Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
×
Home
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 2
  • Cited by
    This chapter has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Hendel, Giovanna 2001. Supervenience, Metaphysical Reduction, and Metaphysics of Properties. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 39, Issue. 1, p. 99.

    Hendel, Giovanna 2002. On What Does the Issue of Supervenience and Psychophysical Dependence Depend?. Dialogue, Vol. 41, Issue. 02, p. 329.

    ×
  • Print publication year: 1995
  • Online publication date: March 2010

Reduction in the Mind of God

Summary

Bertrand Russell (1924) placed at the heart of his logical atomism what he called “the supreme maxim in scientific philosophizing”: “Wherever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities” (p. 326). Rudolf Carnap took this maxim as his motto in explicating the logical structure of the world (1967, p. 5). Twentieth-century metaphysicians have often adopted Russell's maxim tacitly in pursuing reductive strategies.

In an increasing variety of areas, however, a consensus has grown that such strategies face dim prospects. We are still novices at neuroscience, but philosophers of mind no longer have much hope of reducing mental language to physical language. Physics has not yet found a unified theory of basic physical phenomena, much less a theory unifying them with the manifest image of the world, but philosophers of mind have lost faith that our everyday discourse about the world around us will eventually reduce to the language of an ideal physics.

A loss of faith in reduction has not led to a revival of faith in dualism, for its postulation of a realm of immaterial mental entities that have causal powers to affect each other and the material world seems unscientific and without explanatory power. To many, physicalism has remained the only respectable attitude toward the mind–body problem. The challenge has been to find a nonreductive physicalism that resists any commitment to immaterial entities while allowing that psychology and other higher-level theories are autonomous from physics.

Recommend this book

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this book to your organisation's collection.

Supervenience
  • Online ISBN: 9780511663857
  • Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511663857
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to *
×