1 Mikesell, Public International Lending for Development (1966), is a very good short descriptive analysis of the lending institutions and their policies. A good brief description of various national programs, particularly European national programs, can be found in Rubin, The Conscience of the Rich Nations 25-54 (1966), reviewed below, p. 845.

2 It is almost impossible to secure agreement on what constitutes ‘ ‘ aid.'’ The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD has estimated that total official and private “long-term” flows of financial resources to less developed countries and multilateral agencies (disbursements) amounted to something over $8 billion annually in 1962-1964 (Rubin, op. cit.note 1 above, at 154-158). However, one must keep in mind that the growing debt burden (to say nothing of repatriation of earnings on privately invested capital) means that many developing countries are obliged to repay about 50 percent of all new resources transferred. See Prebisch, Statement at 93d Plenary Meeting, Trade and Development Board, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Aug. 31, 1966 (TD/B/103/Rev. 1, Sept. 6, 1966), p. 5.

3 Proceedings of TJNCTAD, Final Act and Report, U.N. Doe. E/Conf. 46/141, Vol. I (1964), p. 44.

4 Recently the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Par East pointed out that the 1% figure was insufficient “ in view of higher costs, greater absorptive capacity and greater need in the developing countries as a result of improving technology.” New York Times, April 3, 1967.

5 Washington Post, March 3, 1960; see Metzger, International Law, Trade and Finance 130 (1962).

6 Prebisch, note 2 above, at 5, states that the figure was 0.83 percent in 1961, 0.65 percent in 1964, and 0.69 percent in 1965.

7 Isaiah Frank, , “New Perspectives on Trade and Development,” 45 Foreign Affairs 5 22(April, 1967)Google Scholar. Prof. Prank points out that earnings from exports in the latter half of the 1950's increased on the average 3% annually. In the 1960-1965 period, however, the rate has been 6% per annum.

8 Some of the conditions imposed upon countries receiving bilateral assistance from the United States are restrictions upon the terms of nationalization of, or breaches of, contract concerning American-owned property beyond those imposed by international law; restraints upon trading with Cuba, North Viet-Nam, China, the TJ.S.S.E., and countries controlled by China or the TJ.S.S.E.; the requirement that half of all cargoes financed by U.S. governmental funds be shipped in American flag vessels; and that loans be tied to American purchases. See 1 Metzger, Law of International Trade, Documents and Readings 132-137, 247; 2 ibid.1137-1151, 1154-1157; Rubin, note 1 above, at 34-35.

9 See 1 Metzger, note 8 above, at 130-132, for a colloquy during Congressional consideration of 1964 legislation to augment IDA's resources, which indicates that multilateral aid is not free of such conditions.

10 “ Note 2 above.

11 UNCTAD, Basic Documents 1 (1966), hereinafter referred to as Basic Documents.

12 The “worsening of the terms of trade” argument has been sharply disputed by many development economists. Harry G. Johnson, for example, states categorically in his very good book, Economic Policies toward Less Developed Countries 28-29 (1967), that “the alleged long-run tendency of the terms of trade to move against primary products is not consistent with the empirical evidence, which shows a succession of upward and downward short-and-medium-term trends with no clear long-term movement in either direction; nor are the theoretical explanations presented to support it logically satisfactory… . “

13 Basic Documents 4-5.

14 See Johnson, note 12 above, at 252-253, for tabulations of negative votes and abstentions of the major developed countries on the general principles adopted by resolutions passed by heavy votes of less developed countries at UNCTAD I.

15 Basic Documents 45-56.

16 Johnson, note 12 above, at 136.

17 U.S. Department of State Pub. No. 3206 (1948).

18 61 Stat. 716 (1947), 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1201 (1958).

19 Ch. V of the ITO Charter, Art. 46. Since the demise of the ITO Charter there has been no general international agreement relating to cartels.

20 Rowe, Primary Commodities in International Trade 121 (1965).

21 Rowe, ibid,at 120-155, contains a very good summary of the commodity control schemes as they evolved in this century until 1945. Earlier monographs were Knorr, Tin Under Control (1945); Wickizer, Tea under International Regulation (1944), and Bauer, The Rubber Industry (1948).

22 Rowe, note 20 above, at 141, 143.

23 Ibid,at 157.

24 Ch. VI, Art. 55.

25 Ch. VI, Arts. 60, 62, 63, 64, and 65.

26 Rowe, note 20 above, at 213; Frank, note 7 above, at 526; a note by the UNCTAD Secretariat “The Development of an International Commodity Policy,” TD/B/C.1/26, Oct. 26, 1966, at p. 3, makes this quite explicit.

27 Rowe, note 20 above, at 214-215.

28 “ T h e Development of an International Commodity Policy , “ op. cit.note 26 above,at 9.

29 Frank, note 7 above, at 528-529.

30 Rowe, note 20 above, at 214.

31 Prebisch, note 2 above, at 7-8; see also ‘ ‘ The Development of an International Commodity Policy,” note 26 above, at 38-40.

32 ‘ ‘ Compensatory Financing of Export Fluctuations,'’ a Report by the International Monetary Fund (February, 1963).

33 '’ Compensatory Financing of Export Fluctuations,'’ A Second Report by the International Monetary Fund (September, 1966).

34 United Nations, International Compensation for Fluctuations in Commodity Trade (Report by a Committee of Experts, E/CN. 13/40, N.T., 1961).

35 Organization of American States, Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Stabilization of Export Receipts (Washington, D.C., 1962).

36 1963 IMF Report 3-4.

37 1963 IMF Report 23-26.

38 Frank, loc. cit.note 7 above, at 530.

39 1966 IMF Second Report 30-32.

40 1966 IMF Second Report 30.

