Both activists who lead social movements and scholars who study them debate the relative effectiveness of nonviolent versus violent means of protest. This book asks a distinct question. It seeks to understand the conditions under which either form of protest is likely or probable. I propose the organizational mediation theory of protest as a framework for analyzing how movements’ internal relationships affect their strategic action. While many factors contribute to a movement’s use of violence, one predominant factor makes that use of nonviolent protest possible: the movement’s own cohesion. Cohesion is an organizational structure that obtains when the factors that generate cooperation among members outweigh those that propel competitive or antagonistic behavior. It can be measured by assessing the strength of a movement’s leadership, institutions, and collective purpose. When a movement is cohesive, it enjoys the organizational capacity to mobilize mass participation, contain disruptive dissent, and rein in violence driven by particularistic motives. In consequence, cohesion increases the possibility that a movement will use nonviolent protest. Inversely, when a movement is unable to centralize authority and institutionalize command and control, it easily becomes racked by divisions. Under conditions of fragmentation, a movement’s very organizational structure generates incentives for members to employ force and weakens constraints on its use. It enables the formation of radical splinter and semi-splinter groups, impedes the conclusion and implementation of ceasefires, and reduces the capacity for popular mobilization that is the hallmark of civil disobedience and direct action. Fragmentation thus increases the likelihood that a movement will use violent protest.

Analysis of nearly one hundred years in the history of the Palestinian national movement, as well as comparisons with national movements in South Africa and Northern Ireland, demonstrate the fruitfulness of this approach. When the Palestinian movement used mass unarmed protest, such as during a general strike in the 1930s and the uprising of 1987, internal cohesion proved crucial. In those episodes, a legitimate leadership and grassroots institutional network helped people across social classes, religions, and regions participate in demonstrations, boycotts, and acts of noncooperation and disengagement from the state. While Palestinians did not use nonviolent protest to the exclusion of violence, a structure of coordination and cooperation enabled them to channel much of the will to rebel into unarmed activities and sustain them on a broad scale. Movement cohesion was also essential in facilitating diplomatic initiatives, be they pressure politics in the 1920s or peace negotiations in the 1990s. To the degree that leaders were able to manage fragmentation, they helped impede spoiler violence from derailing those nonviolent initiatives.