¹ See e.g., AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413 (N.Z.); Teitiota v. The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment [2013] NZHC 3125 (N.Z.) [hereinafter Teitiota HC]; Teitiota v. The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2014] NZCA 173 (N.Z.) [hereinafter Teitiota CA]; Teitiota v. The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment [2015] NZSC 107 (N.Z.) [hereinafter Teitiota SC]; AF (Tuvalu) [2015] NZIPT 800859 (N.Z.); AD (Tuvalu) [2014] NZIPT 501370 (N.Z.); AC (Tuvalu) [2014] NZIPT 800517–520 (N.Z.); and earlier cases cited in McAdam, Jane, The Emerging New Zealand Jurisprudence on Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement, 3 Migration Stud. 131, 139 n. 2 (2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Scott, Matthew, Finding Agency in Adversity: Applying the Refugee Convention in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change, 35 Refugee Surv. Q. 26, 27 nn. 6–7 (2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar [hereinafter Scott, Finding Agency]; Matthew Scott, Climate Change, Disasters and the Refugee Convention, at ch. 3 (2020) [hereinafter Scott, Climate Change]. As both McAdam and Scott note, over an even longer period of time, decision makers have examined cases concerning nonremoval to the impacts of disasters or prolonged drought.

² Human Rights Comm., Teitiota v. New Zealand, UN Doc. CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 (Oct. 24, 2019) [hereinafter Teitiota HRC]. Although the Committee's “views,” which will be referred to in this article as a “decision,” are not legally binding on states, they are grounded in international legal obligations that do bind states.

³ Kenneth R. Weiss, The Making of a Climate Refugee, For. Pol'y (Jan. 28, 2015), at https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/28/the-making-of-a-climate-refugee-kiribati-tarawa-teitiota.

⁴ Teitiota HRC, supra note 2, para. 9.11.

⁵ Id., para. 9.14.

⁶ Miriam Cullen, The UN Human Rights Committee's Recent Decision on Climate Displacement, Asylum Insight (Feb. 2020), at https://www.asyluminsight.com/c-miriam-cullen?rq=cullen#.XlcOITIzaOU.

⁷ Id.

⁸ Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, para. 30, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018) [hereinafter General Comment No. 36] (referring also to Human Rights Committee, Kindler v. Canada, paras. 13.1–13.2, UN Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (Nov. 11, 1993)): “The duty to respect and ensure the right to life requires States parties to refrain from deporting, extraditing or otherwise transferring individuals to countries in which there are substantial grounds for believing that a real risk exists that their right to life under article 6 of the Covenant would be violated.” Id., para. 31 notes that: “The obligation not to extradite, deport or otherwise transfer pursuant to article 6 of the Covenant may be broader than the scope of the principle of non refoulement under international refugee law, since it may also require the protection of aliens not entitled to refugee status.”

⁹ See, e.g., International Law Association Res. 6/2018, Annex, Sydney Declaration of Principles on the Protection of Persons Displaced in the Context of Sea Level Rise (Aug. 2018) [hereinafter Sydney Declaration]; Jane McAdam, Bruce Burson, Walter Kälin & Sanjula Weerasinghe, International Law and Sea-Level Rise: Forced Migration and Human Rights (Fridtjof Nansen Institute & Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, FNI Report No. 1, 2016); Walter Kälin & Nina Schrepfer, Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change: Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches, at 10, UNHCR PPLA/2012/01 (2012); Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law (2012); Nansen Initiative on Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement, Protection for Persons Moving Across Borders in the Context of Disasters: A Guide to Effective Practices for RCM Member Countries, 12 n. 15 (Nov. 2016), available at https://disasterdisplacement.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/PROTECTION-FOR-PERSONS-MOVING-IN-THE-CONTEXT-OF-DISASTERS.pdf [hereinafter RCM Guide]. In 2018, states themselves reaffirmed their obligations under human rights law not to return people to situations of irreparable harm, in a document that recognized risks linked to climate change, disasters, and environmental degradation. GA Res. 73/195, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, obj. 21, para. 37 (Dec. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Migration Compact]. Note, too, a decision by the Austrian Constitutional Court affirming “the applicability, in principle, of the prohibition of inhuman treatment to such returns.” Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 9, at 36, see n. 147 for details.

¹⁰ Teitiota HRC, supra note 2, para. 9.13 (“including the prevailing conditions in Kiribati, the foreseen risks to the author and the other inhabitants of the islands, the time left for the Kiribati authorities and the international community to intervene and the efforts already underway to address the very serious situation of the islands”) As Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 9, at 35, explain, “it is not the behavior of the state of destination that is being adjudicated but that of the state whose authorities order the expulsion or deportation. Thus, it is the sending state that acts inhumanely and violates its obligations if and when, despite being aware of the danger, it sets a key element in the chain of events leading to torture, ill-treatment or death.”

