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Epilogue

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 July 2015

John Hagan
Affiliation:
Northwestern University, Illinois
Joshua Kaiser
Affiliation:
Northwestern University, Illinois
Anna Hanson
Affiliation:
Northwestern University, Illinois
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Summary

President Barak Obama brought Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to the White House in December 2011 to mark the withdrawal of American combat troops from Iraq. The president optimistically observed that “the prime minister leads Iraq's most inclusive government yet,” and that “violence remains at record lows.” Less than two years later, with violence spiking to levels not seen since 2008, the prime minister returned to Washington to ask for Apache helicopter gunships with Hellfire missiles and F-16 fighter jets. When ISIS swept into Mosul in June 2014 – targeting prisons, freeing and recruiting thousands of detainees and inmates, robbing bank vaults, and targeting genocidal attacks on selected groups – al-Maliki urgently requested more help. However, the Obama administration opted for a change of leadership.

As strategically violent and tactically disciplined as ISIS had become by 2014, it was even more apparent when Mosul changed hands how hapless the U.S.-trained Iraqi Army was as a fighting force. Iraq's Shia-dominated army was ill prepared and badly supplied, with many units simply collapsing and abandoning the battlefield. Yet ISIS could not have so easily succeeded without the acquiescence and assistance of the Arab Sunni population and the support of local militias, many of whom previously were paid by the coalition to fight al-Qaeda in Iraq insurgents during the surge and Awakening period. Local support included remnants of Saddam's Republican Guard, now known as the Naqshbandia Order and reputedly led by Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, a high-ranking general under Saddam (the “king of clubs” in the deck of cards American troops used to identify Saddam's henchmen). These former Ba'athists had strong roots in local Arab Sunni communities, which ISIS fighters often lacked.

By 2014, local Sunni groups were motivated to assist ISIS in wresting control from al-Maliki's Shia-dominated central government. The new, more disciplined tactics of ISIS included downplaying restrictions and punishments of Sharia law among local Sunnis. This facilitated near-term alliances focused on regaining local control and expelling the Iraqi Army and Police.

Type
Chapter
Information
Iraq and the Crimes of Aggressive War
The Legal Cynicism of Criminal Militarism
, pp. 192 - 206
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2015

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  • Epilogue
  • John Hagan, Northwestern University, Illinois, Joshua Kaiser, Northwestern University, Illinois, Anna Hanson, Northwestern University, Illinois
  • Book: Iraq and the Crimes of Aggressive War
  • Online publication: 05 July 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316221693.008
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  • Epilogue
  • John Hagan, Northwestern University, Illinois, Joshua Kaiser, Northwestern University, Illinois, Anna Hanson, Northwestern University, Illinois
  • Book: Iraq and the Crimes of Aggressive War
  • Online publication: 05 July 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316221693.008
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Epilogue
  • John Hagan, Northwestern University, Illinois, Joshua Kaiser, Northwestern University, Illinois, Anna Hanson, Northwestern University, Illinois
  • Book: Iraq and the Crimes of Aggressive War
  • Online publication: 05 July 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316221693.008
Available formats
×