41 Frank, loc. cit.note 7 above, at 530.

42 UNCTAD Monthly Bulletin No. 9, March, 1967, summarized the February, 1967, session in the manner described in the text. The formal title of the IBBD study is “Supplementary Financial Measures” (1965).

43 The literature on preferences is large and growing. Some representative studies are found in Johnson, note 12 above, at 163-211; Pincus, Trade, Aid and Development at 177-232 (1967); Patterson, Discrimination in International Trade, The Policy Issues 1945-1965 at 323-384 (1966); “The Question of the Granting and Extension of Preferences in Favour of Developing Countries,” a report by Secretary-General of UNCTAD to Trade and Development Board Committee on Manufacturers, TD/B/.CZ/ AC/Rev. 1, July 12, 1966; and “Preferences and Other Policy Measures to Stimulate Exports of the Less Developed Countries,” a study by the GATT Secretariat (Trade Intelligence Paper No. 7, July, 1966). As might be expected, the UNCTAD paper is favourable toward preferences, while the GATT paper is unfavorable.

44 For materials illustrating the policy considerations involved in the shift from conditional to unconditional most-favoured-nation clauses, see 1 Foreign Relations of the United States (1923) 121-131 (1938); 2 Foreign Relations of the United States (1924) 183-192. See also Culbertson, Reciprocity 167-170, 238-279 (1937). For a recent reconsideration which led to reaffirmation, see Excerpt, Staff Papers, Commission on Foreign Economic Policy of U.S. (1954) 255-264, 269-276.

45 Stat. 944 (1934), as amended, 69 Stat. 164 (1955); 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1351 (1958); Sec. 251, Trade Expansion Act of 1962. See Metzger, Trade Agreements and the Kennedy Bound 30-37 (1961).

46 The new Part IV of GATT specifically recognizes the need for expanded export earnings for developing countries and obliges developed countries to “accord high priority” to the reduction and elimination of barriers thereto and refrain from introducing new ones; see 1 Metzger, op. cit.note 8 above, at 589, 591-592, for text of the new Part. Unfortunately, this seems to have had little influence upon the action of developed countries in restraining imports of cotton textile manufactures from developing countries. See text accompanying note 52 below.

47 Johnson, note 12 above, at 114.

48 Ibid.

49 This is the argument that protection of an infant industry in its years of early development enables it to grow in a sheltered market to a point where its development can assure its survival after trade barriers come down. Apart from the fact that infancy very often seems to stretch well past industrial maturity, the infant-industry argument has recently turned to an “infant-economy” argument in respect of the need for and duration of preferences, which makes it more a slogan than an analogy.

50 Frank, note 7 above, at 532.

51 “Effective” tariffs are generally higher than “nominal” rates, due to the admission into developed countries of raw materials and semi-finished goods at lower rates than finished products. This means that there is a relatively higher tariff on the act of manufacturing in developing countries than is revealed in the rate on the manufactured import itself. See Johnson, note 12 above, at 96-101; Frank, note 7 above, at 532-533.

52 Frank, note 7 above, at 534.

53 Pincus, note 43 above, at 198-199.

54 It is not clear at this writing that there will be important exceptions, so far as tariff reductions on manufactures are concerned, relevant to products of developing countries.

55 Prebisch, note 2 above, at 10. Mr. Prebisch has been a vigorous opponent of “sectional“ or “vertical” preferences, as being a “dangerous path” leading “further and further away from the principle of the most-favoured-nation clause and the principle of multilateral trade,” though he has noted ruefully that he may be swimming against the tide of sentiment in many less developed countries.

56 European Community, the Bulletin of the E.E.C, reported in No. 99 (December, 1966-January, 1967), p. 9, that the 1966 meeting of the countries forming the Yaounde Convention, which associates 18 African and Malagasy states with the E.E.C, disclosed that the associate states’ exports to the E.E.C had actually dropped slightly between 1964 and 1965.In view of this, one new step favoured by theAfrican states was “[E.E.C] levies on certain tropical imports from non-associated countries, at least when the Yaounde associates could supply the products.“!

57 Johnson, note 12 above, at 196; Patterson, note 43 above, at 340, 364-369.

58 Johnson, note 12 above, at 197-198.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid

61 See Patterson, note 43 above, at 145-155, for a brief examination of the rationale for regional arrangements among developing countries.

62 See Metzger, ‘ ‘ Regional Markets and International Law,'’ loo. cit.note 5 above, at 89, 92-93, 96-98.

63 In the Kennedy Round negotiations, the E.E.C.'s Common Agricultural Policy, which is autarchic in nature, making “residual suppliers” out of outside suppliers of temperate products such as grains, became a major source of contention. See Dam, “The European Common Market in Agriculture,” 67 Columbia Law Review 209 (1967); Riesenfeld, “Common Market for Agricultural Products and Common Agricultural Policy in the European Economic Community,” 1965 U. 111. L.E. 658.

64 New York Times, April 2, 1967, Juan de Onis, “The Goal is a Latin American Market.“.

65 Ibid

66 See also New York Times, April 7, 1967, J. Beaton, ‘ ‘ Buenos Aires, The Lost Continent.” The Declaration issued on April 13, 1967 (ibid.,April 14, 1967, p. 16), at Punta Del Este relating to Latin American Economic Integration indicates the extreme complexities connected with developing LAPTA and the Central American Common Markets, and then dovetailing them and the countries outside them into a Latin American Common Market, to be “substantially in operation” by 1985. The language as to each of the four “measures” for accomplishing this task, with a total of 16 subparagraphs, fairly bristles with deliberately vague terminology and implicit let-outs. Knowing the difficulties involved, it would be prudent to reserve judgment as to when, and in what form, a Latin American Common Market will evolve.