¹¹ Cullen, supra note 6, has suggested that its significance may be more political than legal.

¹² Benedikt Behlert, “A Significant Opening,” VölkerrechtsBlog (Jan. 30, 2020), at https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/a-significant-opening; Teitiota SC, supra note 1, paras. 4–7.

¹³ Under the Citizenship Act 1977 (N.Z.), s. 6(1)(b), children born in New Zealand after January 1, 2006 are not eligible for citizenship unless a parent is a New Zealand citizen or is entitled to reside indefinitely in New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Niue, or Tokelau. Teitiota SC, supra note 1, para. 4, n. 4.

¹⁴ Weiss, supra note 3.

¹⁵ Id.

¹⁶ This was pursuant to the Immigration Act 2009 (N.Z.), ss. 129–31 which expressly refers to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 UNTS 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 [hereinafter CAT]; and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].

¹⁷ Teitiota HRC, supra note 2, para. 4.2.

¹⁸ AF (Kiribati), supra note 1. For analysis, see McAdam, supra note 1; Scott, Finding Agency, supra note 1.

¹⁹ Teitiota HC, supra note 1; Teitiota CA, supra note 1; Teitiota SC, supra note 1.

²⁰ Teitiota HRC, supra note 2, para. 1.2.

²¹ Id., para. 4.4.

²² Id., para. 2.1.

²³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), GRID 2019: Global Report on Internal Displacement, 1 (2019), at https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2019; IDMC, GRID 2018: Global Report on Internal Displacement, 6–7 (2018), at https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2018. There is no systematic data on cross-border displacement in this context, but there is evidence that most people remain in countries within the same geographical region. IDMC, GRID 2017: Global Report on Internal Displacement, 53 (2017), at https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2017.

²⁴ Daniel G. Huber & Jay Gulledge, Extreme Weather and Climate Change: Understanding the Link and Managing the Risk, Ctr. Climate & Energy Solutions, 2 (Dec. 2011), available at https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2011/12/white-paper-extreme-weather-climate-change-understanding-link-managing-risk.pdf.

²⁵ See, e.g., Sanjula Weerasinghe, In Harm's Way: International Protection in the Context of Nexus Dynamics Between Conflict or Violence and Disaster or Climate Change, UNHCR, PPLA/2018/05 (2018).

²⁶ McAdam, Burson, Kälin & Weerasinghe, supra note 9, at 21.

²⁷ GRID 2019, supra note 23, at 41 (footnote omitted).

²⁸ Note that the Kampala Convention includes an obligation to “take measures to protect and assist persons who have been internally displaced due to natural or human made disasters, including climate change.” African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, Art. 5(4), Oct. 23, 2009, 52 ILM 400 (2013) (emphasis added).

²⁹ AF (Kiribati), supra note 1, para. 56; Teitiota HC, supra note 1, para. 54; Teitiota CA, supra note 1, para. 19.

³⁰ Sydney Declaration, supra note 9 (footnotes omitted). See also AF (Kiribati), supra note 1, para. 64. In such cases, the broader regional refugee definitions may apply. Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa of 10 September 1969, Art. 1(2), Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 UNTS 45; Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66/doc.10 rev. 1, 190–93 conclusion III(3) (1984). See further for analysis of whether the regional refugee treaties provide protection, Tamara Wood, Protection and Disasters in the Horn of Africa: Norms and Practice for Addressing Cross-Border Displacement in Disaster Contexts (2013); David J. Cantor, Law, Policy, and Practice Concerning the Humanitarian Protection of Aliens on a Temporary Basis in the Context of Disasters 23–31 (2015); McAdam, Burson, Kälin & Weerasinghe, supra note 9, paras. 85–91.

³¹ AF (Kiribati), supra note 1, paras. 55–70; AC (Tuvalu), supra note 1, paras. 84–86, 97.

³² Scott, Finding Agency, supra note 1, 27; Scott, Climate Change, supra note 1, ch. 7 in particular. The United Nations Office of Disaster Disk Reduction's (UNDRR) definition of “disaster’ reflects this approach, see UNDRR, Disaster, at https://www.undrr.org/terminology/disaster.

³³ Weerasinghe, supra note 25, at 10.

³⁴ Id.

