Just as restrictionist fervor had begun to wane in 2012, a countertrend was beginning to emerge, and a growing number of states began passing pro-integration legislation. This development did not emerge out of nowhere. Indeed, it owed its origins in some important ways to the prior restrictive movement, as various state-based groups battled restrictive efforts, both at the legislative stage through lobbying and coalition-building efforts and at the implementation stage through lawsuits. Many of these same state and local groups had also been gaining political skills and legal experience in confronting federal enforcement, from persuading the Obama administration to slow down its record pace of deportations and, when those strategies failed, exploring ways to legally resist them.

And yet, 2012 represented a dramatic shift in the balance of power between pro-immigrant and restrictive forces at the subfederal level. While previously, many pro-immigrant groups had been playing defense, battling what they considered to be very harmful legislation and administrative action, these same groups now began to play offense, working across jurisdictions and in partnership with national actors to turn the tide toward pro-immigrant legislation. This development was significant in and of itself: as late as 2008 and 2009, the major national immigrant advocacy organizations had thought of federal legislation and litigation as the best way to deal with the spate of restrictive laws at the state and local level. This strategy seemed to be the most efficient since it relied on the hope of federal preemption, either by passing congressional legislation or by getting federal courts to beat back the growing reach of restrictive state and local laws. It was a high-risk strategy and one that counseled patience: the political opportunities had to be aligned in order for preemptive legislation to pass, and advocates would have to wait months or years for cases to wend their way through federal courts, with considerable uncertainty over the ultimate outcome (the Supreme Court's decision in Whiting, for example, was far from reassuring).

After the failure of the DREAM Act in 2010, however, even those national advocacy groups primarily focused on comprehensive immigration reform began to recognize the near-term futility of federal legislative efforts. They also began to see state legislation as an opportunity to push for pro-immigrant policies, and to coordinate efforts across jurisdictions.