Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: Why the CIA Gets It Wrong and What Needs to Be Done to Get It Right

Richard L. Russell

doi:10.1017/CBO9780511509902

This book critically examines the weaknesses of American intelligence led by the Central Intelligence Agency in informing presidential decision making on issues of war and peace. It evaluates the CIA's strategic intelligence performance during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods as a foundation for examining the root causes of intelligence failures surrounding the September 11th attacks and assessments of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs in the run up to the Iraq War. The book probes these intelligence failures, which lie in the CIA's poor human intelligence collection and analysis practices. The book argues that none of the post-9/11 intelligence reforms have squarely addressed these root causes of strategic intelligence failure and it recommends measures for redressing these dangerous vulnerabilities in American security.

"Here is a study of the CIA and its weakness that is both hard-hitting and well-informed. More in sorrow than in anger Richard Russell lays out the flaws in intelligence collection and analysis and points the way to improvements. Even if policy-makers do not respond, readers will learn a great deal."
Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of Political Science, Columbia University

"An impressively comprehensive, insightful, and revealing examination of why the CIA has made major intelligence mistakes in recent years and what might be done to lessen the chances of failure in the future. Richard Russell knows this subject inside-out, writes lucidly, and skillfully captures the strengths and the weaknesses of contemporary American intelligence capabilities."
Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor, University of Georgia and editor, INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

"Professor Russell has written a book that should be read by both those who are dismayed by the CIA''s dismal performance over the last two decades and those who are now trying to rebuild the Agency. Those who have been dismayed will certainly, after reading this book, understand why it has failed so often and will understand that the accountability for that failure begins at the very core of the institution itself. On the other hand, those who believe, and I count myself in this group, that an effective, strategically focused intelligence system is an absolute requirement for the survival in the dangerous and chaotic world in which we now find ourselves will come away from this book humbled by the immense task at hand. Simply rearranging the reporting arrangements of the various parts of the system and appointing a czar will have no real effect except to delude those who have not read this book into believing that something meaningful has been done. Drawing on his own 17 year experience in the CIA and an exceptional ability to speak directly and with candor, Professor Russell has written a book that should be on the top of the reading list of those who aspire to power and will have to listen to the truth that comes from the current dysfunctional intelligence system. It also should find an avid readership among all those who worry that the United States is steaming into the eyes of multiple storms without any capability of discerning a strategic course that will avoid the certainty of disaster. For those who believe that US foreign policy has become all to ready to fall back on unilateral and even preemptive military force, this book provide the answer as to why this is so we have lost our strategic intelligence capability and with it the capacity to be smart. We are left with only our military power and the loss and destruction that results."
David Kay, Senior Research Fellow, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

"Richard Russell offers a compelling critique of enduring weaknesses in US intelligence. With a focus on the Central Intelligence Agency, he calmly dissects the most significant issue: why does intelligence get it wrong on the big picture, the mysteries of strategic shifts in geopolitics and the fortunes of nations? Russell brings all the right stuff - 17 years as a CIA analyst, fine academic credentials, deep knowledge of how policy and intelligence relate to each other, and a healthy disdain for the rule-bound culture of big bureaucracies."
Ellen Laipson, President and CEO, Stimson Center and former Vice Chairman of theNational Intelligence Council

"Russell’s overall diagnosis is damning, and the recommendations he makes are solid ones..."
The American Interest

"There is no critique more damning than that of a disillusioned insider. Russell, an award-winning intelligence analyst with 17 years of experience in the CIA,…takes a sober look at the intelligence community--in particular, the CIA--to show why failures of strategic intelligence have become the norm. He finds the problems extend far back into the Cold War and have not been corrected by the most recent round of ‘reforms.’ The author describes a system that rewards those who collect minutiae, but discourages anyone from looking at the big picture. He finds too many layers of management, weak professional training, and ‘bureaucratic rot.’ The book contains practical suggestions for improvement. This is a book that should be read by anyone who wants to know what is wrong with the system today, and what it would take to fix it."
D. McIntosh, Slippery Rock University of Pennsylvania, Choice

