“Seldom has an apparent major change in international law been accomplished by peaceful means more rapidly and amidst more general acquiescence and approval,” Lauterpacht observed of continental shelf claims nearly seventy years ago. When considered today, this observation merits a caveat, as the question of how far the continental shelf extends into the sea is not yet fully settled. This article explores the customary international law applicable for determining continental shelf limits and also examines the legal procedures used by states to gain international acceptance of those limits.

This article challenges the conventional wisdom that MFN clauses in investment treaties can always be used to “import” substantive standards of treatment (e.g. FET). It argues that most tribunals permitting this use of MFN clauses have relied on presumptions and have ignored meaningful variations among clauses. It also points out that states are increasingly questioning the conventional view, and that a recent arbitral award has firmly rejected an attempt to use an MFN clause to import substantive standards. It concludes by sketching the terms of the new MFN debate.

Most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses have been included in international commercial treaties for many centuries. They also figure prominently as standard provisions in almost any international investment agreement (IIA). Their longstanding and widespread use notwithstanding, investment law doctrine and arbitral practice continue to struggle with the clauses’ application and interpretation, in particular as regards their scope of application. What Stanley Hornbeck observed more than one hundred years ago in this Journal, that “there appear[s] constant disagreements and ever-recurring irritation over what is the meaning and what are the obligations attaching to this or that [MFN] clause,” still characterizes the practice of investment tribunals and the literature on MFN clauses in IIAs today.

For readers whose first introduction to Shakespeare was through the widely seen film Henry V by Laurence Olivier, it is not surprising that Shakespeare was regarded as a patriotic, nationalistic and militaristic, rather pro-war playwright. Olivier's Henry V, as Ton Hoenselaars points out in his “Out-Ranting the Enemy Leader”: Henry V and/as World War II Propaganda, was entrenched in the British propaganda effort even before the thought of the film version of the war epic had occurred. Indeed, the film resulted from an invitation to produce it for the Churchill government. According to William Shaw, Olivier's film produced uplifting, patriotic propaganda for a war-weary England. It was the first Shakespeare play produced in Technicolor.

As part of the “America First” agenda discussed in his inaugural address, President Donald J. Trump promised that “[e]very decision” on trade, among other areas, would be “made to benefit American workers and American families.” During its first months, the Trump Administration made a number of trade moves apparently in connection with this “America First” trade agenda, including initiating national security investigations into steel and aluminum imports under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and preparing an “omnibus” report on trade deficits. The Trump Administration also took steps to alter U.S. treaty relationships, by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, announcing the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and requesting a special session of a joint committee created under the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement. In August 2017, President Trump continued this course—and indicated a willingness to take unilateral action against U.S. trading partners—by signing a presidential memorandum directing the United States Trade Representative to determine whether China's treatment of U.S. intellectual property warranted investigation under Section 301 et seq. of the Trade Act of 1974.

On August 24, 2017, the Supreme Court of India issued a rare, unanimous nine-judge decision holding that the right to privacy is protected by the Constitution of India. The case is all the more noteworthy because the Court reversed its prior decisions holding that the right to privacy was not protected by the country's Constitution. It arose out of the government's creation of a national database of biometric and demographic information for every Indian. Rejecting the government's arguments, the Court found that the right to privacy applies across the gamut of “fundamental” rights including equality, dignity (Article 14), speech, expression (Article 19), life, and liberty (Article 21). The six separate and concurring judgments in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Ret'd) and Anr v. Union of India and Ors are trailblazing for their commitment to privacy as a fundamental freedom and for the judges’ use of foreign law across jurisdictions and spanning centuries.

On February 26, 2016, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Court) issued an advisory opinion requested by the Republic of Panama (Advisory Opinion). The request stemmed from “doubts among States” as to whether “legal persons, being legal fictions, are not as such entitled to rights” (Request) (para. 2). The Court unanimously held that legal persons are not entitled to rights under the American Convention on Human Rights (Convention) because Article 1.2 of the Convention establishes rights only in favor of natural persons. The Court, also unanimously, reiterated that indigenous and tribal communities are entitled to rights under the Convention. By majority vote, the Court held that labor union organizations are entitled to rights under the Protocol of San Salvador (Protocol). The Advisory Opinion is most significant for its finding regarding labor union organizations and for its analysis of how general international law relates to various aspects of the Inter-American system.

