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2 - Cambodia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 January 2010

James Mayall
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science
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Summary

The United Nations operation in Cambodia during 1992–3 was, at the time, the most ambitious and expensive undertaking in the peacekeeping experience of the Organisation. At a cost of around US $1.7 billion, 22,000 military and civilian personnel were deployed to implement the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict which had been concluded at an international conference in Paris on 23 October 1991. That settlement made provision for a United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) charged with holding the ring politically so that elections under its aegis could determine the future governance of a country long afflicted by violent upheaval and human suffering.

UNTAC was provided with exceptional resources but its mandate was restricted to peacekeeping. Peace enforcement, which had been demonstrated early in 1991 in Operation Desert Storm, was not any part of UNTAC's remit which was confined, in essence, to a quasiadministrative role. The critical problem confronted by UNTAC virtually from the outset of its deployment was how to discharge responsibility for filling a political vacuum in the face of obstructive violence by contending Cambodian parties.

The notorious Khmer Rouge refused totally to cooperate in implementing the Paris Agreement which it had signed, while the incumbent administration in Phnom Penh also used violence to force the outcome of the elections in which it would participate. In the event, UNTAC assumed a calculated risk in embarking on elections, which were conducted without serious disruption. No single party secured an overall majority, which paved the way for a coalition government which excluded the Khmer Rouge. They had repudiated the electoral process but failed to disrupt it with an effective military challenge.

Type
Chapter
Information
The New Interventionism, 1991–1994
United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia
, pp. 25 - 58
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1996

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  • Cambodia
  • Edited by James Mayall, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book: The New Interventionism, 1991–1994
  • Online publication: 15 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511559105.002
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  • Cambodia
  • Edited by James Mayall, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book: The New Interventionism, 1991–1994
  • Online publication: 15 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511559105.002
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Cambodia
  • Edited by James Mayall, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book: The New Interventionism, 1991–1994
  • Online publication: 15 January 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511559105.002
Available formats
×