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7 - How should the IMF view capital controls?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 December 2009

Gregor Irwin
Affiliation:
Economic Advisor, HM Treasury
Christopher L. Gilbert
Affiliation:
Professor of Finance in the Department of Finance, Vrije University, Amsterdam; Professor of Econometrics, Università degli Studi di Trento; Fellow, Tinbergen Institute
David Vines
Affiliation:
Professor of Economics, Oxford University; Professor of Economics, Australian National University; Research Fellow, CEPR
David Vines
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
Christopher L. Gilbert
Affiliation:
Universiteit van Amsterdam
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Summary

Introduction

This chapter is a substantially revised version of Gilbert, Irwin and Vines (2001) in which the focus is on the implications of capital account liberalisation for the poorest developing countries.

The articles of agreement of the IMF, first drafted in 1945, include among their primary purposes the achievement of current account convertibility and trade liberalisation. In April 1997, the IMF announced its intention to alter its articles of agreement to widen its mandate to include capital account liberalisation. Since then a succession of financial and currency crises worldwide have led some to call into question the desirability of free international capital mobility and to advocate restrictions on capital flows (Rodrik, 1998). In this chapter, we assess how the IMF should view capital controls.

First, we discuss the extent to which countries should move towards capital account liberalisation. The focus is on developing countries as full capital account convertibility already exists in the developed countries. Our argument – in line with the climate of opinion since the crises in East Asia and elsewhere – is one in favour of caution. The reasons are partly sequencing (or ‘second-best’) ones, and partly that liberalisation can increase the vulnerability to financial crisis. Second, we discuss what role the IMF should play in facilitating the policy and institutional development identified in the first part of this chapter as necessary for the successful liberalisation of the capital account.

Type
Chapter
Information
The IMF and its Critics
Reform of Global Financial Architecture
, pp. 181 - 206
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

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  • How should the IMF view capital controls?
    • By Gregor Irwin, Economic Advisor, HM Treasury, Christopher L. Gilbert, Professor of Finance in the Department of Finance, Vrije University, Amsterdam; Professor of Econometrics, Università degli Studi di Trento; Fellow, Tinbergen Institute, David Vines, Professor of Economics, Oxford University; Professor of Economics, Australian National University; Research Fellow, CEPR
  • Edited by David Vines, University of Oxford, Christopher L. Gilbert, Universiteit van Amsterdam
  • Book: The IMF and its Critics
  • Online publication: 04 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511493362.008
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  • How should the IMF view capital controls?
    • By Gregor Irwin, Economic Advisor, HM Treasury, Christopher L. Gilbert, Professor of Finance in the Department of Finance, Vrije University, Amsterdam; Professor of Econometrics, Università degli Studi di Trento; Fellow, Tinbergen Institute, David Vines, Professor of Economics, Oxford University; Professor of Economics, Australian National University; Research Fellow, CEPR
  • Edited by David Vines, University of Oxford, Christopher L. Gilbert, Universiteit van Amsterdam
  • Book: The IMF and its Critics
  • Online publication: 04 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511493362.008
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • How should the IMF view capital controls?
    • By Gregor Irwin, Economic Advisor, HM Treasury, Christopher L. Gilbert, Professor of Finance in the Department of Finance, Vrije University, Amsterdam; Professor of Econometrics, Università degli Studi di Trento; Fellow, Tinbergen Institute, David Vines, Professor of Economics, Oxford University; Professor of Economics, Australian National University; Research Fellow, CEPR
  • Edited by David Vines, University of Oxford, Christopher L. Gilbert, Universiteit van Amsterdam
  • Book: The IMF and its Critics
  • Online publication: 04 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511493362.008
Available formats
×