Compared to the turmoil of the 1950s and early 1960s, intra-alliance debate over NATO strategy in the period from 1968 through the end of the Cold War was more acrimonious but less substantive. The Military Committee's formula of using nuclear weapons “as early as necessary and as late as possible” and the Harmel Report's validation of both defense and détente as NATO tasks established the basic compromises needed for consensus on alliance strategy. Although strategy did not materially change after 1968, its constituent arms control and deployment decisions became the areas in which the Federal Republic and the United States disputed policy toward the Soviet Union. The central debate of 1968-89 was over the balance in Western strategy between ensuring security and furthering détente. The American focus on preparedness to fight the Soviet Union came increasingly into conflict with the Federal Republic's desire to foster prospects for détente as a means to prevent a war in which Germany would be the main battlefield. These divergent priorities caused recurrent disputes over the deployment of nuclear weapons and even “out-of-area” issues like Vietnam and the Arab-Israeli wars.