I have argued that one can deliberate about ends (§8), that ends can be deliberatively specified (Chapter IV), and that deliberative specifications of ends can be subject to rational support and criticism in terms of their overall fit within a system of mutually supporting norms found acceptable upon reflection (Chapter VIII). One may accept these points, however, and remain skeptical about the possibility of deliberating about the (or an) ultimate end. Regarding an ultimate end as a source of value is here the principal obstacle.

REMAINING GROUNDS OF SKEPTICISM

We may distinguish four sorts of principled consideration supporting this residual doubt about extending rational deliberation to ultimate ends.

First, there may remain some commitment to what might be called “normative foundationalism” regarding practical reasoning (cf. Audi 1989, 35–6). This is the view that while we may deliberate about ends, if our deliberation is to have any normative force then this must be obtained from an ultimate end that is not subject to deliberation. On this view, even if an ultimate end is not by definition a “source of value,” it must be regarded as such if practical reasoning is to have normative force. To overcome whatever resistance to deliberation about the ultimate end resides in those who think that normative force must flow from it, my approach will be to describe in the following chapter a number of examples, as realistically as I can, in which deliberation with a claim to normative force concerns an ultimate end.