With the submission to the Permanent Court of International Justice of the dispute over the sovereignty of East Greenland, a controversy of long standing between Denmark and Norway approaches a solution. The question first became acute in 1919, but an understanding of the conflicting claims upon which the parties rest their cases can be gained only by an examination of the more remote historical factors involved. Without attempting definitive opinions in a case concerning which complete information is not available, the writer wishes to examine the various claims which have been advanced, and to evaluate their relative importance in the settlement of the dispute.

The events in Manchuria during the fall of 1931 have again focussed considerable attention upon the problems of treaty enforcement, a matter which has attracted great interest since Bethmann-Hollweg’s famous statement about “a scrap of paper” in 1914. The discussion and study of sanctions, of implementation and putting “teeth” into pacts and treaties, have been widespread since 1919, and two or three schools of thought have arisen in regard to this question, which is one of important current political and legal concern.

It is not necessary to make a profound study of the work of the League of Nations in the sphere of minorities protection to realize the importance of the I Minorities Section of the Secretariat, of the minorities petition and of the Minorities Committees (usually called “the Committees of Three”). Indeed it is difficult to imagine how the guarantee of the League could have been given substantial reality without these three institutions. At first sight it would appear remarkable that the treaty articles upon which the present procedure is based should make not the slightest mention of any provision concerning these institutions. This is nevertheless the fact. All the rules (with only one exception) concerning the functions of the Minorities Section and of the Minorities Committees and the nature of the minorities petition have been established unilaterally by resolution of the Council.

A brief description of Belgium’s geography and history is essential to make clear how the present tangled legal situation arose respecting Belgium’s neutrality since its violation in 1914. Belgium is one of those nations, like Palestine and Luxemburg, which, unfortunately for their tranquillity, lie across the easiest route between two powerful states. Her history is largely the story of the passage of armies up and down the Meuse, between France and Germany. The names of Rocroi, Sedan, Namur and Liege tell the story of the importance of this highway.

The Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, which was signed at Geneva on April 20, 1929, was the natural outgrowth of a conviction, held by the majority of states, that the counterfeiting of currency was an international crime, and moreover, that it was one of a decidedly virulent and insidious character. Had this belief not been widely prevalent, the proposal of the French Government that the League of Nations should undertake the drafting of a convention for the suppression of this crime would have fallen on barren ground. As it was, the existence of the conviction that the whole community of states had an interest in the repression of this form of criminality was what made the agreement at all possible. Repeatedly, especially during the years immediately preceding the drafting of this convention, the states had had occasion to observe that purely national action against counterfeiters was often insufficient, and that international action was in many cases extremely difficult, if not, impossible. Thus, in the face of this common menace, with which separately the states were unable to cope, they came in time to realize that international cooperation was necessary, and what is more, that it was imperative, if they were to make any headway in the prevention and punishment of such crime.

During the early years of independence there existed in America two schools of political thinking. The one, of which Alexander Hamilton was the great exponent, emphasized the rights of government as against those of the individual, while the other, which found its leader in Thomas Jefferson, stressed the rights of the individual as against those of government.