1964 Election in California,” The Western Political Quarterly, 18 (06, 1965), p. 467 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Fully a third of Bay Area Republicans intended, in late October, to vote for Johnson, compared to a 24 per cent defection rate among Southern California Republicans. The difference between the regions in Democratic defection was the same (but in the opposite direction): four per cent and thirteen per cent, respectively.

⁹ These data, from the California Poll, are limited to white gentiles who had made up their minds how to vote by late October.

¹⁰ While there is a slightly larger proportion of persons of foreign stock in the Bay Area, this difference is compensated for by the bigger Jewish community in Los Angeles.

¹¹ See, for example, Bell, Daniel, “The Dispossessed—1962,” in Bell, (ed.), The Radical Right, Anchor edition (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), p. 24 Google Scholar; Seymour M. Lipset, “Three Decades of the Radical Right: Coughlinites, McCarthyites, and Birchers—1962,” in Ibid., pp. 373–446; Lipset, , “Beyond the Backlash,” Encounter (11, 1964), pp. 11–24 Google Scholar; Miles, Michael, “Reagan and the Respectable Right,” The New Republic (04 20, 1968), pp. 25–28 Google Scholar; Talcott Parsons, “Social Strains in America: A Postscript—1962,” in Bell, op. cit., p. 234; Patterson, Samuel C., “The Political Cultures of the American States,” Journal of Politics, 30 (02, 1968), p. 203 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and White, Theodore H., The Making of the President 1964 (New York: Atheneum, 1965), pp. 116–117 Google Scholar.

¹² Lipset, “Three Decades,” op. cit., p. 437.

¹³ Respondents were given their choice of all Republican presidential contenders, not just Rockefeller and Goldwater.

¹⁴ “New residents” are people who have lived in the state for less than a year, were qualified to register in their previous state, and would be eligible to vote in California but for their recent arrival. They can vote only for President and Vice President. They probably are more interested in politics than the common run of registered voters.

¹⁵ A related proposition is that various recent manifestations of ultraconservatism reflect resentment by people from small towns and farms at the eclipse of older, simpler virtues and verities by the complex, cosmopolitan big city (see Lipset, “Beyond the Backlash,” op. cit., p. 20; and Bell, op. cit., The Radical Right, passim.). Despite its popularity, no data have been presented to support this proposition and systematic empirical research on followers of the radical right provides no support for it. See Wolfinger, Raymond E., Wolfinger, Barbara Kaye, Prewitt, Kenneth, and Rosenhack, Sheilah, “America's Radical Right: Politics and Ideology,” in Apter, David (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 281 Google Scholar; and Koeppen, Sheilah R., “The Radical Right and the Politics of Consensus,” in Schoenberger, Robert A. (ed.), The American Right Wing (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ “Right-wing extremism, and presumably Goldwater Republicanism as well, is related to the tension of population growth and lack of community integration” (Lipset, “Beyond the Backlash,” op. cit., p. 20.).

¹⁷ Aside from a few people in the extreme northern fringe, residents of Santa Clara County (San Jose) do not commute to work in San Francisco.

¹⁸ See, e.g. Bell, op. cit., The Radical Right, passim.

¹⁹ Lipset, “Three Decades,” op. cit., pp. 436–437.

²⁰ Lipset, “Beyond the Backlash,” op. cit., p. 20.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 19–20. While these presumed political characteristics of nouveaux riches may seem to resemble those often attributed to all upward mobile groups, it may be useful to view them separately. One assumes that a new millionaire may be somewhat different from a member of the middle class with working-class parents. In any event, the familiar contention about upward mobile members of the business and professional classes appears to be unfounded. Data showing that the upward mobile are not more ethnically prejudiced have been available for some time (see, e.g., Bettleheim, Bruno, Dynamics of Prejudice (New York: Harper & Row, 1950), p. 59)Google Scholar; more recently the vast preponderance of published research has cast doubt on the notion that upward mobility produces ethnic prejudice. The most extensive study of this point is Barber, James A. Jr., Social Mobility and Political Behavior (Chicago: Rand-McNally, forthcoming)Google Scholar. Analyzing data from the University of Michigan Survey Research Center's studies of the 1960, 1956, and 1952 elections, Barber found that upward mobile members of the middle class were, compared to status-stable members of the same class, less likely to be Republicans and to have conservative attitudes on various political issues. For data showing that supporters of the radical right are, if anything, less upward mobile, see Wolfinger et al., op. cit., p. 278; and Koeppen, op. cit. The same seems to be the case with Senator Goldwater's followers. See McEvoy, James III, Radicals or Conservatives: A Study of the Contemporary American Right (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969)Google Scholar.

