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Series:   Elements in Metaphysics

Teleology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 August 2024

Matthew Tugby
Matthew Tugby
Affiliation:
Durham University

Summary

Teleology is about functions, ends, and goals in nature. This Element offers a philosophical examination of these phenomena and aims to reinstate teleology as a core part of the metaphysics of science. It starts with a critical analysis of three theories of function and argues that functions ultimately depend on goals. A metaphysical investigation of goal-directedness is then undertaken. After arguing against reductive approaches to goal-directedness, the Element develops a new theory which grounds many cases of goal-directedness in the metaphysics of powers. According to this theory, teleological properties are genuine, irreducible features of the world.
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Keywords

Teleologyfunctionsgoalsendspowers
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in Metaphysics
Online ISBN: 9781009257404
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 27 June 2024

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