³⁵ ICCPR, supra note 16, Arts. 6–7; Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), para. 9 (Mar. 10, 1992); Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 [80]: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, Mar. 29, 2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 12; CAT, supra note 16, Art. 3; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Arts. 6, 37(a), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 UNTS 3; Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6 (2005): Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside Their Country of Origin, para. 27, UN Doc. CRC/GC/2005/6 (Sept. 1, 2005); Global Compact for Migration, supra note 9, obj. 21, para. 37. See further Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, ch. 6 (3d ed. 2007); Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion, in Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR's Global Consultations on International Protection 87 (Erika Feller, Volker Türk & Frances Nicholson eds., 2003).

³⁶ European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 5, 213 UNTS 221 [hereinafter ECHR]); see also Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 19(2), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 OJ (C 326) 391; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Art. 5, June 17, 1981, 21 ILM 58 (1982); Arab Charter on Human Rights, Art. I, May 22, 2004, reprinted in 893 Int'l Hum. Rts. Rep. (2005).

³⁷ Article 2 claims are generally raised in conjunction with Article 3, and if the latter provision is found to have been violated, then the Article 2 claim generally falls away. See, e.g., D v. United Kingdom, 24 EHRR 423 (1997); Bader v. Sweden, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R 75; In N.A. v. Finland, App. No. 25244/18, HUDOC (Nov. 14, 2019), at https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-198465 the provisions were considered together.

³⁸ Human Rights Comm., Judge v. Canada, para. 10.10, UN Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 (Aug. 5, 2002); noted with approval in Human Rights Comm., Kwok Yin Fong v. Australia, para. 9.4, UN Doc. CCPR/C/97/D/1442/2005 (Oct. 23, 2009).

³⁹ Mr. Teitiota did not raise the ICCPR Article 7 claim. Teitiota HRC, supra note 2, para. 1.1.

⁴⁰ Id., para. 3.

⁴¹ Id., para. 9.6; see also id., para. 2.7.

⁴² Id., para. 9.6.

⁴³ Id., para. 9.4.

⁴⁴ Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, para. 162 (June 17, 2005) (referring to Case of the “Juvenile Reeducation Institute” v. Paraguay, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment (ser. C) No. 112, para. 159 (Sept. 2, 2004)).

⁴⁵ See, e.g., M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 255, para. 249; Sufi and Elmi v. United Kingdom, 54 EHRR 9 (2012). These cases are discussed further below.

⁴⁶ Teitiota HRC, supra note 2, para. 9.8 (emphasis added). But cf. id. Individual Opinion of Committee Member Duncan Laki Muhumuza (dissenting), para. 5: “The considerable difficulty in accessing fresh water because of the environmental conditions, should be enough to reach the threshold of risk, without being a complete lack of fresh water.”

⁴⁷ Teitiota HRC, supra note 2, para. 9.9 (emphasis added).

⁴⁸ See further McAdam, Burson, Kälin & Weerasinghe, supra note 9, para. 93; McAdam, supra note 9, ch. 3. Other Human Rights Committee cases on socioeconomic deprivation have focused on the applicant's particular vulnerability, but in doing so appear to have assessed the conditions in a cumulative manner, with far less articulation of specific thresholds for specific rights whose violation is alleged. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., R.A.A. and Z.M. v. Denmark, para. 7.8, UN Doc. CCPR/C/118/D/2608/2015 (Oct. 28, 2016); Human Rights Comm., Y.A.A. and F.H.M. v. Denmark, para. 7.9, UN Doc. CCPR/C/119/D/2681/2015 (Mar. 10, 2017).

⁴⁹ Scott, Climate Change, supra note 1, at 109, however, argues that it would be better to take a holistic approach that focuses on harm “as a condition of existence, as distinct from an isolated act or accumulation of measures.”

⁵⁰ UNHCR, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, para. 53, HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 4 (1979, reissued 2019). Furthermore, “sometimes a small incident may be ‘the last straw’; and although no single incident may be sufficient, all the incidents related by the applicant taken together, could make his fear ‘well-founded.’” Id., para. 201.

⁵¹ See, e.g., Sufi and Elmi, supra note 45, paras. 291–92; M.S.S., supra note 45. In 2016, the eleven member countries of the Regional Conference of Migration (Belize, Canada, Costa Rica, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and the United States of America) acknowledged that human rights-based non-refoulement obligations “could perhaps apply, mutatis mutandis, to [disaster] situations, especially if the cumulative conditions in those countries amounted a threat to life or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. RCM Guide, supra note 9, at 12 n. 15.

⁵² Teitiota HRC, supra note 2, para. 1.1.

⁵³ See AF (Kiribati), supra note 1, paras. 94–95.

