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10 - Taking the genetic challenge rationally

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 July 2014

Matti Häyry
Affiliation:
University of Manchester
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Summary

In this chapter, I summarise the assumptions and arguments employed in the ethical analysis of the genetic challenge; present complete versions of the three main approaches to the issue; and conclude that my findings call for changes in the work of philosophers in the field of genethics.

From challenges to solutions

In the previous chapters, I have presented seven challenges that advances in genetics and related fields pose to humanity; three philosophical ways of tackling these challenges; and the main arguments that have been used in ethical debates concerning them. In this chapter, I will summarise my findings and eventually suggest directions into which philosophical studies in this field could be usefully taken. Before formulating this conclusion, however, I must sum up the arguments introduced in the preceding chapters (Sections 10.2, 10.3, and 10.4) and the cases that can be made for and against genetic practices from the viewpoints of the three philosophical approaches (Sections 10.5, 10.6, 10.7, 10.8, and 10.9).

The main arguments presented in the context of the genetic challenge can be divided into six categories: (i) general tenets accepted by all in theory but interpreted in different ways in practice; (ii) more specific arguments that can be used by both sides of the debate; (iii) arguments for advances; (iv) arguments for restrictions; (v) arguments against restrictions; and (vi) arguments against advances. The ensuing layers of counterarguments and counter-counterarguments are infinite, but these six levels should enable me to pin down the main points.

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Chapter
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Rationality and the Genetic Challenge
Making People Better?
, pp. 220 - 240
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

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