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The Soviet Union and the Nigerian Civil War: A Triumph of Realism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 May 2019

Angela Stent
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Extract

The “winds of change” had barely swept across Africa when the newly-independent nations felt the chilling gusts of the cold war. Decolonization created a power vacuum in the prevailing bipolar structure and for a time it appeared that the African continent would be one of the areas in which the struggle between capitalism and communism would be resolved. As the center of gravity of the cold war shifted towards the periphery, the USSR became increasingly interested in extending its influence in Africa. This interest was sharpened as Sino-Soviet rivalry intensified. Under Khrushchev, Soviet policy in Africa was expansionist, vigorous and unrealistically optimistic, both in its assessment of African gratitude towards Moscow and in its estimation of the socialist potential of certain regimes. A series of spectacular setbacks in the Congo, Guinea, Ghana, and Mali led Khrushchev's successors to reevaluate their Third World policies and downgrade Africa as an area deserving extensive Russian resources.

Type
Research Article
Information
African Issues , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , Summer 1973 , pp. 43 - 48
Copyright
Copyright © African Studies Association 1973 

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References

Footnotes

1 For foreign policy connoisseurs, I am using the “Rational Actor” model in my analysis of Soviet involvement, and not the more fashionable “bureaucratic politics” Model. See Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971).Google Scholar

2 Cited in The New York Times, 9 March 1969.

3 MIZAN, Vol. IX, No. 1 (January/February 1967), p. 71.

4 Nilov, V., in Temps Nouveaux, No. 24, (15 June 1966), p. 23.Google Scholar

5 Awolowo, head of the Action Group party, had at one time been anti-Communist but was now considered pro-Socialist He had been imprisoned since 1963 for plotting to overthrow the Balewa government.

6 Pravda, 31 May 1967, p. 5.

7 Laptev, “From Kantanga to Biafra,” in New Times, No. 52, 1967, p. 19.

8 For example, see the article by Tryasunov, in International Affairs (Moscow), No. 7, 1968.

9 Russia blamed the USA and Britain for the trouble, but Ojukwu himself was not censured. In the first few weeks following the secession, Western oil interests were the focus of Soviet criticism.

10 After the Six-day war, a poll was taken in Hungary, showing that as a result of the war, confidence in Russia's ability to defend its small client states had plummeted. For the Hungarians, this raised the question of whether Russia would be able to defend them were they involved in a war.

11 These opinions were related to John Stremlau, a Ph. D. candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, while doing field work in Nigeria in 1970.

12 Notable exceptions were the Ivory Coast Gabon, Tanzania and Zambia, which supported Biafra.

13 West Africa, No. 2699, 22 February 1969, p. 20.

14 Estimates of the size and frequency of these vary. Under Dubceck, Czechoslovakia ceased to supply arms to the FMG. Russia, however, made up for this. The New York Times, 24 January 1969, p. 50, reported the biggest arms deal to date.

15 Cited in the New York Times, 24 August 1967, p. 15. The Times on 9 March 1969, p. 5, reported that MIG- 15's had been bought for cash and 7,000 tons of cocoa.

16 See MIZAN, Vol. XI, No. I, (January/February 1969), p. 37. He said: “I do not think that your experience can be used by us at the present time. You had a Civil War on a class basis. Our war is on a different basis.”

17 V. Kudryavstev, Izvestiya, 17 November 1967, p. 2.

18 Cited in MIZAN, Vol. IX, No. I (January/February 1969), p. 33.

19 Radio Peace and Progress in English for Africa, 26 February 1969. Cited in MIZAN, op. cit, p. 31.

20 V. Kudryavtsev, Izvestiya, II. 10, 1968.

21 See David Bonavia in The Times, 4 July 1969, p. 8.

22 Chief Enahoro, cited in MIZAN Supplement A, November 1967.

23 Cited in the New York Times, 21 January 1970, p. 1.

24 New York Times, 22 November 1968, p. 2.

25 R. Alexeyev, “Nigeria on the Road of National Development” International Affairs (Moscow), 1972, p. 37.

26 Africa Contemporary Record, 1970-71, p. A 61.

27 Pravda, 9 July 1971.

28 Tass, 16 October 1971.

29 Africa Contemporary Record, 1969-70, p. 57.

30 Alexeyev, op. cit, p. 63.

31 According to the New York Times, 1 December 1968, the iron and steel project “…appears to be the sort of prestige undertaking of which Soviet diplomats in the Third World have long been fond. Its economic viability, given the poor quality of Nigeria's iron ore and coal, is another question.” However, other commentators do not take this view, and indicate that the project has economic value.

32 The USSR and the Third World, July-August 1971, p. 53. Dollar figures are given at the official exchange rate. The real purchasing power parity rate of the ruble is substantially lower.

33 Alexeyev, op. cit, p. 58.

34 Cited in the New York Times, 9 March 1969.

35 New York Times, 21 January 1970, p. 1.

36 West Africa, No. 2699, 22 February 1969, p. 1.

37 M. Zenovich in Pravda, 1 July 1971.

38 Pauline Baker, “The Politics of Nigerian Military Rule,” in Africa Report, February 1971.

39 West Africa, No. 2867, 26 May 1972.

40 See R. A. Yellon, “Shifts in Soviet Policy Towards Developing Areas 1964-68,” in W. Duncan, ed. Soviet Policy in Developing Countries, passim.