⁵⁴ BG (Fiji) [2012] NZIPT 800091, para. 148 (N.Z.). By contrast, if a state withheld post-disaster assistance on a discriminatory basis, for example, this could potentially constitute ill-“treatment” of the affected population. AC (Tuvalu), supra note 1, para. 84. Note that the European Court of Human Rights regards the relevant “treatment” as the state's act of removing the individual. See, e.g., D v. United Kingdom, supra note 37; Sufi and Elmi, supra note 45.

⁵⁵ Although as the Tribunal noted, this “should not be understood as meaning that cruel treatment for the purposes of section 131 of the Act could never arise in the context of natural disasters.” AC (Tuvalu), supra note 1, para. 83.

⁵⁶ AF (Kiribati), supra note 1, para. 94. The scope of Article 7 was considered in more detail in a case concerning a family from Tuvalu who resisted removal on the grounds of climate change-related harms. There, the Tribunal stated that “complicated issues arise for consideration,” including “whether the harm feared is of sufficient seriousness or severity to fall within the scope of Article 7 of the ICCPR.” AC (Tuvalu), supra note 1, para. 68. See further id. discussion at paras. 76–98, 99–114.

⁵⁷ “Treatment” is not defined; the Committee has noted only that it is unnecessary “to draw up a list of prohibited acts or to establish sharp distinctions between the different kinds of punishment or treatment; the distinctions depend on the nature, purpose and severity of the treatment applied.” See Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 20, supra note 35, para. 4. The question is whether the state can ameliorate the risk by providing protection; by analogy, where the danger emanates from private actors, can the receiving state obviate it by providing appropriate protection? HLR v. France, 26 EHRR 29, para. 40 (1997).

⁵⁸ Teitiota HRC, supra note 2, para. 9.3 (referring to General Comment No. 36, supra note 8, para. 30; Human Rights Comm., B.D.K. v. Canada, para. 7.3, UN Doc. CCPR/C/125/D/3041/2017 (June 6, 2019); Human Rights Comm., K v. Denmark, para. 7.3, UN Doc. CCPR/C/114/D/2393/2014 (Sept. 11, 2015)). In commenting on Mr. Teitiota's fear of violent land disputes, the Committee observed that “a general situation of violence is only of sufficient intensity to create a real risk of irreparable harm under articles 6 or 7 of the Covenant in the most extreme cases, where there is a real risk of harm simply by virtue of an individual being exposed to such violence on return, or where the individual in question is in a particularly vulnerable situation.” Teitiota HRC, supra note 2, para. 9.7 (footnotes omitted).

⁵⁹ See General Comment No. 20, supra note 35, para. 2; ILC, Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, Draft Articles and Commentary, in Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty Eighth Session, ch. IV, Draft Arts. 9–11, UN Doc. A/71/10 (2016). The New Zealand Tribunal stated that “it is simply not within the power” of a state “to mitigate the underlying environmental drivers of [climate change-related] hazards,” and “equat[ing] such inability with a failure of state protection goes too far . . . plac[ing] an impossible burden on a state.” AC (Tuvalu), supra note 1, para. 75.

⁶⁰ European courts have acknowledged that return to situations of serious destitution or dire humanitarian conditions may amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in some cases. See, e.g., M.S.S., supra note 45, para. 249; Sufi and Elmi, supra note 45; Case C-562/13, Centre public d'action sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-La-Neuve v. Abdida, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2453, para. 50 (Dec. 18, 2014). In N v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 1 WLR 1182, the English Court of Appeal suggested that “a claim to be protected from the harsh effects of a want of resources,” id., para. 38, “is only justified where the humanitarian appeal of the case is so powerful that it could not in reason be resisted by the authorities of a civilised State,” id., para. 40. The European jurisprudence is fraught and different tests have been applied. For analysis, see Cathryn Costello, The Search for the Outer Edges of Non-refoulement in Europe: Exceptionality and Flagrant Breaches, in Human Rights and the Refugee Definition: Comparative Legal Practice and Theory 180, 194–97 (Bruce Burson & David J. Cantor eds., 2016); Cathryn Costello, The Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European Law 185–90 (2016).

⁶¹ Teitiota HRC, supra note 2, para. 9.11.

⁶² See note 54 supra and corresponding text.

⁶³ Walter Kälin & Jörg Künzli, The Law of International Human Rights Protection 533 (2d ed. 2019). Thank you to Walter Kälin for suggesting this framing.

