Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-vfjqv Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-25T11:17:05.134Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

8 - Stronger Parties as a Solution to Polarization

from Strengthening Parties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2015

Nathaniel Persily
Affiliation:
Stanford Law School
Nathaniel Persily
Affiliation:
Stanford Law School
Get access

Summary

Conventional wisdom regards political parties as the engine of polarization. That perspective is understandable enough: if the polarization problem arises from excessive partisanship, then the parties are probably at fault. Disable the parties, the argument goes, and then the representational distortion (and concomitant gridlock) caused by the parties will be mitigated.

This chapter argues the exact opposite position. Parties, rather than being the cause of our polarization, may be the solution. This argument only makes sense if one believes, as I do, that polarization is caused (or at least exacerbated) by the relative weakness of party organizations and leaders vis-à-vis outside groups. In other words, polarization is caused (in part) by party weakness, not strength, and any solution to polarization must begin by strengthening parties; specifically, the party organizations and their leadership.

This chapter compares the most frequently proposed “good-government” anti-party reforms of the campaign finance, primary election, and redistricting processes with their pro-party analogs. The basic differences between the two approaches concern the threats targeted by the reforms and the assessments as to whether greater promise comes from reining in extremes or promoting moderation. The anti-party approach hopes to promote the election of moderates by fostering electoral competition or liberating candidates from the constraints of party loyalty and discipline. The pro-party approach aims to empower the median party member and the party leadership against the extremes.

The chapter ends with an epilogue presenting lessons drawn from my experience as senior research director for the Presidential Commission on Election Administration. Consistent with the approach outlined here, the success of that body arose from an attempt to have partisans lead the work of the Commission. It took polarization as a given and then worked successfully not to avoid it, but to manage it.

THE CONVENTIONAL “GOOD-GOVERNMENT” “ANTI-PARTY” APPROACH

When Americans seek to reform the political system, their prescriptions usually fall into two categories: more democracy or less democracy.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2015

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×