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  • Patent Remedies and Complex Products
  • Toward a Global Consensus
  • Online publication date: July 2019
  • pp vii-x
  • Publisher: Cambridge University Press

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Contents

  1. List of Contributors

  2. Foreword by Hon. Kathleen M. O’Malley

  3. Preface

  4. Executive Summary

  5. Introduction

  6. 1Reasonable Royalties

    Thomas F. Cotter, John M. Golden, Oskar Liivak, Brian J. Love, Norman V. Siebrasse, Masabumi Suzuki, and David O. Taylor

    1. 1.1Preliminary Matters

      1. 1.1.1Empirical Literature

      2. 1.1.2Theoretical Justifications

      3. 1.1.3Principal Approaches

    2. 1.2Reformulating Georgia-Pacific

    3. 1.3Incremental Value and Other Issues

      1. 1.3.1Incremental Value

      2. 1.3.2Hypothetical Bargain

      3. 1.3.3Dividing Incremental Value

      4. 1.3.4Timing of Hypothetical Negotiation

      5. 1.3.5Information Set

      6. 1.3.6Comparable Licenses

      7. 1.3.7Entire Market Value Rule and Smallest Saleable Unit

    4. 1.4Practical Considerations

      1. 1.4.1Expert Evidence and Daubert Gatekeeping in the United States

      2. 1.4.2.“Kickers” for Reasonable Royalties

      3. 1.4.3Calibrated Evidentiary Burdens or Royalty Measures

  7. 2Lost Profits and Disgorgement

    Christopher B. Seaman, Thomas F. Cotter, Brian J. Love, Norman V. Siebrasse, and Masabumi Suzuki

    1. 2.1Introduction

    2. 2.2Lost Profits

      1. 2.2.1Introduction

      2. 2.2.2Specific Issues Regarding Lost Profits

    3. 2.3Disgorgement of Infringer’s Profit

      1. 2.3.1Theoretical Justifications

      2. 2.3.2Comparative Approaches to Disgorgement

      3. 2.3.3Specific Issues Regarding Disgorgement

  8. 3Enhanced Damages, Litigation Cost Recovery, and Interest

    Colleen V. Chien, Jorge L. Contreras, Thomas F. Cotter, Brian J. Love, Christopher B. Seaman, and Norman V. Siebrasse

    1. 3.1Introduction

    2. 3.2Enhanced Damages

      1. 3.2.1Approaches to Enhanced Damages

      2. 3.2.2Criminal Sanctions

      3. 3.2.3Policy Considerations Relating to Enhanced Damages

      4. 3.2.4Recommendations and Further Research

    3. 3.3Litigation Cost Recovery

      1. 3.3.1Approaches to Litigation Cost Recovery

      2. 3.3.2Economic Theory and Empirical Research on the Effects of Cost Recovery

      3. 3.3.3Recommendations for Best Practices and Future Research

    4. 3.4Pre- and Post-judgment Interest

      1. 3.4.1Approaches in Selected Countries

      2. 3.4.2Recommendations for Best Practices and Future Research

  9. 4Injunctive Relief

    Norman V. Siebrasse, Rafal Sikorski, Jorge L. Contreras, Thomas F. Cotter, John Golden, Sang Jo Jong, Brian J. Love, and David O. Taylor

    1. 4.1Introduction

    2. 4.2Theory

      1. 4.2.1Nature of Patent Rights and Injunctions

      2. 4.2.2Economic Analysis and Complex Products

      3. 4.2.3Preliminary v. Permanent Injunctions

    3. 4.3Comparative Overview of Injunction Practices

      1. 4.3.1Overview

      2. 4.3.2United States

      3. 4.3.3England

      4. 4.3.4Civil Law Systems

      5. 4.3.5International Context and TRIPS

    4. 4.4Recommendations

      1. 4.4.1Basic Principles for Injunctive Relief

      2. 4.4.2Proportionality

      3. 4.4.3Tailoring Injunctive Relief

      4. 4.4.4Ongoing Royalty in Lieu of Injunctive Relief

  10. 5The Effect of FRAND Commitments on Patent Remedies

    Jorge L. Contreras, Thomas F. Cotter, Sang Jo Jong, Brian J. Love, Nicolas Petit, Peter Picht, Norman V. Siebrasse, Rafal Sikorski, Masabumi Suzuki, and Jacques de Werra

    1. 5.1Introduction

    2. 5.2FRAND Commitments and Monetary Patent Damages

      1. 5.2.1United States

      2. 5.2.2European Union – Applicability of Huawei v. ZTE to Monetary Remedies

      3. 5.2.3National Damages Laws

      4. 5.2.4Discussion and Analysis: Monetary Damages and FRAND

    3. 5.3FRAND Commitments and Injunctive Relief

      1. 5.3.1United States

      2. 5.3.2European Union

      3. 5.3.3Korea

      4. 5.3.4Japan

      5. 5.3.5China

      6. 5.3.6Discussion and Analysis: FRAND and Injunctions

    4. Appendix – National Law Considerations for Monetary FRAND Damages

      1. A.Germany

      2. B.Switzerland

      3. C.Korea

      4. D.Japan

      5. E.China

  11. 6The Effect of Competition Law on Patent Remedies

    Alison Jones and Renato Nazzini

    1. 6.1Introduction

    2. 6.2Objectives of Intellectual Property and Competition Law

    3. 6.3Antitrust Liability for Enforcement or Exploitation of Patents

      1. 6.3.1Background

      2. 6.3.2Antitrust Limits on a Patent Holder Seeking Restorative Patent Remedies (and Judicial Exploitation of Patents)

      3. 6.3.3Antitrust Limits on the Commercial Exploitation of Patents

    4. 6.4Antitrust Remedies

    5. 6.5Conclusions

  12. 7Holdup, Holdout, and Royalty Stacking: A Review of the Literature

    Norman V. Siebrasse

    1. 7.1Introduction

    2. 7.2Benchmark Return to Patentee

      1. 7.2.1A Share of the Discounted Incremental Ex Ante Value: θβν

      2. 7.2.2Incremental Value Over Best Alternative: ν

      3. 7.2.3Bargaining Power Discount: β

    3. 7.3Holdup

      1. 7.3.1Varieties of Holdup

    4. 7.4Mitigating Mechanisms

      1. 7.4.1Introduction

      2. 7.4.2Ex Ante Licensing

      3. 7.4.3Ex Ante Validity Challenge

      4. 7.4.4Norms

      5. 7.4.5Repeat Play

    5. 7.5Property Rules and Liability Rules

      1. 7.5.1Inaccuracy of Damages Awards

      2. 7.5.2Transaction Cost Arguments

      3. 7.5.3Generating Information Regarding Potential Use

      4. 7.5.4Inaccuracy of Damages Assessment

      5. 7.5.5Summary

    6. 7.6Holdout/Reverse Holdup

      1. 7.6.1General

      2. 7.6.2Underdetection

      3. 7.6.3Undercompensatory Damages

      4. 7.6.4Oligopoly Pricing in SSOs

      5. 7.6.5Summary

    7. 7.7Royalty Stacking

      1. 7.7.1Introduction

      2. 7.7.2Cumulative Effect of Holdup

      3. 7.7.3Cournot Complements

    8. 7.8Empirical Evidence

      1. 7.8.1General

      2. 7.8.2Case Studies

      3. 7.8.3Testing of Empirical Models

      4. 7.8.4Industry Structure

      5. 7.8.5Summary

  13. Bibliography

  14. Index