⁶⁴ This was intimated by one of the Human Rights Committee members at a seminar in February 2020. By contrast, see AC (Tuvalu), supra note 1 and AD (Tuvalu), supra note 1 for specific consideration of the children's rights.

⁶⁵ See text at note 71 infra and discussion in Anderson, Adrienne, Foster, Michelle, Lambert, Hélène & McAdam, Jane, A Well-Founded Fear of Being Persecuted . . . But When?, 42 Sydney L. Rev. 155 (2020)Google Scholar. Note, too, UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Child Asylum Claims Under Article 1(A)2 and 1(F) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, para. 36, HCR/GIP/09/08 (Dec. 22, 2009) (emphasis added), which requires that “it is important to assess the consequences of such acts for each child concerned, now and in the future.”

⁶⁶ Communication to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, Sacchi v. Argentina, para. 14 (Sept. 23, 2019), available at https://childrenvsclimatecrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/2019.09.23-CRC-communication-Sacchi-et-al-v.-Argentina-et-al.pdf. On the latter, see Edith Brown Weiss, Intergenerational Equity, in A Global Pact for the Environment: Legal Foundations 51 (Yann Aguila & Jorge E. Viñuales eds., 2019); Sumudu Atapattu, Intergenerational Equity and Children's Rights: The Role of Sustainable Development and Justice, in Children's Rights and Sustainable Development: Interpreting the UNCRC for Future Generations 167 (Claire Fenton-Glynn ed., 2019).

⁶⁷ Teitiota HRC, supra note 2, para. 9.4 (referring to General Comment No. 36, supra note 8, para. 62).

⁶⁸ Id., para. 9.4; see also id., paras. 9.7–9.9 (where it is framed slightly differently). See further Human Rights Comm., Toussaint v. Canada, para. 11.3, UN Doc. CCPR/C/123/D/2348/2014 (July 24, 2018); Human Rights Comm., Cáceres v. Paraguay, para. 7.5, UN Doc. CCPR/C/126/D/2751/2016 (Sept. 20, 2019). The “real, personal and reasonably foreseeable risk” test has been applied by the Committee Against Torture (e.g., Comm. Against Torture, Aemei v. Switzerland, para. 9.5, UN Doc. CAT/C/18/D/34/1995 (May 29, 1997); Comm. Against Torture, AR v. Netherlands, paras. 7.3, 7.6, UN Doc. CAT/C/31/D/203/2002 (Nov. 21, 2003)). It is based on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to Article 3 of the ECHR. See Soering v. United Kingdom 161 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) paras. 86, 90, 92, 98, 104, 111 (1989). “Foreseeable” is discussed at id., paras. 86, 90, 92. The Human Rights Committee has not always applied this test, at times requiring that a risk be both “necessary and foreseeable.” Human Rights Comm., ARJ v. Australia, para. 6.8, UN Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996 (Aug. 11, 1997) (which imposes an additional hurdle). See discussion in Anderson, Adrienne, Foster, Michelle, Lambert, Hélène & McAdam, Jane, Imminence in Refugee and Human Rights Law: A Misplaced Notion for International Protection, 68 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 111, 135–39 (2019)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁹ Anderson, Foster, Lambert & McAdam, supra note 65. The authors note by way of analogy that in situations of generalized violence, the Court of Justice of the European Union has stated that “the more the applicant is able to show that he is specifically affected by reason of factors particular to his personal circumstances, the lower the level of indiscriminate violence required for him to be eligible for subsidiary protection.” Case C-465/07, Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 2009 ECR I-00921, para. 39.

⁷⁰ CPE15 v. Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 591, para. 60 (Austl.). This and the next few cases are discussed in Anderson, Foster, Lambert & McAdam, supra note 65.

⁷¹ 1703914 (Refugee) [2018] AATA 3088, para. 75 (June 8, 2018) (Austl.). The case concerned the potential risk to an Ethiopian child (who was a toddler at the time of the decision) of being subjected to corporal punishment at school.

⁷² 1001683 [2010] RRTA 506, para. 75 (June 23, 2010) (Austl.). The Israeli applicant was in his forties and could be called up for service until age fifty-one (even though this was uncommon).

⁷³ Mok v. Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (No. 1) (1993) 47 FCR 1, para. 96 (Austl.); see also Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs v. Mok (1994) 55 FCR 375 (Austl.).

⁷⁴ 1703914 (Refugee), supra note 71, para. 75; see also 1319201 [2014] RRTA 835, para. 33 (Dec. 2, 2014) (Austl.); 1314106 [2014] RRTA 796, para. 30 (Nov. 13, 2014) (Austl.).

⁷⁵ Teitiota HRC, supra note 2, para. 9.12.