²² Propositions about elites cannot easily be verified with data from surveys of the general population since there are seldom enough elite respondents. The same is true here, but we can use these data to examine the related proposition that self-employed individuals tend to be more conservative than people who do not work for themselves. Examining Republicans and Democrats separately (and excluding non-whites and Jews), we found that the self-employed were no more likely to vote for Proposition 14. Self-employed Republicans showed a slightly greater preference for Goldwater among all Republican presidential possibilities (30 per cent to 24 per cent).

²³ See Blalock, Hubert M. Jr., Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 225–231 Google Scholar.

²⁴ The surveys did not include questions on respondents' income and we found the occupation code unsatisfactory for purposes of the present analysis. There were too few cases to permit valid analysis of primary preferences for Goldwater among the highly educated. There was no discernible tendency for a greater proportion of better-educated respondents in the Bay Area to be Democrats (but see Table 5).

²⁵ Bay Area cities with 1959 median incomes of less than $6000 were only six percentage points more hostile to Proposition 14 than comparable cities in Southern California, while the parallel difference among cities in the over-$8000 category was 19 per cent.

²⁶ The Los Angeles Times has a position of dominance in Southern California far exceeding that of any newspaper in the Bay Area. The Times has become relatively more moderate recently (although it favored both Proposition 14 and Goldwater over Johnson), but until the last few years it followed an ultraconservative line in both news and editorial columns.

Regional differences in newspapers' political orientation are particularly noticeable in the suburban press, as is illustrated by the following passage from a Newsweek story on Orange County, described as “a monument of monolithic conservatism”:

Pervasive, rather than powerful, is the word for the county's conservative journalism. R. C. Hoiles' “Freedom Newspapers” … reflect the creaky views of their 87-year-old owner. “Tax-supported schools violate the Ten Commandments and the Golden Rule,” he says, and then advises that the entire public-school system be handed over to “private enterprise.”

But Hoiles' papers, and a few other conservative journals, are all that is available in local journalism. Conservatives have the ball game almost to themselves. Liberals—not to mention moderate Republicans or Democrats—are almost literally nowhere. (Newsweek, November 14, 1966, p. 37).

²⁷ Daniel J. Elazar makes particularly imaginative use of the differential migration theme. See his American Federalism: A View from the States (New York: Crowell, 1966), pp. 104–105 Google Scholar. He does not, however, explain why these different sources would produce conservatism in the South and liberalism in the North.

²⁸ See, e.g., Hichborn, Franklin, California Politics—1891–1930, vol. 2 (Los Angeles: Haynes Foundation, no date), pp. 904–905, 1072, ch. 50Google Scholar. The tendency for yesterday's progressives to become today's radical right has been discussed—perhaps beyond the available evidence—by Richard Hofstadter and other social commentators. Nevertheless, this points to the need for a careful examination of indices of conservative and liberal behavior in California in the past two generations. Some measures that might be considered “liberal,” such as the Townsend Plan, fared better in Southern California. Cf. McWilliams, Carey, Southern California Country (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1956), chap. 14Google Scholar.

²⁹ Wilson, James Q., “A Guide to Reagan Country: The Political Culture of Southern California,” Commentary (05, 1967), p. 38 Google Scholar.

³⁰ Since many nominal Protestants, unlike Catholics, are not formally members of a church, measures of religious affiliation which rely on church membership inevitably inflate the proportion of Catholics in the population. Therefore the survey data are a more accurate measure of the absolute number of Catholics and Protestants.

³¹ For data on Catholics' Democratic proclivities see Berelson, Bernard R., et al., Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 61–71 Google Scholar; Campbell, Angus, et al., The Voter Decides (Evanston: Row, Peterson & Co., 1954), p. 71 Google Scholar; Campbell, Angus, et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960), ch. 12Google Scholar; and Greer, Scott, “Catholic Voters and the Democratic Party,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 25 (Winter, 1961), 611–625 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³² These percentages are computed on a base of respondents who identified with one major party or the other.

³³ These percentages are computed on a base of respondents who had an opinion on the Rumford Act.

³⁴ Erskine, Helen, “The Polls: Negro Housing,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 31 (Fall, 1967), p. 491 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.