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    Climenhaga, Nevin 2018. Intuitions are Used as Evidence in Philosophy. Mind, Vol. 127, Issue. 505, p. 69.

  • Print publication year: 2014
  • Online publication date: September 2014

9 - Intuition in Contemporary Philosophy

from Part I - Intuition in Western Philosophy
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Rational Intuition
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