"...it is a brutally candid critique of the bureaucratic and operational problems in the CIA and the Intelligence Community...Russell outlines the fundamental changes required to produce accurate and timely intelligence and, incidentally, to keep others from quitting as he did...for the intelligence professional and the decision makers, it is a book worthy of close and serious scrutiny."
Hayden B. Peake, Studies in Intelligence

"Sharpening Strategic Intelligence is a cut above other books by former officials, and offers much-needed insight into the CIA’s history and current challenges."
Amy B. Zegart, Political Science Quarterly

“In this book, Dr. Russell methodically integrates official reports and the observations of intelligence and national security professionals to make a compelling argument in support of his central thesis that the CIA’s seemingly intractable flaws have resulted in a ‘systemic failure to deliver firstrate human intelligence and analysis to the commander in chief.’”
American Intelligence Journal

References

Selected bibliography

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JOURNAL ARTICLES AND CASE STUDIES

Albright, David and Hinderstein, Corey, “Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks,” The Washington Quarterly 28, no. 2 (spring 2005).

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Carter, Ashton B., “How to Counter WMD,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 5 (Sep-tember/October 2004).

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Daugherty, William J., “Behind the Intelligence Failure in Iran,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 14, no. 4 (winter 2001).

Freedman, Lawrence, “War in Iraq: Selling the Threat,” Survival 46, no. 2 (summer 2004).

Freedman, Lawrence, “The CIA and the Soviet Threat: The Politicization of Estimates, 1966–1977,” Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 1 (January 1997).

Gates, Robert M., “An Opportunity Unfulfilled: The Use and Perceptions of Intelligence at the White House,” Washington Quarterly 12, no. 1 (winter 1989).

Gates, Robert M., “The CIA and Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 66, no. 2 (winter 1987/88).

Handel, Michael I., “Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise,” Journal of Strategic Studies 7, no. 3 (September 1984).

Jervis, Robert, “Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 29, no. 1 (February 2006).

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Pillar, Paul R., “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006).

Pollack, Jonathan D., “The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework,” Naval War College Review LVI, no. 3 (summer 2003).

Robarge, David S., “A Look Back: Directors of Central Intelligence, 1946–2005,” Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 3 (2005).

Robarge, David S., “Getting It Right: CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War,” Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 1 (2005).

Russell, Richard L., “Iraq's Chemical Weapons Legacy: What Others Might Learn from Saddam,” Middle East Journal 59, no. 2 (spring 2005).

Russell, Richard L., “Iran in Iraq's Shadow: Dealing with Tehran's Nuclear Weapons Bid,” Parameters XXXIV, no. 3 (autumn 2004).

Russell, Richard L., “Spies Like Them,” National Interest 77 (fall 2004).

Russell, Richard L., “Intelligence Failures: The Wrong Model for the War on Terror,” Policy Review 123 (February & March 2004).

Russell, Richard L., “CIA's Strategic Intelligence in Iraq,” Political Science Quarterly 117, no. 2 (summer 2002).

Russell, Richard L., “Tug of War: The CIA's Uneasy Relationship with the Military,” SAIS Review XⅫ, no. 2 (summer–fall 2002).

Russell, Richard L., “The Fog of War: NATO's Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade,” Pew Case Study, no. 253 (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 2002).

Russell, Richard L., “A Saudi Nuclear Option?” Survival 43, no. 2 (summer 2001).

Russell, Richard L., “American Military Retaliation for Terrorism: Judging the Merits of the 1998 Cruise Missile Strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan,” Pew Case Study, no. 238 (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 2000).

Yankelovich, Daniel, “Poll Positions: What Americans Really Think about U. S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (September/October 2005).

NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES

John Barry and Evan Thomas, “The Kosovo Cover-Up,” Newsweek, 15 May 2000.

David Barstow, “Who the White House Embraced Disputed Arms Intelligence,” New York Times, 3 October 2004.

William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “The Bomb Merchant,” New York Times, 26 December 2004, A1.

Barbara Demick, “North Korea's Ace in the Hole,” Los Angeles Times, 14 November 2003.

