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10 - Knowledge, Trust, and International Reasoning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Samuel L. Popkin
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
Michael A. Dimock
Affiliation:
North Carolina State University
Arthur Lupia
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
Mathew D. McCubbins
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
Samuel L. Popkin
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
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Summary

This essay challenges the argument that most citizens are susceptible to elite and media manipulation because they are too uninformed to reason about public policy. We challenge the view that citizens rarely engage in reasoning about public policy, and thus are moved mainly by media and elite influences (Bennett 1988; Converse 1964; Price and Zaller 1993; Zaller 1992). Such an argument views citizens as having nothing resembling “true” opinions on issues of public policy. When faced with opinion questions on a survey, respondents merely answer mechanically from the “top of their head” without thinking, reasoning, or deliberating (Zaller 1992: 45; Zaller and Feldman 1992).

A citizen's defense against elite and media influence and manipulation is what Converse (1964) called “constraint”: People reject elite and media arguments that are inconsistent with their ideological or partisan predispositions. Unfortunately, however, only a small minority are viewed as sufficiently attentive and informed to recognize whether the messages are consistent or inconsistent with their partisan and ideological (liberal-conservative) leanings. Such cues fly over the head of most other people, and as Zaller (1992: 311) states:

Many citizens … pay too little attention to public affairs to be able to respond critically to the political communications they encounter; rather, they are blown about by whatever current of information manages to develop the greatest intensity. The minority of citizens who are highly attentive to public affairs are scarcely more critical: They respond to new issues mainly on the basis of the partisanship and ideology of the elite sources of the messages.

Type
Chapter
Information
Elements of Reason
Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality
, pp. 214 - 238
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2000

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