Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Electoral Markets and Russia's Political Smorgasbord
- 2 Party Entrepreneurship in Russia's Electoral Market 1989–2005
- 3 How Much Party Is in the Party System?
- 4 Electoral Markets and Party Substitutes in Russia : Origins and Impact
- 5 Parties and Party Substitutes : Determining the Balance
- 6 Conclusion : The Market Model and Theories of Parties, National Integration, and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule
- References
- Index
5 - Parties and Party Substitutes : Determining the Balance
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 July 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Electoral Markets and Russia's Political Smorgasbord
- 2 Party Entrepreneurship in Russia's Electoral Market 1989–2005
- 3 How Much Party Is in the Party System?
- 4 Electoral Markets and Party Substitutes in Russia : Origins and Impact
- 5 Parties and Party Substitutes : Determining the Balance
- 6 Conclusion : The Market Model and Theories of Parties, National Integration, and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule
- References
- Index
Summary
Whether a political system becomes fully a party system depends upon factors that give parties a competitive edge over party substitutes in a given country's electoral markets. Chapter 4 has already shown how Russia's patrimonial communist legacy combined with its transition path to produce party substitutes that were capable of withstanding or even eliminating competition from parties in struggles for Russia's most important electoral offices. As Chapters 1 and 2 made clear, however, the answer does not end with initial capital allocations, since these can be expected to grow or shrink depending on how they are used and to be used differently as new technologies or opportunities develop. How, then, can we explain the persistence of party substitutes as major players and the consequent inability of parties to close out the electoral market over time? Can the same answer also make sense of the indications in 2005 that parties were in fact gaining some ground? And can this explanation further account for the major reforms announced during the Putin era that appeared aimed at ending Russia's partial party system and establishing party dominance?
The answers to all of these questions, it is argued, can be found in the broad institutional context that defines both the market itself and the abilities of different actors to intervene in and regulate the market.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Why Not Parties in Russia?Democracy, Federalism, and the State, pp. 197 - 234Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005