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5 - Moral realism and non-naturalism

Andrew Fisher
Andrew Fisher
Affiliation:
University of Nottingham
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Summary

Good is indefinable not for the reasons offered by Moore's successors, but because of the infinite difficulty of the task of apprehending a magnetic but inexhaustible reality.

(Murdoch 1970: 42)

Non-naturalism has a musty reputation, redolent of Oxbridge dons delivering the opinions of the “best and most enlightened of men” who perceive goodness just as mortals perceive yellowness … In histories, it is noted chiefly as the theory so unacceptable that it inspired the non-cognitivists.

(Shaver 2007: 283)

CHAPTER AIMS

  • To explain the attractions of combining non-naturalism and moral realism.

  • To outline two non-naturalist realist positions.

  • To discuss the difficulties involved in demarcating naturalism from non-naturalism.

Introduction

As we discussed in the previous chapter, realism claims that:

  • Moral judgements express beliefs that describe the world, and consequently moral judgements can be true or false (cognitivism).

  • Moral judgements are sometimes true and are so in virtue of features of the world.

  • The truth of moral judgements is not decided by how individuals, groups or societies think; for example, it is possible for everyone to be mistaken in their moral judgements.

The realism of this chapter differs from that of the Chapter 4 because it claims that the features that make moral claims true are not natural features but rather they are non-natural.

Type
Chapter
Information
Metaethics
An Introduction
 , pp. 73 - 90
Publisher: Acumen Publishing
Print publication year: 2011

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