On July 6, 2017, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (the Court or ICC)—composed of Judges Tarfusser, Perrin de Brichambaut, and Chung—held that South Africa violated the Rome Statute of the ICC (Rome Statute) by failing to arrest and surrender to the Court President Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan when he visited the country in June 2015. However, the Court did not refer the matter to the ICC Assembly of States Parties (ASP) or the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute. The decision added South Africa to a list of ICC state parties that have failed in their Rome Statute obligations with respect to the incumbent head of state of Sudan. It also marked the first time that the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), all ICC states parties, and the United Nations (UN) were invited to present their views and argue fully what is perhaps the most legally contentious and politically sensitive issue that the ICC has faced in its history.

In July 2017, Congress passed the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. The legislation—which enjoyed nearly unanimous legislative support—contained sanctions targeting Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Title II of the Act—titled separately as the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (Countering Russian Influence Act)—entrenched and extended U.S. sanctions against Russia for violating Ukraine's territorial sovereignty and interfering with the U.S. presidential election. Title II's key provisions codified existing sanctions against Russia; imposed new sanctions against Russia; and restricted the president's authority to modify or eliminate these sanctions without congressional approval. Despite voicing constitutional objections to the legislation, President Trump signed the bill into law.

On July 11, 2017, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and Qatar, thereby establishing a joint plan to investigate and eliminate the financing of terrorism. The agreement was signed against a backdrop of conflict between Qatar and a number of its regional neighbors, particularly Saudi Arabia. While it appears that negotiations between Qatar and the United States predated the formal standoff between Qatar and its neighbors, Qatar has invoked the MOU to defend itself against Saudi accusations of terror financing.

In June 2017, President Donald Trump announced a plan to roll back various steps taken by his predecessor toward normalizing relations between the United States and Cuba. A senior official for the administration announced the plan in a White House press briefing:

On September 3, 2016, the United States deposited with the UN its instrument of acceptance for the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. The agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016. Following the change of U.S. presidential administrations, new President Donald Trump announced less than seven months later that the United States would withdraw from the Agreement. On August 4, 2017, the United States communicated this intention to the United Nations secretary-general, who serves as the depositary for the agreement.

The United States' total trade deficit in 2016 was $502.3 billion. President Trump believes that the deficit—and especially its consequences (“wealth … stripped from our country”), causes (“bad trade deals”), and images (“shuttered factories”)—played a prominent role in his electoral success in 2016. Since taking office, Trump has signed a series of executive orders and memoranda on trade in order to fulfill various campaign promises on this front. The executive orders and memoranda focus mainly on gathering information and laying groundwork for future executive action. Taken together, they signal the Trump administration's intention to address the United States' trade deficits, especially with China.

As the civil war in Syria continues, some of the key actors have sought ways to reduce the conflict's toll on civilians. In May, 2007, Russia and the United States began exploring the possibility of establishing “safe” or “de-escalation” zones. On July 7, this dialogue yielded a trilateral agreement and memorandum signed by Russia, the United States, and Jordan to establish a ceasefire in southwest Syria. The resulting ceasefire—the first in Syria signed by the Trump administration—governs hostilities between Syrian government forces and associated troops on one side and rebels on the other. It began on July 9.

In July 2015, Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and the European Union adopted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Pursuant to that agreement, Iran committed to limiting the scope and content of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from various nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the other signatories. By law, the U.S. State Department is required to certify Iran's compliance with the agreement every ninety days. The Trump administration first certified Iran's compliance with the agreement in April 2017, albeit reluctantly. In its first certification, the Trump administration expressed ongoing concern about Iran's sponsorship of terrorism, and repeated previous criticism of the JCPOA as “fail[ing] to achieve the objective of a non-nuclear Iran.”

The United States is more than fifteen years into a fight against terrorism that shows no sign of abating and, with the change in administration, appears to be intensifying. Other Western democracies that have historically been uneasy about U.S. counterterrorism policies have, in recent years, shifted toward those policies. And armed nonstate groups continue to commit large-scale acts of violence in multiple distinct theaters. The legal issues that these situations present are not entirely new, but neither are they going away. Recent publications, like the three works under review, thus provide useful opportunities to reflect on and refine our thinking on them.