This is the second of two chapters dealing with public good problems. The main point is that free rider problems can block employee buyouts of capitalist firms, even when a labor-managed firm would have higher productivity. This can occur because the productivity benefits from an employee buyout are uncertain and are spread broadly across the workforce. Accordingly, it is difficult for an individual agent or a small group to capture these benefits. Individual employees can invest time, effort, and money in an attempt to determine whether conversion to an LMF would be profitable, but in a Nash equilibrium the effort devoted to this purpose is too small relative to the level that would maximize aggregate surplus. Therefore the frequency of employee buyouts is too low. Due to alienability factors, there is no parallel free rider problem for investor takeovers of LMFs. A wealthy investor has sufficient private incentive to make the expenditures required in order to determine whether a conversion of an LMF into a capitalist firm would be profitable. These asymmetries with respect to firm conversion may help to explain why LMFs are rare.