Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Home
  • Home
Hostname: page-component-78dcdb465f-9pqtr Total loading time: 0.266 Render date: 2021-04-14T13:07:59.088Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": false, "newCiteModal": false, "newCitedByModal": true }
EnglishFrançais
American Political Science Review American Political Science Review

Article contents

An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Jonathan Bendor  and
Terry M. Moe
Jonathan Bendor
Affiliation:
Stanford University
Terry M. Moe
Affiliation:
Stanford University
Get access
Rights & Permissions[Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In this article we outline a new framework for the formal analysis of bureaucratic politics. It departs from standard neoclassical approaches, notably those of Niskanen (1971) and Peltzman (1976), in several important respects. First our approach explicitly models a system of three-way interaction among bureaus, politicians, and interest groups. Second, it allows for institutional features of each type of participant. Third, it is a model of dynamic process. Fourth, participants make choices adoptively rather than optimizing. Fifth, participants are only minimally informed.

The result is a dynamic model of adaptive behavior, very much in the spirit of Simon's (1947) behavioral tradition, that offers a new perspective on political control, bureaucratic power, and the “intelligence of democracy.”

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 79 , Issue 3 , September 1985 , pp. 755 - 774
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1985

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below.
If you should have access and can't see this content please contact technical support.

References

Aberbach, J., & Rockman, B.Clashing beliefs within the executive branch: The Nixon administration bureaucracy. American Political Science Review, 1976, 70, 456–468.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Axelrod, R.Structure of decision: The cognitive maps of political elites. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976.Google Scholar
Bernstein, M.Regulating business by independent commission. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1955.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Braybrooke, D., & Lindblom, C.A strategy of decision. New York: Free Press, 1963.Google Scholar
Cater, D.Power in Washington. New York: Random House, 1964.Google Scholar
Cohen, M.The power of parallel thinking. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1981, 2, 285–306.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, M.Conflict and complexity: Goal diversity and organizational search effectiveness. American Political Science Review, 1984, 78, 435–451.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, M., & Axelrod, R.Coping with complexity: The adaptive value of changing utilities. American Economic Review, 1984, 74, 30–42.Google Scholar
Cohen, M., March, J., & Olsen, J.A garbage can model of organizational choice. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1972, 17, 1–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crecine, J. P.Governmental problem-solving. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969.Google Scholar
Cyert, R., & March, J. G.A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963.Google Scholar
Dahl, R.Polyarchy. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971.Google Scholar
Fiorina, M.Representatives, roll calls, and constituencies. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1974.Google Scholar
Fiorina, M., & Noll, R.Voters, bureaucrats, and legislators: A rational choice perspective on the growth of bureaucracy. Journal of Public Economics, 1978, 9, 239–253.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Freeman, J. L.The political process: Executive bureau-legislative committee relations. New York: Random House, 1955.Google Scholar
Huntington, S.The Marasmus of the ICC: The commission, the railroads, and the public interest. Yale Law Journal, 1952, 614, 467–509.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Landau, M.Federalism, redundancy, and system reliability. Publius, 1973, 3, 173–196.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lave, C., & March, J.Introduction to models in the social sciences. New York: Harper & Row, 1975.Google Scholar
Levinthal, D., & March, J.A model of adaptive search. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1982, 2, 307–333.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lindblom, C.The science of “muddling through.” Public Administration Review, 1959, 10, 79–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lindblom, C.The intelligence of democracy. New York: Free Press, 1965.Google Scholar
Long, N.Power and administration. Public Administration Review, 1949, 9, 257–264.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lowi, T.The end of liberalism. New York: Norton, 1969.Google Scholar
March, J. G., & Simon, H.Organizations. New York: Wiley, 1958.Google Scholar
Mayhew, D.Congress: The electoral connection. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974.Google Scholar
McCubbins, M., & Schwartz, T.Congressional oversight overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms. American Journal of Political Science, 1984, 28, 165–179.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Migue, J., & Belanger, G.Toward a general theory of managerial discretion. Public Choice, 1974, 17, 27–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Miller, G., & Moe, T. M.Bureaucrats, legislators and the size of government. American Political Science Review, 1983, 77, 297–322.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Newell, A., & Simon, H.Human problem solving. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972.Google Scholar
Niskanen, W.Representative bureaucracy. New York: Aldine-Atherton, 1971.Google Scholar
Niskanen, W.Bureaucrats and politicians. Journal of Law and Economics, 1975, 18, 617–644.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Olson, M.The logic of collective action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965.Google Scholar
Padgett, J.Bounded rationality in budgetary research. American Political Science Review, 1980, 74, 354–372.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Peltzman, S.Toward a more general theory of regulation. Journal of Law and Economics, 1976, 19, 211–240.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Posner, R.Theories of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1974, 52, 335–358.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quirk, P.Industry influence in federal regulatory agencies. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rich, E.Artificial intelligence. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983.Google Scholar
Shepsle, K., & Weingast, B.Political preferences for the pork barrel: A generalization. American Journal of Political Science, 1981, 25, 96–111.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simon, H.Administrative behavior. New York: Macmillan, 1947.Google Scholar
Simon, H., Smithburg, D., & Thompson, V.Public administration. New York: Knopf, 1950.Google Scholar
Stigler, G.The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics, 1971, 2, 3–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weingast, B.A principal-agent perspective on congressional-bureaucratic relations. Presented at the Fifth Carnegie Conference on Political Economy, Carnegie-Mellon University, June, 1983.Google Scholar
Wilson, J.The politics of regulation. New York: Basic Books, 1980.Google Scholar

Altmetric attention score

Full text views

Full text views reflects PDF downloads, PDFs sent to Google Drive, Dropbox and Kindle and HTML full text views.

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 29 *
View data table for this chart

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 14th April 2021. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

99
Cited by

Send article to Kindle

To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics
Available formats
×

Send article to Dropbox

To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics
Available formats
×

Send article to Google Drive

To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Your details

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *