1 For a discussion of human rights violations in Grenada under the Bishop regime, see Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1982, at 138–39, 353 (1982); the Grenada section of U.S. Dep’t of State, 1982 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Dep’ts of State & Defense, Grenada: A Preliminary Report 15–17 (1983).

2 On the military buildup, see generally Grenada: A Preliminary Report, supra note 1.

3 On this neocolonization, see generally id.

4 For a general discussion of events surrounding the murder of Maurice Bishop, see, e.g., Army in Grenada Takes Over Power, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1983, at Al, col. 1; From a Grenadian Diplomat: How Party Wrangle Led to Premier’s Death, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1983, at 20, col. 1.

5 For a summary of regional responses to the attempted coup, see Dep’t of Defense, Grenada: October 25 To November 2, 1983 (1983).

6 The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) was established June 4, 1981, as a successor to the West Indies Associated States Council of Ministers, set up in September 1966. It includes seven member states with unusually close diplomatic, cultural and administrative ties, a common currency and a common market. Its members are Antigua/Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts/Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The governing treaty ofthe OECS is the OECS Treaty of Establishment, done June 18, 1981, reprinted in 20 ILM 1166 (1981). The member states of the OECS share stronger cultural and economic affinities than the members of most regional arrangements.

7 Transcript of BBC-TV interview with Grenadan Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon on “Panorama,” Oct. 31, 1983.

8 Statement by the Honorable Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State, Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Nov. 2, 1983, at 8; the major portion is reprinted infra at p. 200.

9 Id. at 7, and infra at p. 203.

10 Cheney, , What Banker Missed, Wash. Post, Nov. 14, 1983, at A17, cols. 1–2Google Scholar.

11 Id. See also Reid, & Shapiro, , Hill Democrats Back Reagan on Grenada Action, Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1983, at Al, col. 6.Google Scholar

12 Broomfield, , The President Couldn’t Wait, Wash. Post, Nov. 14, 1983, at A17, cols. 3–4.Google Scholar

13 U.S. Reports Evidence of Island Hostage Plan, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A14, col. 5.

14 For a description of the Cuban role and the military action, see generally Grenada: A Preliminary Report, supra note 1.

15 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1983, at A9, col. 6.

16 Wash. Post, Oct. 28, at A16, col. 6.

17 McCombs, , Grenada, After the Yanks, Wash. Post, Nov. 3, 1983, at Dl, cols. 2–4, and D13, cols. 1–6.Google Scholar

18 Id. at D13, col. 1.

19 Id. at D13, col. 2.

20 Bakshian, , Now, even more vindication on Grenada, Wash. Times, Dec. 2, 1983, at C2, cols. 1–4Google Scholar.

21 Grenadians Welcomed Invasion, a Poll Finds, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1983, at 21, cols. 1–6. The poll was supervised by Warren J. Mitofsky, Director of the Election and Survey Unit of CBS News.

22 Letter of December 8, 1983, from President Reagan to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House Informing the Congress of the situation in Grenada, that the Armed Conflict in Grenada Came to an End on November 2, and that all United States marines and army rangers had been withdrawn from Grenada, in 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1667–68 (Dec. 12, 1983).

23 Grenada: A Preliminary Report, supra note 1, at 1.

24 For a follow-up on the Harvard shenanigans, see the Letters to the Editor of the Record, Harv. L. Rec, Dec. 2, 1983, at 12–13.

25 GA Res. 38/7 (Nov. 2, 1983).

For a discussion of the General Assembly vote, see N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1983, at A21, cols. 1–2.

26 Although the role of the Governor-General varies from Commonwealth country to country, in some cases, as in Grenada, it is a position of considerable authority. Under Article 57 of the 1973 Constitution of Grenada, for example, the executive authority of Grenada may be exercised by the Governor-General. Moreover, Article 106 of the Constitution provides that the Constitution prevails over inconsistent laws. In a setting of breakdown of authority, as occurred in Grenada, it is generally recognized that the Governor-General may act for the nation. Certainly, the authority of the Governor-General to represent Grenada was stronger than that of anyone else following the attempted coup against the Bishop regime. Governor-General Scoon is a native and resident national of Grenada. For the 1973 Constitution, see the superseded section on Grenada in Constitutions of the Countries of the World, infra note 39.

27 See, e.g., The authorities collected in Fonteyne, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights: Recent Views from the United Nations, in Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations 197 (Lillich, R. ed. 1973)Google Scholar.

28 See, e.g., Moore, , Toward an Applied Theory for the Regulation of Intervention, in Law and Civil War in the Modern World 3, 24–25 (Moore, J. N. ed. 1974)Google Scholar; Lillich, , Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in id. at 229 Google Scholar; Reisman, & McDougal, , Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos?, in Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 27, at 167 Google Scholar. For a sample of the continuing opposition to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, see Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in Law and Civil War, supra, at 217.

29 Article 52, which appears in chapter VIII of the Charter on “Regional Arrangements,” provides in pertinent part:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

See, e.g., Moore, Toward an Applied Theory, supra note 28, at 27; Moore, , The Role of Regional Arrangements in the Maintenance of World Order, in 3 The Future of the International Legal Order 122, 153–54 (Black, C. E. & Falk, R. eds. 1971)Google Scholar.

30 See Moore, The Role of Regional Arrangements, supra note 29, at 153–54.

31 1962 ICJ Rep. 151 (Advisory Opinion of July 20).

32 Although space precludes inclusion here, perhaps the clearest legal case for regional peacekeeping action in a setting of breakdown of authority is that presented by Ambassadors Stevenson and Yost for the United States in the Security Council debate on the 1965 OAS Dominican action. See 20 UN SCOR (1220th mtg.) at 15, 16–17, UN Doc. S/PV.1220 (June 3, 1965); 20 UN SCOR (1222d mtg.) at 3, 4–5, UN Doc. S/PV.1222 (June 9, 1965). See also the excellent statement by Ambassador Ramani of Malaysia, id. at 21, 25.

33 Goodrich, L., Hambro, E. & Simons, A., Charter of The United Nations 366–67 (1969) (emphasis added)Google Scholar.

34 It may be of interest to the reader to know that, although precise supporting rationales may vary, the following leading international legal experts on use-of-force issues, among others, have taken the position that the OECS and U.S. actions were lawful in the Grenada mission: Anthony D’Amato, L. F. E. Goldie, Monroe Leigh, Howard Levie, Myres McDougal, Carlyle Maw, W. Michael Reisman, Stefan A. Riesenfeld, William D. Rogers, Eugene V. Rostow, Dean Rusk, Louis B. Sohn, Waldemar A. Solf, and John R. Stevenson.

It should be noted that the official Department of State legal analysis of the Grenada mission carefully and narrowly confines the legal basis to a combined setting of request from lawful Grenadan authority, protection of nationals and regional peacekeeping under the OECS Treaty. The United States Government has not advanced a claim of humanitarian intervention in the Grenada context. See Statement of Kenneth W. Dam, supra note 8.

For a legal analysis in support of the Grenada mission relying broadly on anticipatory defense, see Rostow, 2. Law “Is Not a Suicide Pact,” N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1983, at A35, cols. 1–3.

35 For the negotiating history of Articles 22 and 28, see 3 Novena Conferencla Internacional Americana, Actos y Documentos 1948, at 90, 226–30; 2 id. at 219; 4 id. at 23; Report of the Delegation of The United States of America to the Ninth International Conference of American States 39 (1948).

36 The Spanish and Portuguese texts both read “tratados vigentes.” The French text reads “traités en vigueur.” Spanish, Portuguese, French and English are “equally authentic” according to Article 144 of the Revised OAS Charter.

37 It is significant that no OAS member state introduced a resolution on the Grenada mission during the OAS debate and the OAS took no action questioning compliance of the mission with the OAS Charter.

38 The authority and role of the Governor-General under the Constitution of Grenada are substantial, but complex, and are in the context of a parliamentary system. Other articles of interest concerning the powers of the Governor-General include Articles 58–64, 66, 72 and 108.

For a general description of the role of the Governor-General in the British Commonwealth system, see Phillips, H., Constitutional and Administrative Law (5th ed. 1973)Google Scholar; and De Smith, S., The New Commonwealth and its Constitution (1964)Google Scholar. Although the role of the Governor-General varies from Commonwealth country to country, in some cases, as in Grenada, it is a position of considerable authority. For example, the phraseology of Article 61 “in his own deliberate judgment” is language recognized within the Commonwealth system as carrying substantial independent authority. See 1973 CONSt., supra note 26.

39 6 Halsbury’s Laws of England 28 (Cum. Supp. 1983). See also People’s Law Nos. 15 & 18, in Blaustein, & Holt, , Grenada, 6 Constitutions of the Countries of the World (Blaustein, A. & Flanz, G. eds.).Google Scholar

When inquiry was made at the time of the UN debate on Grenada, it was learned that the Ambassador of Grenada to the United Nations appointed by the ousted Bishop regime had his letter of appointment signed by Governor-General Scoon. One wonders by what legal authority the Ambassador spoke against a regional peacekeeping action requested by the same Governor- General and by what logic he joined the Cubans in arguing that a letter revoking his credentials signed by that Governor-General was without authority.

40 See the Statement by the President and the Prime Minister of Dominica Eugenia Charles on U.S. Involvement in Grenada, 9:07 A.M. EDT, Oct. 25, 1983.

41 See speech by Charles Fleming, excerpted in Department of State, Grenada Quotes File, ARA/PPC 10/28 Oct. 3134P.

42 Agence France Presse report, Oct. 27, 1983.

43 See, e.g., the OAS Declaration of Caracas, March 13, 1954, reprinted in 30 Dep’t St. Bull. 420 (1954).

44 See Remarks of the President to St. George’s Medical School Students [and vice versa], Nov. 7, 1983 (White House Office of the Press Secretary).

45 Grenadian Journalist Backs U.S. Presence, Wash. Times, Nov. 18, 1983, at A6, cols. 1–3.

46 If Article 102 is to be read in a literal sense—as the proponents of this bizarre argument apparently read it—it should be pointed out that its sanction of noninvocation applies only to parties to such unregistered treaties, and thus the United States, a nonparty, would not be affected.

47 On the Brezhnev Doctrine, see generally Goodman, , The Invasion of Czechoslovakia: 1968, 4 Int’l Law. 42 (1969)Google Scholar; Rostow, , Law and the Use of Force by States: The Brezhnev Doctrine, 7 Yale J. World pub. Ord. 209 (1981)Google Scholar; and more generally Bozeman, A., The Future of Law in a Multicultural World (1971)Google Scholar (see particularly the Pravda article justifying the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Sept. 25, 1968, at 187–93).

48 See Eliot, Grenada ≠Afghanistan, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1983, at 34, col. 3. See also Harsch, , The Case for Invading Grenada, Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 1, 1983, at 22, cols. 2–3Google Scholar.