Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- Part I Background
- Part II The Nazi system
- Part III Background for war
- 6 Hitler and England, 1933–1945: Pretense and reality
- 7 German foreign policy and Austria
- 8 Germany, Munich, and appeasement
- 9 A proposed compromise over Danzig in 1939?
- 10 The German generals and the outbreak of war, 1938–1939
- 11 Hitler's decision for war
- Part IV World War II
- Appendix: the end of Ranke's history? Reflections on the fate of history in the twentieth century
- Index
6 - Hitler and England, 1933–1945: Pretense and reality
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- Part I Background
- Part II The Nazi system
- Part III Background for war
- 6 Hitler and England, 1933–1945: Pretense and reality
- 7 German foreign policy and Austria
- 8 Germany, Munich, and appeasement
- 9 A proposed compromise over Danzig in 1939?
- 10 The German generals and the outbreak of war, 1938–1939
- 11 Hitler's decision for war
- Part IV World War II
- Appendix: the end of Ranke's history? Reflections on the fate of history in the twentieth century
- Index
Summary
A subject of continuing interest in analyses of the origins and conduct of World War II is the policy of Germany toward England. It has been asserted time and again that Adolf Hitler and his government wanted good relations with Britain, preferred to avoid war with that nation, and, once war had started, were very interested in returning to peaceful relations. This picture is, in my judgment, largely mistaken, and ought to be subjected to a new examination.
The thesis of German desire for good relations with England is based on a number of events and arguments; a few of the most frequently mentioned will be examined here. It is obviously appropriate to exclude those published as Hitler's own views in a diary which turned out to be a forgery, but even some more substantial ones which are often cited by reputable scholars look rather dubious on closer inspection. The four which will be reviewed are the Anglo–German Naval Agreement of 1935, the mission of Joachim von Ribbentrop to London in 1936, the socalled alliance offer to England of August 25, 1939, and the scene in Berlin when Hitler learned of Britain's intention to declare war in 1939.
The Anglo–German Naval Agreement of 1935 is often mentioned as evidence that Hitler had indeed decided to forgo the challenge to British naval power which had poisoned Anglo–German relations before World War I. Whatever the British motives for this agreement, the German ones must be seen in the context of other German decisions in the same field and at that time.
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- Information
- Germany, Hitler, and World War IIEssays in Modern German and World History, pp. 85 - 94Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1995
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