Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-qsmjn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-24T00:36:06.153Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

8 - Submarine warfare: The great gamble, 1917–18

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2014

Lawrence Sondhaus
Affiliation:
University of Indianapolis
Get access

Summary

On July 29 of the war’s last year, at the railway station in Elberfeld, near Wuppertal on the fringe of the Ruhr, two German submarine officers exchanged farewells after spending two days with friends on leave. They had entered the navy in 1910 and had been Naval School classmates; now, aged twenty-six, both were veterans of four years of war and held the rank of Oberleutnant. As they parted ways, Hans Jochen Emsmann boarded a train for occupied Flanders and a U-boat command at Zeebrugge, while his friend on the platform, Martin Niemöller, would soon return to the Adriatic and his own U-boat command at Pola. The disastrous, irreversible breakdown of Germany’s Western front at Amiens – on what Ludendorff called “the black day of the German army” – was still a week and a half away, but both Emsmann and Niemöller had experienced enough to know that the prospects for victory were no longer very good, even though U-boats had sunk nearly 8 million tons of Allied shipping in the eighteen months since the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. At the close of what Niemöller remembered as “a serious talk about the general situation,” Emsmann’s mood suddenly shifted to an exculpatory light-heartedness: “If the war is lost, it will certainly not be due to anything you and I have done!” he assured his friend.

Emsmann died three months later, when his U 116 sank with all hands on a suicidal attempt to infiltrate the harbor at Scapa Flow in the war’s last days. Niemöller died in 1984 at the age of ninety-two, after becoming more famous for his second career as a Protestant pastor and survivor of eight years’ imprisonment in concentration camps for his principled condemnation of Nazi Aryan racism. Through all that came afterward, Emsmann’s words remained with him, and for Niemöller, ever the patriotic German, they rang true. But the irony, for Germany, was that they and other U-boat commanders did their duty all too well. The war, indeed, would be lost, with the intervention of the United States and its massive reservoir of fresh manpower the key to the Allied victory. At the Armistice, 1.4 million American troops stood on the Western front, where their numbers had long since exceeded the French and, in the war’s last days, grew to surpass the total number of British and Imperial troops.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Great War at Sea
A Naval History of the First World War
, pp. 241 - 277
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2014

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Ludendorff, Erich, Ludendorff’s Own Story, 2 vols. (New York: Harper, 1919), vol. 2, p. 20Google Scholar
Osborne, Eric W., Britain’s Economic Blockade of Germany, 1914–1919 (London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 127–145CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Allen, Keith, “Food and the German Home Front: Evidence from Berlin,” in Braybon, Gail (ed.), Evidence, History and the Great War: Historians and the Impact of 1914–18 (New York: Berghahn, 2003), pp. 172–197Google Scholar
Black, Nicholas, The British Naval Staff in the First World War (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2009), p. 2Google Scholar
Boghardt, Thomas, The Zimmermann Telegram: Intelligence, Diplomacy, and America’s Entry into World War I (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012)Google Scholar
Jones, Jerry W., U.S. Battleship Operations in World War I (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), pp. 3Google Scholar
Morison, Elting E., Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1942), pp. 280Google Scholar
Bayly, Lewis, Pull Together! The Memoirs of Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly (London: George G. Harrap, 1939), p. 62Google Scholar
Sims, William Snowden, The Victory at Sea, with Hendrick, Burton J. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page, 1920), pp. 9–11Google Scholar
Corbett, Julian Stafford, Some Principles of Naval Strategy (London: Longmans, Green, 1911), pp. 261–279Google Scholar
George, Lloyd, War Memoirs, 6 vols. (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1933–37), vol. 3, pp. 105–107Google Scholar
Hughes, Thomas, “Learning to Fight: Bill Halsey and the Early American Destroyer Force,” Journal of Military History, 77(1) (January 2013): 83–84Google Scholar
Delany, Walter S., Bayly’s Navy (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Foundation, 1980), p. 12Google Scholar
United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation: Hearings Before the Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, Sixty-fifth Congress, Second [and Third] Session, on S.Res. 170 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1918), Pt 3, pp. 56–57
Ayres, Leonard P., War with Germany: A Statistical Summary (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1919)Google Scholar
McKee, Fraser M., “An Explosive Story: The Rise and Fall of the Depth Charge,” Northern Mariner, 3 (1993): 49–50Google Scholar
Abbatiello, John J., Anti-Submarine Warfare in World War I: British Naval Aviation and the Defeat of the U-Boats (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 1–3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Halpern, Paul G., The Battle of the Otranto Straits: Controlling the Gateway to the Adriatic in World War I (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004)Google Scholar
Daniels, Josephus, Our Navy at War (New York: George H. Dolan, 1922), p. 146Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×