Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- Part I Background
- Part II The Nazi system
- Part III Background for war
- Part IV World War II
- 12 German diplomacy toward the Soviet Union
- 13 The Nazi–Soviet pacts of 1939: A half century later
- 14 From confrontation to cooperation: Germany and the United States, 1917–1949
- 15 Pearl Harbor: The German perspective
- 16 Global conflict: The interaction between the European and Pacific theaters of war in World War II
- 17 The “Final Solution” and the war in 1943
- 18 July 20, 1944: The German resistance to Hitler
- 19 D-Day after fifty years: Assessments of costs and benefits
- 20 German plans for victory, 1944–1945
- 21 Reflections on running a war: Hitler, Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt, Tojo
- 22 Some thoughts on World War II
- 23 A new Germany in a new world
- Appendix: the end of Ranke's history? Reflections on the fate of history in the twentieth century
- Index
15 - Pearl Harbor: The German perspective
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- Part I Background
- Part II The Nazi system
- Part III Background for war
- Part IV World War II
- 12 German diplomacy toward the Soviet Union
- 13 The Nazi–Soviet pacts of 1939: A half century later
- 14 From confrontation to cooperation: Germany and the United States, 1917–1949
- 15 Pearl Harbor: The German perspective
- 16 Global conflict: The interaction between the European and Pacific theaters of war in World War II
- 17 The “Final Solution” and the war in 1943
- 18 July 20, 1944: The German resistance to Hitler
- 19 D-Day after fifty years: Assessments of costs and benefits
- 20 German plans for victory, 1944–1945
- 21 Reflections on running a war: Hitler, Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt, Tojo
- 22 Some thoughts on World War II
- 23 A new Germany in a new world
- Appendix: the end of Ranke's history? Reflections on the fate of history in the twentieth century
- Index
Summary
When news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor reached Germany, that nation's leadership was absorbed by the crisis in its war with the Soviet Union, begun by the German attack earlier that year. In view of a serious defeat administered to the German forces by the Red Army at the southern end of the front, Adolf Hitler had relieved the commander-inchief of the German army group fighting there, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, on December 1 and flew to the army group and army headquarters in the southern Ukraine on December 2. Late on December 3, he flew back to his headquarters in East Prussia, only to be greeted by more bad news: the German army group at the northern end of the main front was also being pushed back by Red Army counterattacks; and, most ominous of all, the German offensive in the center toward Moscow was not only exhausted but was itself in danger of being overwhelmed by a Soviet counteroffensive of which the first major effects were beginning to be noted in German headquarters on December 5 and 6. Not yet recognizing the extent of the defeat at the front, and imagining that there would merely be a temporary halt in German offensive operations, Hitler and the German Army Chief of Staff, General Franz Haider, as well as the head of operations in the high command of the armed forces, General Alfred Jodl, prepared a general directive for winter operations which was signed by Hitler, issued on December 8, and quickly overtaken by the reality of Red Army victories on the Eastern Front.
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- Germany, Hitler, and World War IIEssays in Modern German and World History, pp. 194 - 204Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1995
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