⁷⁶ Id., para. 9.12. See also AF (Kiribati), supra note 1, para. 89; AC (Tuvalu), supra note 1, paras. 58, 102, 109.

⁷⁷ Teitiota HRC, supra note 2, para. 9.12.

⁷⁸ Id., para. 9.6.

⁷⁹ This paragraph draws on Anderson, Foster, Lambert & McAdam, supra note 68, at 133–35.

⁸⁰ Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report 13 (Core Writing Team, Rajendra K. Pachauri & Leo Meyer eds., 2014) [hereinafter Pachauri & Meyer].

⁸¹ Id. at 16.

⁸² Id. at 15.

⁸³ Chan v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, 389 (Dawson, J.) (Austl.), citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); Refugee Appeal No. 71404/99 [1999] NZRSAA 292, paras. 26–27 (N.Z.).

⁸⁴ Anderson, Foster, Lambert & McAdam, supra note 68, at 138.

⁸⁵ Pachauri & Meyer, supra note 80, at 26 (emphasis omitted).

⁸⁶ Id. at 20 (emphasis omitted).

⁸⁷ Anderson, Foster, Lambert & McAdam, supra note 65 (footnote omitted).

⁸⁸ Id. (footnote omitted).

⁸⁹ “The assessment of the intensity, severity, and nature of future harm, based on its foreseeability in light of the individual's circumstances, is the crucial factor.” Anderson, Foster, Lambert & McAdam, supra note 68, at 135, referring to Michelle Foster, International Refugee Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from Deprivation 192–93 (2007).

⁹⁰ Teitiota HRC, supra note 2, para. 9.14.

⁹¹ Regrettably, a notion of imminence has started to infiltrate decision making in this area. Anderson, Foster, Lambert & McAdam, supra note 68; Anderson, Foster, Lambert & McAdam, supra note 65. Arguably, the Human Rights Committee has entrenched this further by transplanting its procedural consideration of imminence (namely, whether someone meets admissibility requirements as a “victim” of a violation (Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171 [hereinafter ICCPR Op. Prot. I]) to the substantive consideration of the claim (namely, whether or not there is a “real risk” of harm).

⁹² Teitiota HRC, supra note 2, at Annex 2, para. 5, Individual Opinion of Muhumuza (dissenting), referring also to the main Committee, id., para. 9.4.

⁹³ See id., para. 9.11; id., Annex 2, para. 5 (dissent).

⁹⁴ Under ICCPR Op. Prot. I, supra note 91. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., E.W. v Netherlands, UN Doc. CCPR/C/47/D/429/1990 (Apr. 29, 1993); Human Rights Comm., Aalbersberg v. Netherlands, UN Doc. CCPR/C/87/D/1440/2005 (July 12, 2006); discussion in Anderson, Foster, Lambert & McAdam, supra note 68, at 125–28.

⁹⁵ Teitiota HRC, supra note 2, para. 9.6. See, e.g., Adaena Sinclair-Blakemore, Teitiota v. New Zealand: A Step Forward in the Protection of Climate Refugees Under International Human Rights Law?, Oxford Hum. Rts. Hub (Jan. 28, 2020), at https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/teitiota-v-new-zealand-a-step-forward-in-the-protection-of-climate-refugees-under-international-human-rights-law.

⁹⁶ Teitiota HRC, supra note 2, para. 8.5.

⁹⁷ Anderson, Foster, Lambert & McAdam, supra note 68, at 127 (footnote omitted).

⁹⁸ For a detailed mapping of relevant global instruments and policy processes, see IOM, Mapping Human Mobility (Migration, Displacement and Planned Relocation) and Climate Change in International Processes, Policies and Legal Frameworks, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Task Force on Displacement, at 8 (Aug. 2018), available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/WIM%20TFD%20II.2%20Output.pdf. See also Jane McAdam, From the Nansen Initiative to the Platform on Disaster Displacement: Shaping International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement, 39 UNSW L.J. 1518 (2016); Kälin, Walter, The Global Compact on Migration: A Ray of Hope for Disaster-Displaced Persons, 30 Int'l J. Refugee L. 664 (2018)Google Scholar. For regional developments, see note 116 and accompanying text.

⁹⁹ Nansen Initiative on Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement, Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change, Vols. 1 & 2 (2015) [hereinafter Protection Agenda]. States were encouraged to give “favourable consideration” to incorporating its insights “into national policies and practices.” UN Secretary-General, In Safety and Dignity: Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants (Report of the Secretary-General), para. 119, UN Doc. A/70/59 (Apr. 21, 2016).