John Diamond and Judy Keen, “Bush's Daily Intel Briefing Revamped,” USA Today, 25 August 2005, A1.

John Diamond, “CIA's Spy Network Thin,” USA Today, 22 September 2004, 13A.

Bob Drogin, “Spy Work in Iraq Riddled by Failures,” Los Angeles Times, 17 June 2004, A1.

Thomas Fingar, “Questionable Intelligence,” Correspondence, The New Republic, 10 July2006.

Douglas Frantz, “A High-Risk Nuclear Stakeout,” Los Angeles Times, 27 February2005.

Douglas Frantz, “Iran Moving Methodically toward Nuclear Capability,” Los Angeles Times, 21 October 2004, A1.

Douglas Franz and William C. Rempel, “New Find in a Nuclear World,” Los Angeles Times, 28 November 2004, A1.

Barton Gellman, “Iraq's Arsenal of Ambitions,” Washington Post, 7 January 2004.

Reuel Marc Gerecht, “I Spy with My Little Eye …,” Wall Street Journal, 9 November 2005.

Reuel Marc Gerecht, “The Sorry State of the CIA,” The Weekly Standard, 19 July 2004.

Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Unknown,” The New Yorker 78, no. 46 (10 February 2003).

Stephen Grey and Don VanNatta, “In Italy, Anger at U. S. Tactics Colors Spy Case,” New York Times, 26 June 2005, A1.

David Ignatius, “Spying: Time to Think Outside the Box,” Washington Post, 29 August 2004, B7.

Douglas Jehl, “Qaeda-Iraq Link U. S. Cited Is Tied to Coercion Claim,” New York Times, 9 December 2005, A1.

Douglas Jehl, “Bush's Arms Intelligence Panel Works in Secret,” New York Times, 6 December 2004.

David E. Kaplan, “Playing Offense: The Inside Story of How U. S. Terrorist Hunters are Going after al Qaeda,” U. S. News & World Report, 2 June 2003.

George F. Kennan, “Spy and Counterspy,” New York Times, 18 May 1997, A17.

Jim Mann, “Threat to Mideast Military Balance: US Caught Napping by Sino-Saudi Missile Deal,” Los Angeles Times, 4 May 1988.

Mark Mazzetti, “Spymaster Tells Secret of Size of Spy Force,” New York Times, 21 April 2006.

Josh Meyer, “CIA Expands Use of Drones in Terror War,” Los Angeles Times, 29 January 2006, A1.

Steven Lee Myers, “Chinese Embassy Bombing: A Wide Net of Blame,” New York Times, 17 April 2000, A1 and A10.

Greg Miller, “CIA Operation in Iran Failed When Spies Were Exposed,” Los Angeles Times, 12 February 2005.

Daniel P. Moynihan, “Do We Still Need the CIA?” New York Times, 19 May 1991, E17.

Walter Pincus, “CIA Morale on Hayden's Menu,” Washington Post, 18 May 2006.

Walter Pincus, “Intelligence Director's Budget May Near $1 Billion, Report Finds,” Washington Post, 20 April 2006, A11.

Walter Pincus, “CIA Spies Get a New Home Base,” Washington Post, 14 October 2005, A6.

Walter Pincus, “Goss Plan to Strengthen CIA Is Ready,” Washington Post, 16 February 2005, A2.

Walter Pincus, “Bush's Intelligence Panel Gains Stature,” Washington Post, 7 February 2005, A19.

Walter Pincus, “Intelligence Efforts Get Boost: Undercover Officers to Keep Salaries from Civilian Jobs Abroad,” Washington Post, 10 December 2004, A6.

Walter Pincus, “Bush Orders the CIA to Hire More Spies,” Washington Post, 24 November 2004, A4.

Walter Pincus, “Spy Agencies Faulted for Missing Indian Tests,” Washington Post, 3 June 1998, A18.

Dana Priest, “Covert CIA Program Withstands New Furor,” Washington Post, 30 December 2005.

Dana Priest, “CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons,” Washington Post, 2 November 2005, A1.

