This book is motivated by a substantive question: Under what conditions can politicians from different ethnic groups agree to share power? This is a question that must be addressed if we believe that interethnic cooperation is needed for democracy to survive in multiethnic polities. The answer, however, is not obvious. The violent breakdown of democracy can be readily attributed to enduring ethnic antagonisms or irreconcilable ethnic preferences. A popular book on the subject is unequivocal in stating that “the global spread of markets and democracy is a principal, aggravating cause of group hatred and ethnic violence throughout the non-Western world” (Chua 2004, 9). Journalistic accounts routinely pass off election crises in African countries as the product of “atavistic tribal rivalry,” as in Côte d’Ivoire, “an atavistic vein of tribal tension,” as in Kenya, or to “murderous ethnic rivalries,” as in Madagascar.

While it may seem intuitive that groups fearing an uncertain political future might resort to extraconstitutional means to pursue their collective interests, the recent findings from political science on the relationship between ethnic mobilization and democratic consolidation are ambiguous. Scholars have shown that ethnic identities, when interacting with democratic institutions, can result in a wide range of political strategies (Chandra 2004b; Ferree 2010; Posner 2005). Some studies show that political violence is more likely to occur with the initial democratization of multiethnic states (Ellingsen 2000; Mousseau 2001), while others find that ethnic-based parties can help to stabilize multiethnic democracies (Birnir 2007; Chandra 2004a).