¹⁰⁰ GA Res. 69/283, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (June 23, 2015). Note, also, the Cancún Adaptation Framework, which noted the importance of “[m]easures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation.” UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.16, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, in Report of the Conference of Parties on Its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, para. 14(f) (Mar. 15, 2011).

¹⁰¹ GA Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Oct. 21, 2015).

¹⁰² UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, in Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, Held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016).

¹⁰³ Id., para. 49; see also id., para. 50. In 2018, the Task Force's mandate was extended for five years.

¹⁰⁴ UN Secretary-General, One Humanity: Shared Responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit, Annex viii, UN Doc. A/70/709 (Feb. 2, 2016).

¹⁰⁵ GA Res. 71/1, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, paras. 1, 18, 43, 50 (Sept. 19, 2016).

¹⁰⁶ Weaker language is included in the Global Compact on Refugees. See Rep. of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Part II Global Compact on Refugees, paras. 8, 12, 63, UN Doc. A/73/12 (Part II) (Sept. 13, 2018); although see Türk, Volker & Garlick, Madeline, Addressing Displacement in the Context of Disasters and the Adverse Effects of Climate Change: Elements and Opportunities in the Global Compact on Refugees, 31 Int'l J. Refugee L. 389 (2019)Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁷ Migration Compact, supra note 9, obj. 2, para. 18(h)–(l); obj. 5, para. 21(g)–(h) (Jan. 11, 2019).

¹⁰⁸ One hundred fifty-two states voted in favor of the Migration Compact, twelve abstained, and five voted against.

¹⁰⁹ Kälin, supra note 98, at 665.

¹¹⁰ Id. at 667.

¹¹¹ See Migration Compact, supra note 9, obj. 2, para. 18(h)–(l).

¹¹² Id., obj. 21, para. 37.

¹¹³ See also Protection Agenda, supra note 99, Vol. 1, paras. 87–93, 119–20. For a range of good practices, see id., Vol. 2, 40–52; Jane McAdam, Australia's Chance to Turn with the Tide, Pol'y F. (May 15, 2019), at https://www.policyforum.net/australias-chance-to-turn-with-the-tide.

¹¹⁴ Migration Compact, supra note 9, obj. 5, para. 21(g); see also Protection Agenda, supra note 97, Vol. 1, paras. 46–47, 114–15.

¹¹⁵ Migration Compact, supra note 9, obj. 5, para. 21(h); see also Protection Agenda, supra note 97, Vol. 1, paras. 94–98, 121–22; Brookings, Georgetown University & UNHCR, Guidance on Protecting People from Disasters and Environmental Change Through Planned Relocation (Oct. 7, 2015); Georgetown University, UNHCR & IOM, A Toolbox: Planning Relocations to Protect People from Disasters and Environmental Change (2017); Republic of Fiji, Planned Relocation Guidelines: A Framework to Undertake Climate Change Related Relocation (2018); Government of Vanuatu, National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement (2018).

¹¹⁶ For a very detailed overview of international and regional tools and guidance, see UNHCR, Mapping of Existing International and Regional Guidance and Tools on Averting, Minimizing, Addressing and Facilitating Durable Solutions to Displacement Related to the Adverse Impacts of Climate Change, UNFCCC Task Force on Displacement (Aug. 2018), available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/WIM%20TFD%20II.4%20Output.pdf; see also Matthew Scott, Migration/Refugee Law (2018), in Y.B. Int'l Disaster L.: 2018, at 462, 468–72 (Giulio Bartolini, Dug Cubie, Marlies Hesselman & Jacqueline Peel eds., 2020). Most recently, the eight member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda) endorsed the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons in the IGAD Region, which contains express provisions for those displaced by disasters and the adverse impacts of climate change. See IGAD, Communiqué of the Sectoral Ministerial Meeting on the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons in the IGAD Region, 26 February 2020 Khartoum, Republic of Sudan (Feb. 26, 2020), available at https://www.igad.int/attachments/article/2373/Communique%20on%20Endorsement%20of%20the%20Protocol%20of%20Free%20Movement%20of%20Persons.pdf.

¹¹⁷ See e.g., Republic of Fiji, supra note 115; Republic of Fiji, Displacement Guidelines in the Context of Climate Change and Disasters (2019), available at https://www.pacificclimatechange.net/document/displacement-guidelines-context-climate-change-and-disasters; Government of Vanuatu, supra note 115; Tasneem Siddiqui, Mohammad Towheedul Islam & Zohra Akhter, National Strategy on the Management of Disaster and Climate Induced Internal Displacement (Sept. 13, 2015), available at https://www.preventionweb.net/files/46732_nsmdciidfinalversion21sept2015withc.pdf. See further, e.g., IOM, supra note 98.

