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The Legality of Naval Cruise Missiles

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2017

D.P. O’Connell
D.P. O’Connell*
Affiliation:
Public International Law, University of Oxford
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Extract

The sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat by Styx missiles from a naval platform during the 1967 hostilities between Israel and the United Arab Republic demonstrated that missile technology was sufficiently developed for this weapon to be effectively deployed. The appearance of the missile in naval armament has raised old questions of international law in a new form, and it seems appropriate that they should be discussed as an aspect of the search for a system of legal controls to limit the use of the sea for strategic and political purposes. The aim of this paper is to examine the question of protection of the innocent from injury both inside and outside the target area, and in times of war and local, limited hostilities.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 66 , Issue 4 , October 1972 , pp. 785 - 794
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1972

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References

1 “The Aftermath of The Eilat,” in 95 U.S. Naval Institute Proc. 61 (1969).

2 See O’Connell, , “International Law and Contemporary Naval Operations,” 44 Brit. Y. B. of Int’l. L. (1970)Google Scholar.

3 22 Trial of the Major War Criminals 588 (1948).

4 The naval varieties of strategic missiles are Polaris A2, with a range of 1,500 nautical miles; Polaris A3 and Poseidon, with ranges of 2,500 nautical miles, which are used in the United States and Royal Navies; and the French MSBS of Polaris type, which became operational In the submarine Redoutable in 1971.

5 Information is derived from Dept of the Air Force, Guided Missiles, Operations, Designs and Theory (1958); “Maritime Missiles: The New Weapon Technology,” International Defense Review, 1969 at 247; Janes Fighting Ships, 1970–71; “World Missiles, 1971,” Flight International, 1971 at 374; “The Royal Navy’s Missile Gap,” Flight International, 1970 at 919; “USSR Improves Cruise Missile Capabilities,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, (Nov. 8, 1971) at 38.

6 Flight International, 1971 at 381.

7 Ibid. 380; Flight International, 1970 at 919.

8 Flight International, 1971 at 387; Air Force and Space Digest, 1970 at 58.

9 Flight International, 1971 at 380.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Given as 10+ nautical miles by Aviation Week and Space Technology (March 8, 1971).

13 Flight International, 1971 at 381.

14 Ibid. 378.

15 Ibid. 381.

16 This is the author’s estimate based on known performance of Styx considered to the light of range improvements in comparable weapons. See Janes 616, cited note 5 supra.

17 The suggestion has been made that in the Kynda class four separate S or C band antennae were mounted because the techniques of track-while-scan were not effective, and if the assumption is correct it bears upon the legality of the use of medium-range missiles. But for another explanation see “Soviet Radars Disclose Clues to Doctrine,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, (Feb. 22, 1971) at 38, 42.

18 The figure of 450 is given by Flight International, 1971 at 370; 400 by Weyer’s Warships of the World and 200 in Aviation Week and Space Technology (Nov 8, 1971), at 38.

19 Ibid. 38, 40.

20 The major naval powers may be expected to have intelligence over a wide area based on air reconnaissance, but lesser powers to whom these weapons may be distributed may lack this means of intelligence.