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7 - British decisions for peace and war 1938–1939: the rise and fall of realism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

By
Zara Steiner
Edited by
Ernest R. May ,
Richard Rosecrance  and
Zara Steiner
Ernest R. May
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Massachusetts
Richard Rosecrance
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Massachusetts
Zara Steiner
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
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Summary

For many years, the dominant approach to the study of international relations has been that of structural realism. Because this theory has such a long pedigree, there is a great divergence of views among those who call themselves or are called “realists” or “neorealists.” In order to give shape to this chapter, I have arbitrarily selected what I consider to be the main features of the realist case, knowing that many variants of the model exist. Realists begin with the assumption that states live in an anarchical international environment where there is no authority above that of the state. As a result, great powers, usually the focus of realist theorists, must rely on “self-help” to survive. They seek to maximize their power as against other states, though occasionally they will try to achieve absolute power without regard to the other players in the system. States which try to increase their power necessarily make other states feel more insecure and they will respond by adopting strategies to enhance their chances of survival. Structural realists or defensive realists, following Kenneth Waltz, argue that when great powers act aggressively, their would-be victims try to balance against the aggressor and check its threat to their survival. The anarchical conditions of the international life encourage states to behave defensively so that they can protect themselves and try to maintain their power positions.

Type
Chapter
Information
History and Neorealism , pp. 129 - 154
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

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