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In September and October of 2016, Colombians witnessed a series of political events that defied their belief. First, the Colombian Government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo (FARC—EP), signed to great fanfare a historic peace agreement finalizing Colombia’s armed conflict. The Un Secretary-General, the U.S. Secretary of State, and dozens other top diplomats and heads of states gathered in Cartagena for an emotional signing ceremony, symbolically ending a fifty-year armed confrontation that, according to the Colombian Center for Historic Memory, killed more than two hundred thousand people, 80 percent of which were noncombatants.
In this short piece, I open a conversation over how the Colombian Final Peace Accord provides evidence of, and a contribution to, a more general lex pacificatoria or “law of the peacemakers” (lex pax for short). In light of the Accord’s recent ballot defeat, I integrate into this assessment the merits of using a referendum to approve (in Colombia’s case “affirm or deny”) the Agreement as a whole. Throughout, I draw on a peace agreement database which has coded over one thousand four hundred peace agreements since 1990 for comparative insight.
It is very unlikely—if not impossible—that a guerrilla movement would voluntarily agree to demobilize if the cost is that a majority of its members will receive long prison sentences. For this reason, any peace accord between the Colombian government and the Farc (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) Marxist guerilla will not be able to adapt to a strict interpretation of the duty to investigate, judge, and penalize. The challenge in this context is to incentivize demobilization while fulfilling the accountability standards of criminal law.
The results of the plebiscite suggest that Colombia’s international obligations regarding the right to justice will be a key issue in the new postplebiscite phase of the peace negotiation. Perhaps, then, the best starting point for an analysis of these obligations is the rejected Peace Accord. If it complies with international obligations, then it seems likely that any new agreement will also be in compliance: opponents focused much of their arguments on the high level of impunity supposedly embedded in the original deal.
Gender may have been one of the main reasons behind the rejection of the Peace Agreement in Colombia. A few hours after the narrow victory of those who opposed the deal, Senator and ex-president Álvaro Uribe Vélez gave a speech calling for the strengthening of religious family values. His words echoed an argument that gained traction in recent months in Colombia, particularly in the Evangelical Christian community: that the content of the Peace Accord dismantled traditional mores, such as the biological difference between man and woman, the importance of the heterosexual family, and the place of religion in public life.
One of the many roles played by international law in the Colombian Peace Accord is that of guarantor—that is, creating assurances that the parties will comply with their commitments. To this end, negotiators declared that the Final Peace Accord would constitute a Special Agreement (SA) in “terms of Article 3 common to all Geneva Conventions of 1949,” which “will be introduced [in the Colombian legal system] as part of the constitutional block” and deposited “before the Swiss Federal Council.” Furthermore, they stated, “a presidential declaration will be made taking the form of a unilateral declaration of the Colombian State before the Secretary-General of the United Nations,” and its incorporation in a Resolution of the Security Council will be requested.
In recent debates about the interplay between international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law (IHRL), two broad camps have emerged. On the one hand, defenders of what may be called the convergence thesis have emphasized the inclusion of basic rights protections in the so-called “Geneva instruments” of IHL, as well as the role of human rights bodies in interpreting and amplifying rights protections in IHL through juridical or quasi-juridical interpretation and pronouncements. In armed conflicts, it is said, human rights apply concurrently and in ways that strengthen the protective constraints of IHL. Critics of the convergence thesis, on the other hand, have protested that pressing human rights obligations on state forces misunderstands the nature of both IHL and IHRL, and generates misplaced and impossibly onerous demands on belligerents—ultimately and perversely, the effect of emphasizing convergence may be less, not more, human rights protection.
The stunning vote against the Colombian Peace Agreement opens an opportunity to include in the negotiations issues that were not included in the first deal—despite the fact that their omission had the potential to undermine the goal of a sustainable peace. One such issue is foreign investment law. Since the beginning of the talks, the Colombian government was keen on emphasizing that the country’s “economic model” was not subject to negotiation. The shadow of Venezuela loomed large in that position. Whatever came out of the talks was to be integrated in a framework of a free market economy, where private property and, above all, foreign investments would be respected.
On November 30, 2016, after much uncertainty, the Colombian Congress finally approved a historic peace deal between the Colombian government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), bringing to an end the country's fifty-year conflict. This peace deal was a historical achievement, and had important ramifications for international law, as discussed in a recent AJIL Unbound symposium. But once the spotlights were off, the government was faced with the daunting challenge of implementing the complex, lengthy accord. In particular, the government had to draw up and pass through Congress the legal and constitutional framework for the transitional justice process—a key component of the peace deal. It is there, in the subtle details of domestic criminal law, where the balance between peace and justice must be achieved.