Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-xtgtn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-19T23:18:17.967Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

4 - Bank Rate policy under the interwar gold standard

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 March 2010

Barry Eichengreen
Affiliation:
University of California, Berkeley
Get access

Summary

In truth, the gold standard is already a barbarous relic. All of us, from the Governor of the Bank of England downwards, are now primarily interested in preserving the stability of business, prices, and employment, and are not likely, when the choice is forced upon us, deliberately to sacrifice these to the outworn dogma, which had value once, of £3. 17s. 10½d. per ounce.

J. M. KEYNES (1923), p. 172

The classical gold standard occupies an almost mystical position in the literature of international finance. In popular accounts the gold standard is portrayed as a remarkably durable and efficient mechanism for achieving price and exchange rate stability and for relieving balance of payments pressures. The system's resilience is attributed to the willingness of national monetary authorities to refrain from impeding the international adjustment process. When central banks intervened in financial markets, it is said, they did so mechanically, obeying ‘rules of the game’ which dictated that they reinforce the impact on domestic money and credit of changing balance of payments conditions.

Succeeding generations of economists and historians have sought to qualify this popular view. The recent contributions of Bordo (1981) and Cooper (1982) provide a critical assessment of extravagant claims concerning price and exchange rate stability under the classical gold standard. Other authors have extended the research of Bloomfield (1959), Ford (1962), and Triffin (1964), who emphasized the special conditions that permitted the classical gold standard's smooth operation and cast doubt on the tendency of national monetary authorities to adhere faithfully to ‘rules of the game.’

Type
Chapter
Information
Elusive Stability
Essays in the History of International Finance, 1919–1939
, pp. 57 - 82
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1990

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×