Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-c4f8m Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-23T17:09:58.391Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

1 - Competition policy and game-theory: reflections based on the cement industry case

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 September 2009

George Norman
Affiliation:
Tufts University, Massachusetts
Jacques-François Thisse
Affiliation:
Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium
Get access

Summary

Introduction

Is the main objective of competition policy the maintenance of competition per se or the promotion of economic efficiency? These two goals do not necessarily have the same basis or the same implications. The goal of maintaining competition per se can be justified morally, politically and legally by the wish to protect individual freedom and rights, and by limiting the power of agents. This faith in the democratic virtues of interacting competitive forces is grounded in a political philosophy which sees regulatory mechanisms resulting from impersonal market forces as a guarantee against the arbitrariness of authority, whether public or private. In this sense, competition is a right which warrants protection. Economically, competition is not considered as an end in itself but rather as a mechanism for allocating resources which in many, if not all cases, promotes economic efficiency. The question the economist has then to answer is whether or not, depending on the circumstances, competition promotes the reduction of costs, the selection of the most efficient businesses, the welfare of consumers, the creation of new products, the entry of new enterprises, the development of technological progress and innovation and so on.

To what extent do these two goals of competition policy overlap? Before setting out our framework to formulate an answer to this question, let us introduce the basic issues.

Type
Chapter
Information
Market Structure and Competition Policy
Game-Theoretic Approaches
, pp. 9 - 30
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2000

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×