A German colleague once told me that Americans always begin their scholarly presentations with a humorous story or anecdote. Whether or not that national stereotype holds true, I could not resist beginning this chapter with such a story. When my first book was published, it had the title America's Germany, an expression that captured the almost proprietary relationship that the American foreign policy establishment - notably John J. McCloy - had with “their” Germany. However, in the post-Cold War atmosphere of the early 1990s, the German publisher did not particularly care for my choice of title, with its connotations of a Germany within the American orbit and under American tutelage. They changed the title to Die Atlantik-Brücke, a translation that may have soothed national pride but missed the point of the original moniker entirely.

The relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany from 1945 to 1968 was unique in the history of relations between highly developed states. The rapid reversal of alliances that began the German-American relationship and the intensity with which it flourished during the Cold War resist comparison. Embedded within the multilateral framework of NATO, the German-American alliance spawned a network of exceptionally close institutional and personal relationships. For all intents and purposes, the Federal Republic of Germany functioned as an integral part of a larger American commonwealth or confederation, a nonvoting but influential player in the game of American politics, with its concerns and interests woven into the fabric of American decision making.