Dana Priest, “CIA Feels Strain of Iraq and Al Qaeda,” Washington Post, 17 November 2002, A26.

James Risen, “To Bomb Sudan Plant, or Not: A Year Later, Debate Rankle,” New York Times, 27 October 1999, A12.

Steve Rodan, “All in the Family,” Jerusalem Post, 13 June 1997.

Richard L. Russell, “Saudi Nukes: A Looming Intelligence Failure,” Washington Times, 5 January 2004.

David E. Sanger, “Pakistan Found to Aid Iran Nuclear Efforts,” New York Times, 2 September 2004.

David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Pakistan's Nuclear Earnings,” New York Times, 16 March 2004.

David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “From Rogue Nuclear Programs, Web of Trails Leads to Pakistan,” New York Times, 4 January 2004, A1.

Scott Shane, “Iraqi Official, Paid by CIA, Gave Account of Weapons,” New York Times, 22 March 2006.

Scott Shane, “Intelligence Center Is Created for Unclassified Information,” New York Times, 9 November 2005.

Scott Shane, “Official Reveals Budget for U. S. Intelligence,” New York Times, 8 November 2005.

Scott Shane and Neil A. Lewis, “At Sept. 11 Trial, Tale of Missteps and Management,” New York Times, 31 March 2006, A1.

Scott Shane and David E. Sanger, “Daily Intelligence Briefings are Vague, Officials Say,” New York Times, 3 April 2005.

Shirley, Edward G. [Reuel Marc Gerecht], “Can't Anybody Here Play This Game?” Atlantic Monthly 281, no. 2 (February 1998).

Richard H. Shultz, Jr., “Showstoppers: Nine Reasons Why We Never Sent Our Special Operations Forces after al Qaeda Before 9II11,” The Weekly Standard, 26 January 2004.

Phillip van Niekerk, “South Africa Had Six A-Bombs,” Washington Post, 25 March 1993.

John Walcott and Brian Duffy, “The CIA's Darkest Secrets,” U. S. News & World Report, 4 July 1994.

Joby Warrick and Glenn Kessler, “Iran's Nuclear Program Speeds Ahead,” Washington Post, 10 March 2003, A1.

Shaun Waterman, “Goss Says CIA Ban Excludes Terrorists,” Washington Times, 25 March 2005, A5.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Bush, George W., The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002). Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.

Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence and Policy: The Evolving Relationship (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, June 2004). Available at http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/Roundtable_june2004/IntelandPolicyRelationship_Internet.pdf.

Central Intelligence Agency Report, “Further Comments on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction,” August 1995, Gulf Link Declassified Document. Available at http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/declassdocs/cia/19960705.

Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction,Report to the President (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 31 March 2005). Available at http://www.wmd.gov/report.

Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U. S. Intelligence (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1 March 1996). Available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/dpos/epubs/int/pdf/report.html.

Committee of Privy Counsellors, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction (Norwich, UK: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 14 July 2004). Available at http://www.butlerreview.org.uk/report/index.asp.

House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investi- gations, Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/ Storm (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, August 1993).

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 21 June 2004). Available at http://intelligence.house.gov/Reports.aspx?Section56).

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, December 2002). Available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, July 2004). Available athttp://www.9–11commission.gov/report/index.htm.

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Sharpening Strategic Intelligence

Why the CIA Gets It Wrong and What Needs to Be Done to Get It Right

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Contents

Frontmatter
pp i-vi

Contents
pp vii-viii

Acknowledgments
pp ix-xii

Sharpening Strategic Intelligence
pp xiii-xiv

1 - Strategic Intelligence and American Statecraft
pp 1-28

2 - Debunking Cold War Myths
pp 29-52

3 - Stumbling after the Cold War
pp 53-68

4 - Blundering in the “War on Terrorism”
pp 69-94

5 - Spies Who Do Not Deliver
pp 95-118

6 - Analysts Who Are Not Experts
pp 119-148

7 - Facing Future Strategic Intelligence Challenges
pp 149-170

Notes
pp 171-192

Selected bibliography
pp 193-206

Index
pp 207-214

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