Neurolaw and Responsibility for Action - Title page

pp iii-iii

Copyright page

pp iv-iv

Contents

pp v-vi

Figures

pp vii-vii

Contributors

pp viii-x

Introduction

pp 1-8

Part I - Conceptual Disputes

pp 9-140

1 - Neuroscience and the Explanation of Human Action

pp 11-27

2 - “Nothing but a Pack of Neurons”: The Moral Responsibility of the Human Machine

pp 28-70

3 - Non-Eliminative Reductionism: Not the Theory of Mind Some Responsibility Theorists Want, but the One They Need

pp 71-103

4 - Intention as Non-Observational Knowledge: Rescuing Responsibility from the Brain

pp 104-123

5 - Efficient Causation and Neuroscientific Explanations of Criminal Action

pp 124-140

Part II - Epistemic Disputes

pp 141-192

6 - Lying, Deception, and fMRI: A Critical Update

pp 143-159

7 - Brain-Based Lie Detection and the Mereological Fallacy: Reasons for Optimism

pp 160-181

8 - Is Brain Reading Mind Reading?

pp 182-192

Part III - Implications for Courts and Defendants

pp 193-263

9 - Unlucky, Bad, and the Space in Between: Why Criminologists Should Think More about Responsibility

pp 195-209

10 - Neuroscience and the Criminal Jurisdiction: A New Approach to Reliability and Admissibility in the Courts of England and Wales

pp 210-227

11 - Should Individuals with Psychopathy Be Compensated for Their Fearlessness? (Or How Neuroscience Matters for Equality)

pp 228-243

12 - The Treatment of Psychopathy: Conceptual and Ethical Issues

pp 244-263

Appendix

pp 264-266

Bibliography

pp 267-290

Index

pp 291-302