¹¹⁸ Scott, supra note 116, at 462.

¹¹⁹ The Swedish Aliens Act (2005:716), ch. 4, s. 2, provided protection to people fleeing environmental disasters, but it (along with other aspects of asylum law) was suspended in July 2016 for a three-year period, subsequently extended (in June 2019) until July 2021. (Lag 2016:752) om tillfälliga begränsningar av möjligheten att få uppehållstillstånd i Sverige); Förlängning av lagen om tillfälliga begränsningar av möjligheten att få uppehållstillstånd i Sverige (Proposition 2018/19: 128) (Swed.). The Finnish Aliens Act also provided for protection on account of environmental catastrophes (§ 88, repealed 2016), and for temporary protection in cases of mass displacement linked to an environmental disaster (§ 109). Although the literature states that the provisions have not been used successfully, a new project by Matthew Scott (personal correspondence in March 2020) suggests that they have certainly been invoked by applicants. See also Hélène Ragheboom, The International Legal Status and Protection of Environmentally-Displaced Persons: A European Perspective 352–53 (2017) (and sources there); Emily Hush, Developing a European Model of International Protection for Environmentally-Displaced Persons: Lessons from Finland and Sweden, Columbia J. Eur. L.: Prelim. Ref. Blog (Sept. 7, 2017), at http://cjel.law.columbia.edu/preliminary-reference/2017/developing-a-european-model-of-international-protection-for-environmentally-displaced-persons-lessons-from-finland-and-sweden.

¹²⁰ ILC Rep. on the Work of Its Seventieth Session, Annex B, 329, UN Doc. A/73/10 (2018).

¹²¹ The International Law Association Committee on International Law and Sea Level Rise has a two-part mandate: “(1) to study the possible impacts of sea level rise and the implications under international law of the partial and complete inundation of state territory, or depopulation thereof, in particular of small island and low-lying states; and (2) to develop proposals for the progressive development of international law in relation to the possible loss of all or of parts of state territory and maritime zones due to sea level rise, including the impacts on statehood, nationality, and human rights.” See International Law Association, International Law and Sea Level Rise: Report, pt. 1, 1 (2018).

¹²² Sydney Declaration, supra note 9.

¹²³ Id., princ. 1.

¹²⁴ Id., princ. 9.

¹²⁵ Scott, Matthew, A Role for Strategic Litigation, 49 Forced Migration Rev. 47, 47–48 (2015)Google Scholar.

¹²⁶ See further McAdam, supra note 98, at 1539–40. There are also policy reasons why courts may take a narrow approach. As the New Zealand High Court stated in Teitiota HC, supra note 1, para. 51, had the applicant's arguments been accepted and “adopted in other jurisdictions, at a stroke, millions of people who are facing medium-term economic deprivation, or the immediate consequences of natural disasters or warfare, or indeed presumptive hardships caused by climate change, would be entitled to protection under the Refugee Convention or under the ICCPR.”

¹²⁷ Indeed, it was even wrongly explained by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR): OHCHR, Historic UN Human Rights Case Opens Door to Climate Change Asylum Claims (Jan. 21, 2020) at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25482&LangID=E.

¹²⁸ Even so, it recognized that “no hard and fast rules or presumptions of non-applicability exist. Care must be taken to examine the particular features of the case.” AF (Kiribati), supra note 1, para. 64.

¹²⁹ See, e.g., Jane McAdam, Climate Refugees Cannot Be Forced Back Home, Sydney Morning Herald (Jan. 20, 2020), at https://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/climate-refugees-cannot-be-forced-back-home-20200119-p53sp4.html; Evan Wasuka, Landmark Decision from UN Human Rights Committee Paves Way for Climate Refugees, ABC News (Jan. 21, 2020), at https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-01-21/un-human-rights-ruling-worlds-first-climate-refugee-kiribati/11887070; Mélissa Godin, Climate Refugees Cannot Be Forced Home, U.N. Panel Says in Landmark Ruling, Time (Jan. 20, 2020), at https://time.com/5768347/climate-refugees-un-ioane-teitiota.

¹³⁰ The Human Rights Committee has stated that states parties to the ICCPR “must . . . allow all asylum seekers claiming a real risk of a violation of their right to life in the State of origin access to refugee or other individualized or group status determination procedures that could offer them protection against refoulement.” General Comment No. 36, supra note 8, para. 31.