In the aftermath of Caporetto things did not look good for Italy. The army had lost hundreds of thousands of men and vast amounts of weaponry and equipment, all of which would have to be replaced if the country was to keep its war going. Wild stories of moral collapse abounded, encouraging dark speculations about social disintegration and even revolution. Recovery was the first priority. Many things contributed to the revival of Italian arms during the first six months of 1918, among them Allied military and economic assistance, the effects of a long war of attrition which was now wearing down Austria–Hungary faster than Italy, and Germany’s preoccupation with winning the war on the western front. All this gave Italy time, which she used to good effect. For twenty-nine months the war had been run by a Piedmontese general in the Piedmontese way. What now happened was revolution in military affairs, invisible to outsiders. For decades southern generals had had the reputation of being political soldiers first and foremost. Now the war was handed over to one of them. Diaz proved to be just the man the country needed. Under his guiding hand the Italian army was rebuilt on new foundations, strategy was forged to fit it, and policy shaped and timed by military practicalities.